业绩预期压力、高管股权激励与企业投资不足

发布时间：2018-04-13 16:33

本文选题：业绩预期压力 + 高管股权激励　；参考：《金融论坛》2017年06期

【摘要】：本文以2007~2015年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,基于资本市场的业绩预期压力对企业投资不足的影响,探讨高管股权激励对该影响的治理效应,以及发挥治理作用的具体股权激励类型。研究发现:(1)业绩预期压力的增大会加剧企业投资不足;(2)高管股权激励能够缓解业绩预期压力带来的投资不足;(3)相对于限制性股票和激励型股权激励,股票期权与福利型股权激励对业绩预期压力引起投资不足的缓解作用更强。
[Abstract]:In this paper, based on the effect of expected performance pressure of capital market on underinvestment of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015, this paper discusses the governance effect of executive equity incentive on this impact.And the specific types of equity incentives that play a role in governance.The study found that: 1) the increase of expected pressure on performance will aggravate the lack of investment in enterprises. (2) the executive equity incentive can alleviate the underinvestment caused by the pressure of expected performance. (3) relative to restrictive stocks and incentive equity incentives,Stock option and welfare equity incentive can alleviate the underinvestment caused by expected performance pressure.
【作者单位】：天津财经大学商学院会计系;天津财经大学大公信用管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“环境不确定性、管理者自信与企业创新投资:影响机理与经济后果”(71502119) 天津市财政局天津市会计学会2017~2018年度重点会计科研项目:资本市场业绩预期压力、高管股权激励与企业投资不足(Y171004)
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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