政策性农业保险中保险公司激励问题研究:一个多任务委托代理模型

发布时间：2018-06-01 00:00

本文选题：政策性农业保险 + 保险公司　；参考：《金融理论与实践》2014年07期

【摘要】：建立健全政府激励保险公司努力、高效地运作农业保险的机制,对增加农业保险供给、推动农业保险可持续发展具有重要意义。基于农业保险承保和理赔两项工作任务,构建保险公司在政策性农业保险中的多任务委托代理模型,求解出激励成本函数相互独立和相互依存两种情形下的保险公司最优化激励条件。结果显示,理性的政府和保险公司均会被现实所诱导,用更多的精力和时间去完成农业保险承保任务,而花在农业保险理赔任务上的努力则相对较少。因此,政府有必要建立保险公司农业保险理赔服务质量评估体系,对保险公司在完成农业保险理赔任务过程中的努力程度进行直接观测。在此基础上,政府可以制定农业保险承保业绩和理赔服务业绩并重的财政激励政策。
[Abstract]:It is of great significance to establish and perfect the mechanism of government to encourage insurance companies to work hard and to operate agricultural insurance efficiently. It is of great significance to increase the supply of agricultural insurance and promote the sustainable development of agricultural insurance. Based on the two tasks of agricultural insurance underwriting and claim settlement, this paper constructs a multi-task principal-agent model of insurance companies in policy-oriented agricultural insurance. The optimal incentive conditions for insurance companies with independent and interdependent incentive cost functions are obtained. The results show that rational governments and insurance companies will be induced by reality and spend more energy and time to complete the task of agricultural insurance coverage, while less effort will be spent on the task of agricultural insurance claims settlement. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to establish a service quality evaluation system for agricultural insurance claims of insurance companies, and to observe directly the degree of effort of insurance companies in the process of completing the task of agricultural insurance claims settlement. On this basis, the government can formulate a financial incentive policy with equal emphasis on the underwriting performance of agricultural insurance and the performance of claims settlement service.
【作者单位】：贵州财经大学金融学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71263011) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA630196)
【分类号】：F842.6;F224

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