权力制度、国家与经济发展

发布时间：2018-03-08 07:47

本文选题：权力　切入点：权力制度　出处：《复旦大学》2007年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 本文着眼于权力制度来考察国家对经济发展的影响，并且运用经济学的分析方法探究权力制度本身的变迁。我们的主要研究目标是政治体制或者说国家形式与经济财富之间的关系。我们感兴趣的是：怎样的权力制度更有利于经济繁荣，这样的制度要在怎样的条件下才能出现? 本文的核心部分是理论建模分析，辅之以经济史的阐释。从经济史中发现问题，继而用经济学的工具分析问题，得出解释或结论，最后再放到经济史中进行检验；这可能是一条比较合理的研究路径。文章的结构安排与主要结论如下：第二章对相关文献进行述评。第三章将权力制度分为两个维度，分别讨论它们对经济发展的影响。研究表明，民主制度对促进经济绩效恢复、维持经济发展的稳定性有着重要的积极作用。之所以如此，民主政治下的呼吁机制及其有效性是一个关键因素。通过把呼吁进一步细分为垂直呼吁和水平呼吁，我们分别阐述了这两种机制是如何发挥相应功能的。在全球化的形势下，呼吁变得更为重要，但同时它也将面临更大的挑战。在一个扩展的模型框架内，我们讨论了法治对经济绩效的影响。具体而言，包括公共支出、税收水平以及社会总产出等。分析表明，法治完善度的提高会减少税收带来的效率损失和产出损失；虽然法治完善度本身对公共支出的影响是不确定的，但是在民主的共同作用下，法治却足以推动公共支出乃至社会总产出水平的提高。第四章讨论权力制度本身的变迁。我们构造了一个简单的两阶段动态博弈模型，试图在这一框架内对制度变迁与驻存的动态机制给出简明合理的解释。首先，我们着眼于冲突问题，以此作为理解法治起源的一个视角。研究表明，中间阶层权力禀赋的高低，对法治能否出现乃至维持是一个关键性的决定因素；除此之外，斗争技巧、利害攸关程度等因素也对法治的出现有着重要影响。接下来，我们试图在上述框架内，对历史上专制王朝虽有更迭、专制制度却挥之不去的现象作出解释。研究表明，，之所以会出现王朝更迭而专制制度不变的格局，关键在于被统治者不具备能够与统治阶层相抗衡的持久、稳定的权力禀赋；冲击虽然能够在短期内提高被统治者的实际权力禀赋，甚至使其得以推翻原统治阶层，但这种提高是暂时的，无法对新统治阶层形成长远的、持久的威慑和抑制，法治自然也无从产生。第五章主要运用比较经济史分析的研究方法，具体而言，就是对中世纪以来欧洲及相应时期中国的流动性扩展状况分别进行考察，勾勒出两者各自的发展脉络，进而在这一脉络中，探究国家形式、权力结构对流动性扩展所起到的不同影响和作用。通过对经济史的审视，我们试图回答这样的问题：不同的权力制度或曰国家形式，对资源流动性的扩散与增进将产生怎样的影响?如果从资源流动性扩展这一角度来考察世界经济的形成与演进历程，能否得到一些具有普遍意义的规律或结论，对近代以来中国、欧洲的路径分岔给出一个较为合理的新解释?研究表明：制衡的、支持性的政治体制，是经济发展中流动性得以扩散和提升的一个必要条件。与之相反，专制集权的政治体制则必然会妨碍流动性的扩展，政治上的专制集权是造成传统中国经济流动性停滞的渊薮。第六章将上述理论应用于中国经济增长中的某些问题进行分析。首先，我们从利益集团的角度考察了中国收入差距的扩大，重点分析权力运作失范所带来的收入差距及其后果。研究表明：中国市场化转型的连续性特征和这一过程中法治的缺失是造成收入差距悬殊的关键因素。这种收入差距并不满足库兹涅茨假说的隐含前提，如果任其发展下去，不仅不可能自行趋于收敛，反而会造成既无平等、亦无效率的恶果。要解决这一问题，必须加快法治化进程，推动法治建设。其次，我们考察了近些年来中国经济增长过程中的所谓“过热”现象。分析表明，过热实际上折射出的是经济增长模式转变的紧迫性，政府自身的改革是经济增长模式转变的必要前提。第七章总结全文，并指出本文的某些欠缺和进一步研究的空间。
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on the power system to investigate the influence of the state on economic development, and the use of the methods of economic analysis on the change of the power system itself. The main goal of our research is the political system or the relationship between the state and the form of economic wealth. We are interested in how the power system is more conducive to economic prosperity, such a system to appear in what conditions?
The core of this paper is theoretical modeling analysis, supplemented by the interpretation of economic history. From the economic history, we can find problems, and then use economics tools to analyze problems, draw explanations or conclusions, and finally put them into economic history for inspection. This may be a more reasonable research path.
The structure and main conclusions of the article are as follows:
The second chapter reviews the related literature.
The third chapter will be divided into two dimensions of power system, discusses their impact on the economic development. The study shows that the democratic system to promote economic recovery performance, which play an important role in maintaining the stability of economic development. So, under democratic appeal mechanism and its effectiveness is a key factor in the. Calling for further subdivision for vertical and horizontal calls, we described the two kinds of mechanism is how to play the corresponding function. In the situation of globalization, to become more important, but at the same time it will face a bigger challenge.
In the model, an extension of the framework, we discuss the influence of the rule of law on economic performance. Specifically, including public expenditure, tax level and social output. The analysis shows that the law of increase will reduce tax bring efficiency loss and loss of output; although law itself is the influence of public expenditure not sure, but in the common role of democracy under the rule of law is to promote public expenditure and social total output levels.
