辽河流域生态补偿管理机制与保障政策研究

发布时间：2018-07-03 17:20

本文选题：辽河流域 + 生态补偿　；参考：《吉林大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：2012年党的十八大报告明确指出，面对资源约束趋紧、环境污染严重、生态系统退化的严峻形势，大力推进生态文明建设，建立反映市场供求和资源稀缺程度、体现生态价值和代际补偿的生态补偿制度。2014年修订《中华人民共和国环境保护法》（2015年1月1日实施）第三十一条明确规定，国家建立、健全生态保护补偿制度，所以，作为一种调节流域上下游生态环境保护相关利益主体之间关系的环境经济手段，将“生态补偿”应用于流域环境管理，成为学术研究和流域管理实践的热点内容，也成为新时期我国流域水资源环境利益平衡的重要手段。近年来辽河流域经济社会不断发展，水资源的消耗和污染物的排放导致辽河流域污染严重，上游地区水土沙化严重，东、西辽河入辽宁省境内时水质均为Ⅴ类，跨省界河流污染问题严峻，严重威胁到辽宁省大部分地区的饮用水安全，流域用水关系日趋紧张，用水矛盾日益突出，由此引发的生态补偿问题成为平衡流域上下游政府间用水关系和用水利益的关键环节。受流域上下游政府因存在经济社会和资源环境目标和利益上的各种矛盾冲突，使流域上下游政府生态补偿具有典型的博弈特征。基于此，本文在流域生态补偿的生态学、经济学以及博弈论的基础上，综合阐述辽河流域经济社会发展与自然环境概况，分析辽河流域水资源条件和水环境管理问题，论述流域生态补偿的必要性；然后从博弈论的视角，构建基于成本收益的博弈模型，，系统分析辽河流域生态补偿机制建设中上下游政府博弈关系；研究污染物定价模型和基于污染物总量控制的行政协调模型，并进行了辽河流域污染赔偿方法倾向性分析，构建辽河流域生态补偿标准模型；最后构建辽河流域生态补偿机制。研究显示，（1）政府投资对流域水资源保护与水污染治理起到积极的作用，但是实践中政府投资还存在诸如资金需求缺口大、资金来源少投入渠道单一、资金分散列支缺乏有效整合、偏重项目建设、资金监管薄弱、缺乏跨行政区域合作机制等较多的问题；辽河流域水环境管理还存在诸如缺乏流域水污染赔偿实践、现有生态补偿机制不完善且手段单一以及跨省水环境管理机制薄弱等问题，需要完善的生态补偿机制协调流域用水关系、平衡用水利益。（2）辽河流域上游出境水质达标情形下，下游政府要求更好的水质，则在上下游保护与补偿的静态博弈中，上下游地方政府间生态补偿博弈陷入“囚徒困境”，说明地方政府间横向财政转移支付对流域上游水环境保护处于失效状态，必须通过地方政府间有约束力的协议及与中央纵向财政转移支付相结合的模式，实现生态补偿的最大效用。（3）博弈结果显示，若促进生态补偿机制顺利实施，中央政府和下游政府生态补偿额度为，下游政府的补偿额度不能超过其获得的收益，即c≤b外，其他的生态补偿额度由国家进行承担，并确保c+c‘＞C-B内。（4）流域上下游政府间的动态博弈结论显示，通过市场机制达到流域优化配置的情形，通过法律行政等手段保证下游的索赔权利，并引入激励因子，合理设定激励因子c补，使下游索赔的金额大于上游的治理成本，有效的改变上游的收益预期，使上下游的理性选择最终实现流域环境的优化，达到流域资源环境的优化。（5）辽河流域辽宁省、吉林省和内蒙古自治区因省界断面水质现状及下游省份需求而成为生态补偿的主体和客体，探讨构建的污染物排放补偿金定价模型和基于污染物总量控制的行政协调模型，依据辽河流域“十二五”水污染防治规划水质目标核算，辽宁省2011年需向内蒙补偿14025580元，吉林省需赔偿辽宁省21567154元；依据辽河流域水功能区划水质目标核算，2011年，辽宁省需向内蒙补偿9300917元，吉林省需赔偿辽宁31654015元。（6）生态补偿途径。通过对资金、实物、市场、金融等补偿及赔偿手段的研究，探讨可适用的辽河流域生态补偿与污染赔偿的具体方式及途径，提出资金补偿、政策补偿、产业补偿和区域协作补偿的模式途径。提出建立辽河流域生态补偿机制的推动力量、拓宽补偿资金来源渠道、完善政府投资、政府投资的相关机制设计，并建立完善的生态补偿与污染赔偿评价监督机制。研究辽河流域生态补偿机制，为解决辽河流域污染严重、生态环境恶化等问题提供了理论基础和方法，同时完善了现有的辽河流域资源环境管理体制，为辽河流域的可持续发展和我国流域综合管理提供参考。
[Abstract]:In 2012, the eighteen major reports of the party clearly pointed out that the ecological compensation system, reflecting the market supply and demand and the scarcity of resources, reflecting the ecological value and intergenerational compensation, was revised "People's Republic of China environmental protection" in the face of tighter resource constraints, serious environmental pollution and the severe situation of ecological degradation. The ecological compensation system that reflects the market supply and demand and the scarcity of resources, reflects the ecological value and intergenerational compensation in.2014. The thirty-first articles (implemented in January 1, 2015) clearly stipulate that the state establishes and improves the system of ecological protection compensation. Therefore, as an environmental economic means to regulate the relationship between the stakeholders of the ecological environment protection of the upper and lower reaches of the basin, the "ecological compensation" is applied to the environmental management of the basin, and it has become a practice of academic research and basin management. The hot topics also become an important means to balance the interests of water resources and environment in China in the new era.
In recent years, the economic and social development of the Liaohe River Basin, the consumption of water resources and the emission of pollutants lead to serious pollution in the Liaohe River Basin, the water and soil desertification in the upper reaches of the river is serious. The water quality of the East and the West Liao River is V in Liaoning Province, the pollution of the rivers in the provinces is severe, and the drinking water in most areas of Liaoning province is threatened by Yan Zhongwei, and the river basin is safe. The water relations are becoming more and more tense, and the water contradiction is becoming more and more prominent. The problem of ecological compensation has become a key link to balance the water use relationship between the upper and lower reaches of the river basin and the interests of water use. The ecological compensation of the upstream and downstream governments of the basin is caused by the various contradictions and conflicts between the upstream and downstream governments of the basin and the economic and social and resource environment. Based on the ecological, economic and game theory of ecological compensation in the basin, this paper expounds the economic and social development and the natural environment of the Liaohe River Basin, analyzes the water resource conditions and water environment management in the Liaohe River Basin, discusses the necessity of the ecological compensation in the basin, and then from the game theory The game model based on cost and income is constructed, the game relationship between the upper and lower reaches of the ecological compensation mechanism in Liaohe River Basin is analyzed systematically, the pollutant pricing model and the administrative coordination model based on the total amount control of pollutants are studied, and the tendency analysis of pollution compensation method in Liaohe River basin is carried out, and the ecological compensation standard of the Liaohe River Basin is constructed. Finally, the ecological compensation mechanism of Liaohe River Basin is constructed.
