农村小型水利设施的农户投入行为与激励研究

  本文关键词：农村小型水利设施的农户投入行为与激励研究，，由笔耕文化传播整理发布。

        全文以促进农村小型水利的有效供给为目标,以农村小型水利供给的体制演进为背景,以公共品供给理论、制度变迁理论、行为经济学理论、激励理论为框架,基于农户的行为的视角,分析农户参与小型农村水利设施的效用,分析影响农户投入行为的因素,剖析农户需求表达的不同模式,探讨如何对农户投入意愿进行激励,并在此基础上提出对策和建议。1.研究的主要内容(1)对本文需要借鉴的一般理论进行梳理,包括公共物品供给理论、制度变迁理论、行为经济学理论、激励理论以及社会资本理论；对相关文献进行综述与评价,主要侧重于国家——乡村社会视角的水利供给,小型水利建设的制度变迁以及水利设施需求的实证因素。(2)根据小型水利的公共品属性、以农户的行为为视角,从农户投入特征,投入主体的博弈等方面对小型水利的供给进行经济学分析。(3)对重庆小型水利工程的供给体制演进梳理与分析,划分体制演进的四个阶段,对各个历史时期的特征、投入情况以及主要成就进行概括,总结经验与教训,从历史逻辑的角度探寻现行供给体制存在的问题及困难。(4)以近五年参与过小型水利设施投入的农户为样本,运用排序二元选择模型,对影响农户投入效用的因素进行了分析与讨论,体现农户对水利投入所获回报的主观评价。(5)基于静态博弈理论建立模型,根据农户投入的两种不同形式区分投资行为与投工行为,采取二元选择模型进行回归分析,并对实证的结果进行讨论(6)分析当前农户在小型水利建设中投入需求显示的三种主要模式：主动接触型需求显示、强人替代型需求显示以及投票型需求显示。(7)研究农户行为的激励问题,基于“效价—手段—期望”的框架,从资金支持、工具性完善与社会偏好培育三个途径,全面分析显性激励与隐性激励手段。2.研究的主要结论(1)政府与农户的责权重建是农村准公共品有效供给的关键。小型水利是在一定地域范围内具有公共资源与俱乐部物品双重性质的准公共物品,并且具有较强的外部性与垄断性。合作供给小型水利所需要的激励机制、成本分摊、组织动员以及关系协调等实现集体行动的条件在大集体生产方式下能够实现自然满足,但在家庭经营取代大集体生产之后,上述问题并未得到有效的制度安排,带来的直接后果是小型水利建设的下滑,进而影响到农业生产、城乡统筹发展、国家粮食安全及生态安全等。兴建小型水利设施既是农户切身利益的需要,也是政府职责所在。在政府加大投入的基础上,尊重与引导农户的投入意愿,实现政府与农户在小农水建设上合理的权责重建是实现小农水有效供给的关键。(2)农户对现有水利建设投入的回报普遍感到满意,但相比最初投入的积极性,仍然有所不足。农业收入比例、用水量、是否参与管理、意见是否起作用、文化程度影响农户投入的效用。农业收入比例越高,农户的满意度越高；用水量越大,农户的满意程度越高；参与管理的农户满意度明显高于未参与管理的；农户对水利建设方案的意见越起作用,农户的满意度越高,文化程度较高的农户满意度较高。(3)劳动力价格,组织者能力、社区非农收入水平、政府出资力度、水利建设的效用、文化程度影响农户的出资意愿；水田面积、现有设施是否够用、社区非农收入水平、文化程度影响农户的出工意愿。实证结果表明,在农民收入逐渐提高,以及政府对小农水投资与奖补比例不断上升,农民实际投入相对下降的背景下,收入已不再成为影响农户投入的一个主要因素。劳动力价格的上涨,使农户更倾向于出资的投入方式,且家庭中主要劳动力价格越高,就越愿意出资。农户与农户之间,农户与政府之间存在着明显的博弈行为。在文化水平较低的群体中,对于水利设施的重要性和使用价值的认识还不够因而投入意愿较低。当前影响农户出工与出资意愿的因素存在着较大的差别,农户在进行出资决策时较多地考虑价格因素以及效用,并且表现出对政府投资的明显依赖,其行为模式更符合“理性小农”；只有当水利对农户比较重要时,农户才考虑出工,且水田面积越大,现有设施越不能满足需求,农户就越愿意出工,而几乎不考虑其他因素,在出工决策上表现得更象“生存小农”。(4)政府可以通过对小农水建设进行资金支持、制度支持实现对农户投入意愿的显性激励,也可以通过引导或培育公平感、道德情感和社会资本等社会偏好以增强农户投入行为的隐性激励。目前,政府的资金支持比例已经与大部分农户主观期望相匹配,应该在现有的成本分摊比例下扩大受益范围,惠及更多水利投资项目。全面改进项目决策制度、资金监管制度、水利设施的产权制度、组织制度以及水权制度,提供良好的制度环境,有助于激励农户的投入行为。大多数农户对公平的态度是“相机抉择对等者”,搭便车的现象对农民公平感有明显的负面影响。农户存在为社会福利进行支付的潜在动机,但水利并不是农户自愿捐赠的优先选择。社会网络仍在一定程度上影响着村民的行为,为农户的合作带来正向的激励。(5)农户需求存在多元化的显示方式。主动接触型需求显示的动机来自于对现状的强烈不满,需求显示的真实性、一致性很强。