金融行业上市公司高管激励与盈余管理关系研究

发布时间：2018-03-20 00:08

本文选题：金融行业上市公司　切入点：高管薪酬激励　出处：《陕西科技大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：高管激励与盈余管理的关系一直是公司治理与财务会计领域的研究热点。近年来,我国政府部门陆续出台一系列文件,对国有及国有控股企业的高管薪酬体系进行持续改革。金融行业在国民经济中处于重要地位,一方面,金融企业高管激励问题始终为社会各界所关注,另一方面,较之于其他行业,金融企业盈余管理特殊性显著。因此,迫切需要开展金融行业上市公司高管激励与盈余管理关系的理论研究,从而为合理构建金融行业高管激励机制、规范盈余管理行为提供理论支撑和路径选择。本文以42家金融行业上市公司为样本,选取其2010-2015年的财务数据,从金融行业上市公司高管激励与盈余管理现状分析出发,选取高管薪酬与高管持股作为高管激励衡量指标、以操控性应计利润的绝对值作为盈余管理的衡量指标,通过多元线性回归分析方法,开展高管激励与盈余管理关系的实证研究,检验不同的公司特征与公司治理状况下,高管激励机制对盈余管理的作用。本文主要研究结论为:(1)高管薪酬与盈余管理呈显著负相关关系,即高管薪酬越高,盈余管理程度越小,说明金融行业上市公司基本符合“高薪养廉论”,较高的高管薪酬有利于减少盈余管理行为。(2)高管持股与盈余管理呈正相关关系,即高管持股比例越高,盈余管理程度越大,说明较高程度的高管持股反而会刺激盈余管理行为的发生,但是二者关系不显著。(3)良好的公司业绩、完善的公司治理结构下,可以更有效地发挥高管激励作用,从而降低盈余管理程度。基于此,本文提出以下三点建议:(1)优化金融行业高管激励机制,发挥激励约束作用;(2)完善公司内部治理结构,优化企业内部监督;(3)完善外部监管制度体系,提高信息披露透明度。
[Abstract]:The relationship between executive incentive and earnings management has always been a hot topic in the field of corporate governance and financial accounting. In recent years, government departments in China have issued a series of documents. The financial industry plays an important role in the national economy. On the one hand, the incentive of senior executives in financial enterprises has always been concerned by all walks of life, on the other hand, Compared with other industries, earnings management of financial enterprises has obvious particularity. Therefore, it is urgent to carry out a theoretical study on the relationship between executive incentive and earnings management of listed companies in financial industry, so as to build a reasonable incentive mechanism for senior executives in financial industry. This paper takes 42 listed companies in financial industry as a sample, selects its financial data from 2010 to 2015, and analyzes the current situation of executive incentive and earnings management of listed companies in financial industry. The executive compensation and stock ownership are selected as the measure of executive incentive, and the absolute value of accrual profit is taken as the measure of earnings management, and the multiple linear regression analysis method is adopted. The empirical research on the relationship between executive incentive and earnings management is carried out to test the different corporate characteristics and corporate governance. The main conclusion of this paper is: (1) there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation and earnings management, that is, the higher the executive compensation, the smaller the earnings management. It shows that the listed companies in financial industry basically accord with the theory of "keeping clean with high pay", and higher executive compensation can reduce earnings management behavior. (2) there is a positive correlation between executive stock holding and earnings management, that is, the higher the proportion of senior management is, the greater the earnings management degree is. It shows that the higher degree of executive ownership will stimulate earnings management behavior, but the relationship between the two is not significant. Good corporate performance, perfect corporate governance structure, can play a more effective role in the incentive role of executives. So as to reduce the degree of earnings management. Based on this, this paper puts forward the following three suggestions: 1) optimizing the incentive mechanism of senior executives in financial industry, giving play to the role of incentive and restraint, and perfecting the internal governance structure of the company. Improve the external supervision system and improve the transparency of information disclosure.
【学位授予单位】：陕西科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F830.42;F272.92

【参考文献】