城投债生产性支出偏向及其宏观效应

发布时间：2018-09-12 13:10

【摘要】：自党的十七大提出“加快推进以改善民生为重点的社会建设”以来,改善民生日益成为我国各级政府工作的重中之重。尤其是2008年全球经济危机爆发后,地方政府以改善民生的名义大举发行城投债,如火如荼地进行城市建设。城投债逐渐成为各级政府实现“保增长、扩内需、惠民生”的重要工具。兼具“发展型”特征和“公司化”倾向的地方政府具有追求政治激励和财政激励的内在动力,民生问题不可能成为其“内生发展目标”。作为地方投融资平台的重要融资工具,城投债必然会成为地方政府实现其发展目标的重要手段,具有内生的生产性支出偏向属性,而且不同级别的地方政府对激励的偏好不同,城投债生产性支出偏向存在层级差异。基于广义定序logit模型和2006—2014年发行的4642只城投债数据的实证检验,为城投债生产性支出偏向的存在、决定因素、时空及行政级别差异提供了有力证据。研究发现:(1)在政治激励和财政激励体制下,地方政府呈现明显的发展型特征,城投债存在生产性支出偏向;(2)不同行政级别的地方政府对政治激励、财政激励的偏好不同并由此导致了城投债生产性支出偏向的差异:省级政府更偏好于政治激励,城投债生产性支出偏向更严重;市县级政府更偏好于财政激励,城投债生产性支出偏向较轻;(3)2008年以后,地方政府确实响应了中央政府“改善民生”的政策号召,明显地减弱了城投债的生产性支出偏向;(4)在控制相关的宏观经济变量后,城投债生产性支出偏向对经济增长具有显著的正效应,对民生改善的影响不显著。本文的理论和实证分析均表明,城投债生产性支出偏向的根源是自上而下的以GDP和财政收入为核心的政绩考核机制。城投债生产性支出偏向扭曲了中央改善民生的政策意图,妨碍了向公共服务型政府转型。解决这一问题的根本出路在于,根据地方政府偏好的层级差异相应调整其激励政策,即省级政府偏好于政治激励,就应改革现有的政绩考核机制,弱化对省级政府的政治激励,强化其管理服务职能;市、县级政府偏好于财政激励,则需要适当扩大其“财权”,增加其财政收入,尤其是实现县级“财政解困”。此外,还需要完善地方人民代表大会、司法体系等横向问责机制,“对违规使用政府债务资金建立惩罚机制”,并增强地方政府对居民偏好的回应性。
[Abstract]:Since the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward "speeding up the construction of society with emphasis on improving the people's livelihood", improving the people's livelihood has increasingly become the most important task of the government at all levels in our country. Especially after the global economic crisis broke out in 2008, local governments issued large amounts of city debt in the name of improving people's livelihood and carried out urban construction in full swing. City investment debt has gradually become an important tool for governments at all levels to "maintain growth, expand domestic demand and benefit people's health." With the characteristics of "development" and "corporatization", local governments have the internal motive force to pursue political and financial incentives, and livelihood problems cannot become their "endogenetic development goals". As an important financing tool of local investment and financing platform, city investment debt will inevitably become an important means for local governments to achieve their development goals. It has the attribute of endogenous productive expenditure bias, and different levels of local governments have different preferences for incentives. The urban investment debt productive expenditure bias exists the level difference. Based on the generalized sequenced logit model and the empirical test of 4642 city bond investment data issued from 2006 to 2014, this paper provides strong evidence for the existence, determinants, space-time and administrative level differences of the productive expenditure bias of urban investment bonds. The findings are as follows: (1) under the system of political and financial incentives, local governments have obvious developmental characteristics, and there is a bias towards productive expenditure in urban investment bonds; (2) local governments at different levels of administration give political incentives. The preference of fiscal incentive is different, which leads to the difference of productive expenditure bias of city investment debt: provincial government prefers political incentive, city investment bond production expenditure bias is more serious, city and county government prefer fiscal incentive. (3) after 2008, the local governments did respond to the policy call of the central government to "improve the people's livelihood", which obviously weakened the productive expenditure bias of the city investment debt; (4) after controlling the relevant macroeconomic variables, the local governments did respond to the policy call of the central government to "improve the people's livelihood", and (4) after controlling the relevant macroeconomic variables, The bias of urban investment debt productive expenditure has a significant positive effect on economic growth, but not a significant impact on the improvement of people's livelihood. The theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper shows that the root of the urban investment debt productive expenditure bias is the top-down performance assessment mechanism with GDP and fiscal revenue as the core. The bias towards productive spending distorts the central policy intention of improving people's livelihood and hinders the transition to a public service government. The fundamental solution to this problem is to adjust the incentive policy according to the local government preference, that is, the provincial government should reform the existing performance assessment mechanism and weaken the political incentive to the provincial government. To strengthen the function of management and service, the municipal and county governments prefer fiscal incentives, so they need to expand their "financial power" and increase their financial revenue, especially to realize the "financial difficulties" at the county level. In addition, it is also necessary to improve the horizontal accountability mechanisms such as the local people's congresses and the judicial system, to "establish a punishment mechanism for the illegal use of government debt funds" and to enhance the responsiveness of local governments to residents' preferences.
【学位授予单位】：中南财经政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F812.5

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