公共选择的规则：困难与超越

发布时间：2018-10-31 08:08

【摘要】：公共选择理论中的投票规则问题，尤其是简单多数规则中的选举悖论(Condorcet悖论)是近些年来争论很多的领域。本文研究的目的就是讨论简单多数规则的性质；分析选举悖论的成因、悖论造成的影响、以及如何超越这一悖论。本文讨论的方法、框架、成果如下。首先，讨论一致同意规则与简单多数规则的性质比较。在本文中，笔者首次将这一性质比较应用于对宪政理论中的先定约束问题的讨论。其次，讨论简单多数规则下选举悖论的成因。在这里，笔者应用古典概率的理论分析了双峰偏好与选举悖论在3×3模型中的充分性关系。作为一个必然的结果，笔者计算了选举悖论在3×3模型中出现的概率。第三，笔者讨论了用其它规则替换Condorcet规则的问题。并结合基数效用论与序数效用论的分析，从若干例证的讨论中印证了博尔达(Berda)规则的内在矛盾。最后，笔者回顾了学术界近几十年来对阿罗(Arrow)不可能定理的研究，试图放松该定理的公设条件的伦理要求。笔者从规范研究中得到的观点是：一个缺失了传递性的投票规则，只要能保证公正性，在伦理上是可以接受的。
[Abstract]:The problem of voting rules in the theory of public choice, especially the election paradox (Condorcet paradox) in the simple majority rule, is a controversial field in recent years. The purpose of this study is to discuss the nature of the simple majority rule, to analyze the causes of the electoral paradox, the effects of the paradox, and how to overcome the paradox. The methods, frameworks and results discussed in this paper are as follows. First, the properties of the consensus rule and the simple majority rule are discussed. In this paper, for the first time, the author applies this property to the discussion of predefined constraints in constitutional theory. Secondly, the causes of the electoral paradox under the simple majority rule are discussed. Here, the author applies the classical probability theory to analyze the adequacy relationship between the bimodal preference and the election paradox in the 3 脳 3 model. As an inevitable result, the probability of election paradox in 3 脳 3 model is calculated. Thirdly, the author discusses the replacement of Condorcet rules with other rules. Based on the analysis of cardinality utility theory and ordinal utility theory, this paper proves the inherent contradiction of Borda (Berda) rule from the discussion of several examples. Finally, the author reviews the research of Arrow (Arrow) impossibility theorem in recent decades, and tries to relax the ethical requirements of the postulate conditions of the theorem. The author draws a conclusion from the normative study that a voting rule without transitivity can be accepted ethically as long as fairness is guaranteed.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.6

【共引文献】