The fourth chapter discusses the changes of power system itself. We construct a two stage dynamic game model, trying to within the framework of institutional change and in the dynamic mechanism gives the brief explanation. First, we focus on the problem of conflict, as a way to understand the origin of the rule of law studies. The middle class, the level of endowment of power, the rule of law can appear and maintain is a key factor; in addition, fighting skills, has an important influence factors at stake degree also appeared on the rule of law.
Next, we tried to in the above framework, the history of autocratic Dynasty change, autocratic system lingering phenomenon to explain. The study shows that the reason there will be a change of Dynasty and autocratic system invariant pattern, the key lies in the rulers do not have to contend with the ruling class is lasting, stable endowment of power; although the impact can in the short term to improve the rulers of the actual power endowment, even to overturn the original ruling class, but this increase is temporary, not on the new ruling class to form a long-term, lasting deterrent and suppression, there will be no rule of law.
The fifth chapter mainly uses the research methods of comparative analysis, economic history, specifically, is the mobility in Europe since the middle ages and the corresponding period Chinese extension status were examined. They outline their development, and in this context, explore the influence and effect of different form of state power structure dynamic convection extending up to.
Through the review of economic history, we try to answer the following questions: different power system or national form, will produce what kind of impact on the diffusion mobility of resources and improve resource flow from? If the extension of the perspective of the formation and evolution history of the world economy, can get some rules of universal significance or conclusion of the modern Chinese, European path bifurcation gives a more reasonable explanation of the new study shows that? And that the support of the political system, is a necessary condition for economic development and enhance the liquidity spread. On the contrary, the expansion of autocratic political system is bound to hinder the flow the politics of autocracy is caused by traditional economic stagnation Chinese liquidity source.
The sixth chapter will carry out some problems by using the theories above China economic growth. Firstly, we study the income gap between the Chinese interest groups from the point of view, focus on the analysis of the operation of power loss of income gap and its consequences brought about by the fan. The results show that: the lack of law transformation of the continuity of Chinese market and this process is the key factor that caused the income gap. This income gap does not meet the implicit premise of Kuznets hypothesis, if unchecked, will not converge automatically, it will cause no equality, no efficiency consequences. To solve this problem, we must accelerate the development of the rule of law, promote the rule of law.
Secondly, we examine the so-called "overheating" phenomenon in the process of China's economic growth in recent years. The analysis shows that overheating actually reflects the urgency of the transformation of the economic growth mode, and the government's own reform is a necessary prerequisite for the transformation of the economic growth mode.
The seventh chapter summarizes the full text, and points out some gaps in this paper and the space for further research.

【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F01

【引证文献】