YH公司股权质押前后大股东利益侵占程度变动研究
发布时间：2018-08-18 07:42
【摘要】：在所有权高度集中的情况下，公司治理的研究重心已经从股东与经营者之间的委托代理问题转移到大股东代理问题上了。由于股权的集中度高，大股东可以利用手中的控制权侵占上市公司利益，给上市公司带来损失，因此研究上市公司大股东的行为具有相当重要的意义。而在我国的上市公司中，股权质押已经成为了大股东的重要融资行为之一，2011年共发生A股质押1620宗，2012年共发生A股质押2014宗。股权质押之后，大股东一方面依旧掌握着上市公司的控制权，另一方面质押部分股权价值波动的风险转移给了银行，这样就很可能给上市公司带来风险。因此，本文以股权质押为切入点，对YH公司的大股东行为进行研究，发现YH公司存在的问题并且予以解决。 本文从委托代理理论和信号理论出发，对大股东股权质押前后的利益侵占成本进行分析，，发现股权质押会使大股东的利益侵占成本在一定条件下降低，从而很可能诱使大股东加剧对上市公司的利益侵占，或者成为大股东加剧利益侵占行为时转嫁成本的有力手段。基于上述理论分析，本文以YH公司为研究对象，分析了YH公司大股东股权质押前后的利益侵占成本，然后从关联担保、关联交易和大股东非经营性占款三个角度，就YH公司大股东XT集团公司在股权质押前后对上市公司的利益侵占程度进行了详细的探讨和分析，发现YH公司大股东的股权质押行为能降低他的利益侵占成本，并且在股权质押之后大股东显著加大了对YH公司的利益侵占程度。接着，本文分析了YH公司大股东XT集团公司利益侵占行为得以加剧的原因，即YH公司目前存在的相关问题，最后从充分重视YH公司大股东股权质押行为、完善公司治理结构、完善内部控制制度和加大信息披露范围四个方面为YH公司如何制约大股东加剧利益侵占这一行为提出了建议。
[Abstract]:In the case of high concentration of ownership, the focus of the research on corporate governance has shifted from the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers to that of large shareholders. Due to the high concentration of equity, large shareholders can use their control rights to encroach on the interests of listed companies and bring losses to listed companies, so it is of great significance to study the behavior of large shareholders of listed companies. Among the listed companies in China, equity pledge has become one of the most important financing behaviors of major shareholders. In 2011, 1620 cases of A shares were pledged, and in 2012 2014 cases of A shares were pledged. After the pledge, the majority shareholders still hold the control of the listed company on the one hand, and on the other hand, the risk of the fluctuation of the equity value of the pledge is transferred to the bank, which is likely to bring risks to the listed company. Therefore, this paper studies the behavior of large shareholders of YH Company and finds out the problems existing in YH Company and solves the problem. Based on the principal-agent theory and signal theory, this paper analyzes the cost of interest usurpation before and after the pledge of major shareholders' shares, and finds that the cost of interest usurpation of large shareholders will be reduced under certain conditions. Therefore, it is possible to induce the large shareholders to intensify the interest encroachment on the listed company, or to become a powerful means to pass on the cost when the large shareholder intensifies the behavior of interest encroachment. Based on the above theoretical analysis, this paper takes YH Company as the research object, analyzes the cost of interest encroachment before and after the pledge of large shareholders' equity in YH Company, and then from the three angles of related party guarantee, related party transaction and large shareholders' non-operating funds. This paper makes a detailed discussion and analysis on the extent of interest encroachment on listed companies by XT Group Company, a major shareholder of YH Company, before and after the stock pledge. It is found that the stock rights pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company can reduce its cost of interest encroachment. And after the equity pledge, the major shareholders significantly increased the degree of interest encroachment on YH Company. Then, this paper analyzes the reasons why the behavior of interest encroachment on the large shareholders of YH Company XT Group has been aggravated, that is, the related problems existing in YH Company at present, and finally, from paying full attention to the pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company, perfecting the corporate governance structure. Four aspects of perfecting the internal control system and increasing the scope of information disclosure provide suggestions on how to restrict the behavior of the major shareholders to aggravate the encroachment on the interests of YH Company.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.72;F832.51;F406.7
[Abstract]:In the case of high concentration of ownership, the focus of the research on corporate governance has shifted from the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers to that of large shareholders. Due to the high concentration of equity, large shareholders can use their control rights to encroach on the interests of listed companies and bring losses to listed companies, so it is of great significance to study the behavior of large shareholders of listed companies. Among the listed companies in China, equity pledge has become one of the most important financing behaviors of major shareholders. In 2011, 1620 cases of A shares were pledged, and in 2012 2014 cases of A shares were pledged. After the pledge, the majority shareholders still hold the control of the listed company on the one hand, and on the other hand, the risk of the fluctuation of the equity value of the pledge is transferred to the bank, which is likely to bring risks to the listed company. Therefore, this paper studies the behavior of large shareholders of YH Company and finds out the problems existing in YH Company and solves the problem. Based on the principal-agent theory and signal theory, this paper analyzes the cost of interest usurpation before and after the pledge of major shareholders' shares, and finds that the cost of interest usurpation of large shareholders will be reduced under certain conditions. Therefore, it is possible to induce the large shareholders to intensify the interest encroachment on the listed company, or to become a powerful means to pass on the cost when the large shareholder intensifies the behavior of interest encroachment. Based on the above theoretical analysis, this paper takes YH Company as the research object, analyzes the cost of interest encroachment before and after the pledge of large shareholders' equity in YH Company, and then from the three angles of related party guarantee, related party transaction and large shareholders' non-operating funds. This paper makes a detailed discussion and analysis on the extent of interest encroachment on listed companies by XT Group Company, a major shareholder of YH Company, before and after the stock pledge. It is found that the stock rights pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company can reduce its cost of interest encroachment. And after the equity pledge, the major shareholders significantly increased the degree of interest encroachment on YH Company. Then, this paper analyzes the reasons why the behavior of interest encroachment on the large shareholders of YH Company XT Group has been aggravated, that is, the related problems existing in YH Company at present, and finally, from paying full attention to the pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company, perfecting the corporate governance structure. Four aspects of perfecting the internal control system and increasing the scope of information disclosure provide suggestions on how to restrict the behavior of the major shareholders to aggravate the encroachment on the interests of YH Company.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.72;F832.51;F406.7
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
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