配额初始分配对跨期碳市场效率的影响研究

发布时间：2018-11-07 15:15

【摘要】：碳配额初始分配是碳市场建设与运行的关键环节之一.考察配额初始分配对跨期碳市场效率影响,深刻理解初始分配与储存及借贷间的作用机理,有助于充分发挥二者协同作用,提高跨期碳市场效率.本研究构建了考虑配额分配的两期碳市场效率模型,考察了初始分配对无储存和借贷、单独储存及储存借贷混合三种机制下的跨期碳市场效率影响.理论分析和数值模拟结果表明:无储存和借贷机制下的跨期碳市场有效性严格依赖于初始分配,当初始分配有效,跨期碳市场有效,否则无效.当首期初始配额充足时,单独储存机制下的跨期碳市场有效,跨期均衡价格满足Hotelling规则.当首期初始配额不足时,单独储存机制下的跨期碳市场无效,且第一期价格大于第二期贴现价格.储存借贷混合机制下的跨期碳市场配置有效,跨期均衡价格满足Hotelling规则,且其有效性与初始分配无关.
[Abstract]:The initial allocation of carbon quota is one of the key links in the construction and operation of carbon market. By investigating the effect of quota initial allocation on the efficiency of intertemporal carbon market, we can deeply understand the mechanism of initial allocation, storage and loan, which is helpful to give full play to the synergistic effect of the two and to improve the efficiency of intertemporal carbon market. In this study, a two-period carbon market efficiency model considering quota allocation is constructed, and the effect of initial allocation on intertemporal carbon market efficiency under the three mechanisms of no storage and loan, separate storage and storage loan is investigated. The results of theoretical analysis and numerical simulation show that the effectiveness of the intertemporal carbon market with no storage and borrowing mechanism depends strictly on the initial allocation. When the initial allocation is effective, the cross-period carbon market is effective, otherwise it will not be effective. When the initial quota of the first period is sufficient, the cross-period carbon market under the individual storage mechanism is effective, and the cross-period equilibrium price meets the Hotelling rule. When the initial quota for the first period is insufficient, the cross-period carbon market under the separate storage mechanism is ineffective, and the price of the first period is larger than the discount price of the second period. The cross-period carbon market allocation is efficient under the hybrid mechanism of storage and lending, and the cross-term equilibrium price meets the Hotelling rule, and its efficiency is independent of the initial allocation.
【作者单位】：桂林电子科技大学商学院;暨南大学;湖南大学经济与贸易学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71771105,71473180,71201010) 国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDA054,16ZZD049) 广东省自然科学基金杰出青年项目(2014A030306031) 青年珠江学者(粤教师[2016]95)~~
【分类号】：F224;X196

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