中国式分权下的偏向性投资

发布时间：2018-03-27 06:11

  本文选题：中国式分权　切入点：自利性投资偏好　出处：《经济研究》2017年06期

【摘要】：本文基于政府官员"经济政治人"假设,论证了中国式分权下市场参与者的投资行为逻辑,为中国粗放式经济增长提供了一种解释。在垂直集中的官员治理模式下,中央政府因信息所限,难以有效约束地方官员"重生产,轻创新"的自利性投资偏好。在经济分权体制下,地方政府及其官员掌控着可观的经济资源,形成政府主导型经济。结果是,地方官员的自利性投资偏好能够借助政府"有形之手",作用于各类市场参与者的投资行为,从而整个社会投资呈现"重生产,轻创新"的偏向。本文运用省级面板数据检验了理论假说,结果表明,在中国式分权下,地方财政分权度越高,地方政府、企业和社会的创新性支出占生产性支出的比重越低。
[Abstract]:Based on the assumption of "economic and political person" of government officials, this paper demonstrates the logic of investment behavior of Chinese market participants under decentralization, which provides an explanation for China's extensive economic growth. The central government, limited by information, is unable to effectively constrain the self-interest investment preferences of local officials, which "emphasize production rather than innovation". Under a decentralized economic system, local governments and their officials control considerable economic resources. The result is that local officials' self-interest investment preferences can benefit from the "tangible hand" of the government and act on the investment behavior of all kinds of market participants, so that the whole social investment presents a "heavy production". This paper uses provincial panel data to test the theoretical hypothesis. The results show that the higher the degree of local fiscal decentralization is, the lower the proportion of innovative expenditure of local government, enterprise and society in productive expenditure is.
【作者单位】： 中国社会科学院经济研究所;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(14BJY019) 人力资源和社会保障部留学人员科技活动择优资助项目的资助
【分类号】：F124
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本文编号：1670325