The research shows that (1) government investment plays a positive role in water resource protection and water pollution control, but in practice, government investment still exists such as large shortage of capital demand, single source of funds, lack of effective integration of funds, project construction, weak fund supervision and lack of cross administrative regional cooperation mechanism. There are many problems, such as the water environment management in the Liaohe River Basin, such as the lack of water pollution compensation practice, the existing ecological compensation mechanism is imperfect, the means is single, and the cross provincial water environment management mechanism is weak. It needs perfect ecological compensation mechanism to coordinate the water use relationship in the basin and balance the interest of water. (2) the upper reaches of Liaohe River Basin Under the condition of water quality standard, the downstream government requires better water quality. In the static game of the upstream and downstream protection and compensation, the ecological compensation game between the upper and lower reaches of the local government falls into the "prisoner's dilemma", which indicates that the local government transversal financial transfer payment is in the failure state of the water environment protection in the upper reaches of the river basin, and it must be made through the local governments. The agreement of the beam force and the mode of combining with the central longitudinal financial transfer payment can achieve the greatest utility of ecological compensation. (3) the result of the game shows that, if the ecological compensation mechanism is promoted smoothly, the compensation limit of the central government and the downstream government can not exceed the income obtained by the downstream government, that is, C < B, and other students. The state compensation amount is borne by the state and ensures the c+c > C-B. (4) the dynamic game conclusion between the upstream and downstream governments of the basin shows that through the market mechanism to achieve the optimal allocation of the river basin, the claim right of the downstream is guaranteed by means of legal administration, and the incentive factor is introduced and the incentive factor C supplement is reasonably set to make the amount of the claim downstream. Greater than upstream management costs, effectively change the upstream revenue expectation, make the rational selection of the upstream and downstream to optimize the basin environment and achieve the optimization of the basin resource environment. (5) Liaoning province of Liaohe River Basin, Jilin province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region become the main body and guest of ecological compensation because of the water quality status of the provincial section and the needs of the lower provinces. The pricing model of pollutant emission compensation and the administrative coordination model based on total amount control are discussed. According to the water quality target of "12th Five-Year" water pollution prevention and control planning in Liaohe River Basin, Liaoning province needs to compensate Inner Mongolia 14025580 yuan in 2011, and Jilin province to compensate Liaoning province 21567154 yuan; according to the water function area of Liaohe River Basin Water quality target accounting, in 2011, Liaoning province needs to compensate Inner Mongolia 9300917 yuan, Jilin province to compensate Liaoning 31654015 yuan. (6) ecological compensation approach. Through the study of funds, material, market, financial and other compensation and compensation means to explore the applicable Liaohe River basin ecological compensation and pollution compensation specific ways and means, and put forward capital compensation, The mode of policy compensation, industrial compensation and regional cooperation compensation, puts forward the driving force of establishing the ecological compensation mechanism of the Liaohe River Basin, widens the sources of compensation funds, consummate the government investment, design the related mechanism of government investment, and establish a perfect supervision mechanism for the evaluation of ecological compensation and pollution compensation.
The study of the ecological compensation mechanism in the Liaohe River basin provides a theoretical basis and method for solving the serious pollution of the Liaohe River Basin and the deterioration of the ecological environment. At the same time, the existing management system of the resources and environment of the Liaohe River Basin is perfected, which provides a reference for the sustainable development of the Liaohe River Basin and the comprehensive management of the river basin in our country.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F127;X321

【参考文献】