股权性质、非效率投资与企业价值影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-03 02:18

本文关键词：股权性质、非效率投资与企业价值影响研究　出处：《山东大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资活动、筹资活动与股利分配活动并称为现代公司理财活动的三大核心内容。其中,投资活动作为企业获取未来现金流量增长和实现企业成长的主要动因,间接影响到其他两大核心决策,通过评价投资决策的效率和效果,理财人员可以全面了解到企业现金流量的动向以及企业价值的创造。现实世界中,企业普遍面临不对称信息带来的“融资困境”及“债务悬横”。同时,管理层出于增加报酬和证明自身的需要会不断扩大企业规模,超出了企业的实际投资需要。加之职业经理人本身就存在偷懒和谋取私利的动机,投资决策背后隐藏着深刻的道德风险,本文首先假设我国企业普遍存在非效率投资。在我国,国有企业兼具“双重身份”—享受着来自政策扶持的同时,也承担着政治干预下的“效率损失”。此外,国企领导人众多的“政治关联”及地方政府的过度干预也会对企业的投资决策产生不利影响,随之假设国家股权性质与企业价值负向相关。根据Wooldridge(1988)的研究,当企业披露购买厂房设备、新产品引进或增加研发支出消息时,股票价格一般会上升。本文认为,企业投资消息是“利好”的反映,能够引发众多投资者们的“羊群行为”,构成正能量循环的开始。相反,投资不足的企业为走出困境发出的融资信号向外传递了负能量,导致投资者们“信心”下降,导致企业长期处于一种投资缺乏、融资困难、市场信心较低的状态,最终造成企业价值的下降。本文假设投资过度能够促进企业价值的提升,投资不足则与企业价值呈负相关关系。国有企业因其雄厚的资金背景和政策关注支持,导致市场对其宣布的信号更有信心(林娜,2011)。在上述两种情况下,企业的一切决策行为—包括投资决策,会更加迅速的体现在企业价值上,于是本文假设对于投资效率与企业价值的作用,在国有企业会表现地更加强烈。在实证部分,本文借鉴La Porta(2002)对股权性质的“终极控制人”划分标准,将我国的上市公司分为“国有”股权性质与“非国有”股权性质两个大类,同时按照Richardson(2006)非效率投资的测量模型,依据“投资过度”与“投资不足”两类对中国上市公司的非效率投资程度进行了反映。进一步,选取我国A股上市公司主板市场2007-2012年的数据加以整理筛选,以股权性质和非效率投资(投资过度与投资不足)作为解释变量构建面板数据回归模型,根据数据分析的结果对本文提出的假设进行解释与验证,最终得出本文的研究结论：我国上市公司普遍存在非效率投资行为,并且投资过度程度更加严重；相比非国有股权性质,国有股权性质与企业价值呈负相关关系；投资过度的非效率投资行为与企业价值呈正相关关系,其程度在国有股权性质企业可能强于非国有股权性质企业；投资不足的非效率投资行为与企业价值呈负相关关系,其作用程度在国有股权性质企业可能强于非国有股权性质企业。最后,以本文理论分析结论和实证检验结果为依据,提出诸如转变政府职能、完善上市公司的投资决策机制、发挥外部监督以及改进国有企业管理人员考核标准等建议,同时分析了本研究的不足以及进一步研究的方向,以期为我国当前国有企业改革和实现企业资产的保值增值提供更多可行的建议。
[Abstract]:Investment activities, financing activities and dividend distribution activities and known as the three core financial activities of modern companies. Among them, the investment activities as the main motivation for enterprises to obtain the growth of future cash flow and achieve business growth, and indirectly affect the other two core decision-making, through efficiency and effect evaluation of investment decision-making, financial personnel can fully understand to create the trend of enterprise cash flow and enterprise value.
In the real world, enterprises generally face asymmetric information brings the "financing difficulties" and "debt overhang horizontal". At the same time, the management for increasing returns and prove their needs will continue to expand the scale of enterprises, beyond the actual needs of enterprises and investment managers. Occupation itself is lazy and seek personal motivation behind the investment decision hidden moral risk deeply. Firstly, the assumption that the Chinese enterprises are generally inefficient investment. In our country, state-owned enterprises with "dual identity" - enjoy from policy support at the same time, also bear the political intervention of the "efficiency". In addition, many of the leaders of the state-owned enterprises' political connection and local government the excessive intervention may also adversely affect the investment decision of enterprises, with the assumption of the nature of equity and enterprise value of national negative correlation. According to Wooldridge (1988) study, When the enterprise to disclose the purchase of plant and equipment, the introduction of new products or increase R & D spending news, stock prices will generally rise. This paper argues that enterprise investment news is "good" to reflect, caused many investors "herd behavior", which is the beginning of the energy cycle. On the contrary, the lack of investment in the enterprise financing signal out of the predicament from the outward transfer of negative energy, resulting in a decline in investors "confidence", resulting in a lack of long-term investment, corporate financing difficulties, market confidence is low, eventually leading to a decline in the value of the enterprise. This paper assumes that excessive investment can promote the enterprise value, the lack of investment is negatively correlated with the enterprise the value of the state-owned enterprises. Because of its strong financial background and policy concern support, leading to the market on the announcement signal more confidence (Lin Na, 2011). In the above two cases, enterprises All decision making actions, including investment decisions, will be reflected more rapidly in the enterprise value. Therefore, this paper assumes that the role of investment efficiency and corporate value will be more intense in state-owned enterprises.
In the empirical part, this paper uses La Porta (2002) of the equity nature of the ultimate controller division standard, will be China's listed companies are divided into state-owned and non state-owned equity property ownership "two categories, according to Richardson (2006) model of measuring the efficiency of investment, on the basis of the" investment excessive "and" insufficient investment "two kinds of Chinese listed company inefficient investment is reflected. Further, select the A listed company in China the main market 2007-2012 data collected by screening, the nature of equity and non efficiency investment (over investment and under investment) as explanatory variables to construct a panel data regression model in this paper according to the analysis results of the hypothesis to explain and verify the final conclusion of this article: China's listed companies generally have non efficiency investment behavior, and the degree of over investment More serious; compared with non state-owned equity nature, there was a negative correlation between the nature and the state-owned equity value is positively related to enterprise value; non efficiency investment behavior and corporate over investment, the degree may be stronger than that of non state-owned enterprises in the ownership nature of state-owned shares of enterprises; there was a negative correlation between the non efficiency investment behavior and insufficient investment value and the degree of the effect may be stronger than the non state-owned enterprises in the ownership of state-owned equity nature of the enterprise.
Finally, the conclusion and the empirical results of this paper is based on the theory, put forward such as the transformation of government functions, improve the investment decision-making mechanism of listed companies, and improve the standard of play to the external supervision management assessment of state-owned enterprises, and analyzes the shortcomings of this research and the direction of further research, in order to provide more practical advice for me in the current reform of state-owned enterprises and enterprises to realize the value of the assets.

【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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