薪酬委员会独立性对高管薪酬契约的治理效应——基于薪酬粘性的分析

发布时间：2018-05-16 09:13

本文选题：薪酬委员会 + 独立性　；参考：《会计之友》2017年13期

【摘要】：薪酬委员会是为了保障上市公司良好的薪酬制度而设立,那么我国薪酬委员会是否促进了薪酬契约的有效性,为验证这一问题,选取我国2007—2015年上市公司为样本,并将薪酬粘性加入薪酬契约有效性的研究中。首先验证薪酬委员会与高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的协同作用,然后检验了薪酬粘性是否存在,并进一步验证薪酬委员会对薪酬粘性的作用。研究发现:(1)薪酬委员会中独立董事比例越高,总经理不兼任委员会成员时,委员会独立性越高,薪酬—业绩敏感性越强;(2)上市公司高管薪酬普遍存在"粘性";(3)薪酬委员会独立性并不能抑制高管薪酬粘性现象。可见,目前我国薪酬委员会独立性虽增强了高管薪酬—业绩敏感性,但并未抑制高管薪酬粘性,薪酬委员会对薪酬契约的治理需进一步加强。
[Abstract]:The compensation committee is set up to guarantee the good compensation system of listed companies. So, whether the compensation committee of our country has promoted the effectiveness of the compensation contract, in order to verify this problem, we choose the listed companies of our country from 2007 to 2015 as the sample. And the salary stickiness is added to the study of the effectiveness of the compensation contract. This paper first verifies the synergy between compensation committee and executive compensation performance sensitivity, then tests the existence of compensation stickiness, and further verifies the effect of compensation committee on compensation stickiness. The study found that the higher the proportion of independent directors in the remuneration committee, the higher the independence of the committee when the general manager does not concurrently serve on the committee. The more sensitive the pay to performance, the more "sticky" executive pay is common among listed companies.) the independence of compensation committees does not curb executive pay stickiness. It can be seen that, although the independence of compensation committees in China has enhanced the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance, it has not restrained the stickiness of executive compensation, and the governance of compensation contracts in compensation committees needs to be further strengthened.
【作者单位】：云南民族大学管理学院;
【基金】：云南民族大学研究生创新基金项目(2016JCXS68)
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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