民营高科技企业创始人控制权保护机制研究
发布时间：2018-08-23 13:43
【摘要】：从控制权的概念被提出以来,控制权配置问题就一直作为公司治理的核心议题被广泛关注。然而,尽管学者们一直致力于控制权研究,但是从现实角度来看,企业经营控制权在各利益相关者之间的有效配置问题仍然解决。在许多高科技公司中,控制权配置问题变得更加复杂。作为人力资本的重要持有者——创始人,如何维持适度的组织权力,防止控制权旁落,这也正是本文要讨论的核心议题。本研究在梳理了现有控制权相关研究成果和当前我国民营高科技企业创始人控制权配置特征的基础上,通过探索性案例研究,初步提出在外部制度和技术环境下,创始人如何利用自身资源维持公司控制权这一民营高科技企业创始人控制权保护机制。外部环境是制约组织内部主体资源分配和主体行为的基础,公司章程是控制权主体之间博弈的有效工具,关键性资源配置决定着控制权配置结构。为防止控制权旁落,创始人分别从财产性资源、关系性资源、知识性资源三方面保持自身的优势地位。本文采用了实证研究方法,选取2007-2012期间IPO的中国民营高科技上市公司作为研究样本,对上述民营高科技企业创始人控制权保护机制进行实证检验。实证研究证明:(1)民营高科技上市企业,创始人持股水平(财产性资源)越高,创始人控制权维持效果(IPO后创始人是否继续留任关键职位)越好;(2)民营高科技企业创始成员团队占董事会席位比例(关系性资源)越大,越有利于创始人留任关键职位;(3)在民营高科技企业中,学历(知识性资源)越高的创始人获取和维持控制权的概率越高;(4)在公司章程中累积投票制和绝大多数条款的设置在创始人资源与控制权关系中起正向调节作用。本文提出了在外部制度和技术环境约束下,创始人如何管理和利用自身资源维持控制权的民营高科技企业创始人控制权保护机制,丰富了公司治理和控制权理论及公司控制权配置模式的研究。从资源观视角出发,将影响企业生产的三大资本(即物质资本、社会资本和人力资本)一起纳入到企业控制权配置研究领域,在此基础上,进一步将企业权力资源区分为财产性资源、关系性资源和知识性资源三种类型,较为深入和全面地探讨了民营高科技企业创始人控制权保护路径。本研究弥补了传统契约理论的不足,同时,也对中国民营高科技企业的控制权配置问题提供参考路径。
[Abstract]:Since the concept of control was put forward, the allocation of control rights has been the core issue of corporate governance. However, although scholars have been devoting themselves to the study of control right, the problem of effective allocation of control rights among stakeholders is still solved from the practical point of view. In many high-tech companies, the allocation of control becomes more complicated. As an important holder of human capital, how to maintain moderate organizational power and prevent the fall of control right is the core issue to be discussed in this paper. On the basis of combing the existing research results of control rights and the characteristics of the allocation of the control rights of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in China, this study, through exploratory case studies, proposes that under the external system and the technological environment, How do founders use their own resources to maintain the protection mechanism of corporate control in private high-tech enterprises? The external environment is the basis of restricting the resource allocation and behavior of the main body within the organization. The articles of association is an effective tool for the game between the control bodies, and the allocation of the key resources determines the configuration structure of the control rights. In order to prevent the right of control from falling, the founders maintain their dominant position from three aspects: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources. This paper adopts the empirical research method, selects the Chinese private high-tech listed companies in the IPO period from 2007 to 2012 as the research sample, carries on the empirical test to the above private high-tech enterprise founder control protection mechanism. The empirical research proves that: (1) Private high-tech listed enterprises, the higher the level of founder holding shares (property resources), The better the effect of maintaining founder control (whether the founder will continue to hold the key post after IPO); (2) the larger the proportion of board seats (relational resources) of the founding members of private high-tech enterprises. The more favorable it is for founders to remain in key positions; (3) in private high-tech enterprises, The higher the education (knowledge resources), the higher the probability of obtaining and maintaining the control rights; (4) the cumulative voting system and the setting of most clauses in the articles of association play a positive role in the relationship between the founder resources and the control rights. Under the restriction of external system and technological environment, this paper puts forward the protection mechanism of the founder's right of control of the private high-tech enterprise how to manage and utilize his own resources to maintain the control right of the founder of the private high-tech enterprise. It enriches the theory of corporate governance and control rights and the research of corporate control allocation model. From the perspective of resource view, the three major capital (material capital, social capital and human capital) which affect the enterprise's production are brought into the field of corporate control rights allocation together, and on this basis, This paper further divides enterprise power resources into three types: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources, and probes into the path of protecting the right of control of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in depth and in an all-round way. This study makes up for the deficiency of the traditional contract theory and provides a reference for the allocation of the control rights of the private high-tech enterprises in China.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.44;F832.51
