我国上市公司终极控制人对信息披露质量的影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-04 04:23

本文选题：终极控制人 + 信息披露质量　；参考：《华东师范大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：在证券市场中,投资者买卖股票主要依据是上市公司披露的信息,信息披露是连接投资者与上市公司沟通的重要桥梁之一,可以说,证券市场从本质上来说是一个信息市场,要实现证券市场资源的有效配置,可靠充分准确及时的信息披露是其重要保障。影响信息披露质量的因素有多种多样,包括公司特征、股权结构、公司治理及审计意见等,本文选取股权结构为研究视角。不同于股权较分散的美国、日本及英国上市公司,中国上市公司股权较集中。当股权分散时,代理问题主要集中于委托人和代理人之间,而当股权集中时,代理问题主要集中于处于控制链顶端的终极控制人和中小股东之间。因此本文关注终极控制人与中小股东的代理冲突,主要研究终极控制人对信息披露质量的影响。论文主要从以下方面展开：首先,对终极控制人与信息披露质量的相关国内外前人所做的研究进行回顾与分析,通过文献回顾,了解研究的历史、发展与现状,以期能够发现现有研究中存在的问题并为本文的研究找到方向。其次,对终极控制人与信息披露质量的概念进行界定。对终极控制人的概念界定,沿用拉波特等人的方法,从上市公司控制链条出发,通过层层向上追溯,直至控制链条的最顶层,即上市公司最终控制人。以信息披露的及时性、准确性、真实性和完整性作为信息披露质量的定性标准,并在回顾国内外学者对信息披露质量采用的多种定量衡量标准下,提出本文选取深交所信息披露考评结果作为信息披露质量的定量衡量标准。并对与终极控制人和信息披露质量相关的理论基础进行回顾分析。再次,在前文的基础上,选择在深圳证券交易所主板上市的上市公司,实证检验终极控制人特征对信息披露质量的影响。对终极控制人超额控制的实证研究结果表明：超额控制的绝对程度、相对程度与信息披露质量负相关但并不显著；当存在超额控制时,其与信息披露质量显著负相关。对终极控制人控制层级的实证研究结果表明：当上市公司处于金字塔越底层,信息披露质量越差。对终极控制人属性的实证研究结果表明：相比终极控制人为国有的上市公司,民营上市公司信息披露质量较差。对终极控制人管理权力的实证研究结果表明：终极控制人管理权力与信息披露质量显著负相关。最后,对本文研究结果进行阐述,并在此基础上提供若干条建议。同时结合本文研究局限性的考虑,给出进一步研究的方向。
[Abstract]:In the stock market, investors buy and sell stocks mainly based on the information disclosed by listed companies. Information disclosure is one of the important bridges between investors and listed companies. It can be said that the securities market is essentially an information market. To realize the effective allocation of securities market resources, reliable, full, accurate and timely information disclosure is an important guarantee. There are a variety of factors affecting the quality of information disclosure, including corporate characteristics, equity structure, corporate governance and audit opinions. Unlike American, Japanese and British listed companies, Chinese listed companies are more concentrated. When the equity is dispersed, the agency problem is mainly between the principal and the agent, while when the equity is concentrated, the agency problem is mainly between the ultimate controller and the minority shareholders at the top of the chain of control. Therefore, this paper focuses on the agency conflict between the ultimate controller and the minority shareholders, and mainly studies the impact of the ultimate controller on the quality of information disclosure. The thesis mainly starts from the following aspects: First of all, we review and analyze the research done by related domestic and foreign predecessors of the ultimate controller and the quality of information disclosure, through literature review, we can understand the history, development and current situation of the research. In order to find out the existing problems in the existing research and find a direction for the study of this paper. Secondly, the concept of ultimate controller and information disclosure quality is defined. The concept of ultimate controller is defined by using the method of Laporte and so on, starting from the control chain of listed company, tracing back to the top of the control chain, that is, the ultimate controller of listed company. Taking the timeliness, accuracy, authenticity and completeness of information disclosure as the qualitative standard for the quality of information disclosure, and reviewing the various quantitative standards used by scholars at home and abroad to measure the quality of information disclosure, In this paper, the information disclosure evaluation results of Shenzhen Stock Exchange are selected as the quantitative measure of information disclosure quality. The theoretical basis related to the ultimate controller and the quality of information disclosure is reviewed and analyzed. Thirdly, on the basis of the above, the listed companies listed on the main board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange are selected to empirically test the effect of the ultimate controller characteristics on the quality of information disclosure. The results of the empirical study on the ultimate controller's excess control show that the absolute degree and relative degree of excess control are negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure but not significant, and when there is excess control, it is negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure. The empirical results of the ultimate controller control level show that when listed companies are at the bottom of the pyramid, the quality of information disclosure is worse. The empirical research on the attribute of ultimate controller shows that the quality of information disclosure of private listed companies is worse than that of listed companies with ultimate control. The empirical results of the management power of the ultimate controller show that the management power of the ultimate controller is negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure. Finally, the research results of this paper are described, and some suggestions are provided on this basis. At the same time, considering the limitations of this study, the direction of further research is given.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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