本文编号：2199245
[Abstract]:Since the concept of control was put forward, the allocation of control rights has been the core issue of corporate governance. However, although scholars have been devoting themselves to the study of control right, the problem of effective allocation of control rights among stakeholders is still solved from the practical point of view. In many high-tech companies, the allocation of control becomes more complicated. As an important holder of human capital, how to maintain moderate organizational power and prevent the fall of control right is the core issue to be discussed in this paper. On the basis of combing the existing research results of control rights and the characteristics of the allocation of the control rights of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in China, this study, through exploratory case studies, proposes that under the external system and the technological environment, How do founders use their own resources to maintain the protection mechanism of corporate control in private high-tech enterprises? The external environment is the basis of restricting the resource allocation and behavior of the main body within the organization. The articles of association is an effective tool for the game between the control bodies, and the allocation of the key resources determines the configuration structure of the control rights. In order to prevent the right of control from falling, the founders maintain their dominant position from three aspects: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources. This paper adopts the empirical research method, selects the Chinese private high-tech listed companies in the IPO period from 2007 to 2012 as the research sample, carries on the empirical test to the above private high-tech enterprise founder control protection mechanism. The empirical research proves that: (1) Private high-tech listed enterprises, the higher the level of founder holding shares (property resources), The better the effect of maintaining founder control (whether the founder will continue to hold the key post after IPO); (2) the larger the proportion of board seats (relational resources) of the founding members of private high-tech enterprises. The more favorable it is for founders to remain in key positions; (3) in private high-tech enterprises, The higher the education (knowledge resources), the higher the probability of obtaining and maintaining the control rights; (4) the cumulative voting system and the setting of most clauses in the articles of association play a positive role in the relationship between the founder resources and the control rights. Under the restriction of external system and technological environment, this paper puts forward the protection mechanism of the founder's right of control of the private high-tech enterprise how to manage and utilize his own resources to maintain the control right of the founder of the private high-tech enterprise. It enriches the theory of corporate governance and control rights and the research of corporate control allocation model. From the perspective of resource view, the three major capital (material capital, social capital and human capital) which affect the enterprise's production are brought into the field of corporate control rights allocation together, and on this basis, This paper further divides enterprise power resources into three types: property resources, relational resources and knowledge resources, and probes into the path of protecting the right of control of the founders of private high-tech enterprises in depth and in an all-round way. This study makes up for the deficiency of the traditional contract theory and provides a reference for the allocation of the control rights of the private high-tech enterprises in China.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.44;F832.51
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 郑志刚;邹宇;崔丽;;合伙人制度与创业团队控制权安排模式选择——基于阿里巴巴的案例研究[J];中国工业经济;2016年10期
2 徐炜;王超;;民营高科技公司创始人控制权与公司业绩[J];经济管理;2016年09期
3 王春艳;林润辉;袁庆宏;李娅;李飞;;企业控制权的获取和维持——基于创始人视角的多案例研究[J];中国工业经济;2016年07期
4 胡波;王骜然;;互联网企业创始人控制权对企业长期业绩的影响探究[J];经济问题;2016年07期
5 石晓飞;;创始人非正式权力、正式权力对公司价值的影响——基于民营上市公司的实证研究[J];中国人力资源开发;2016年11期
6 吴义爽;盛亚;蔡宁;;基于互联网+的大规模智能定制研究——青岛红领服饰与佛山维尚家具案例[J];中国工业经济;2016年04期
7 武立东;丁昊杰;王凯;;民营企业创始人特质与公司治理机制完善程度对职业经理人引入影响研究[J];管理学报;2016年04期
8 易阳;宋顺林;谢新敏;谭劲松;;创始人专用性资产、堑壕效应与公司控制权配置——基于雷士照明的案例分析[J];会计研究;2016年01期
9 周嘉南;段宏;黄登仕;;投资者与创始人的争斗:冲突来源及演化路径——基于我国公司公开冲突事件的案例分析[J];管理世界;2015年06期
10 王珏;祝继高;;基金参与公司治理:行为逻辑与路径选择——基于上海家化和格力电器的案例研究[J];中国工业经济;2015年05期
相关博士学位论文 前2条
1 鲁银梭;风投引入后的主体行为与创业企业成长[D];浙江工商大学;2013年
2 潘清;中国国有企业控制权的权能配置研究[D];浙江工商大学;2010年
，本文编号：2199245
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/jinrongzhengquanlunwen/2199245.html