提供畅通的信息传递渠道有助于消除主动接触的动机：强人替代型需求显示有着较高的效率,但大多数村庄不具备实现这种需求显示方式的条件,此外,还存在强人“寻租”以及将自愿的需求显示让渡转化为强制的需求显示让渡的隐忧；公共财政转移支付资源的相对充足是投票型需求显示得以实现的前提条件,但由于乡村干部在规则提供与空间控制中占主导地位,村民的需求无法真实显示,成为精英控制的表达；在村民需求与精英阶层分歧不大的条件下,表现出高效率的特征：但如果存在较大的分歧,精英的控制则会损害村民的权益,甚至导致事实上的不合作。3.可能的创新点建立了一个效用——行为——需求显示——集体行动的框架来描述个人行为与集体行动的关系,选择农户行为的视角对小型水利设施的联合供给进行了分析。不同于以往的研究中将农户的公共品供给决策视为理性假定下一个效用函数的思路,在考虑农户个体异质性、社会偏好的基础上,引入近年来农民收入结构变化、社区非农收入水平不平衡发展,劳动力价格上升以及年近来政府投入的增加等因素进行分析,得出了较为可靠的实证结论,并探讨显性与隐性的双重激励途径,为农村小型水利设施的有效供给提供参考。

    Inorder to enhance the investment behavior for peasant households to promote the construction of small size water conservancy facilities(SWCFs), under the background of the system evolution of the rural public goods supply, based on public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics, motivation theories, social capital theories, this research focused on the peasant households’ behavior, analyzed general influencing factors on the investment behavior, discussed the way to stimulate the investment behavior, dissected the different display patterns for their demand, and put forward a countermeasure and suggestion.The main contents:1. Carding general theories which this research need to refer to, including public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics,motivation theories and social capital theories. Summarizing and reviewing related articles, particularly emphasize on the state-rural society relationship and empirical factors which were affecting the water conservancy facilities demand.2. According to the public goods attribute of small water conservancy, based on the farmer behavior perspective, analyzed the behavior characters and game play of farmers on small water conservancy facilities supply.3. Teasing and analyzing the system evolution of the rural minisize water conservancy facilities in Chongqing by four stages, smmerizing the characteristic, condition and main achievements in each historical periods, summing up experience and lesson, exploring the exsisting problems and difficulties of the supply system in operation viewed of the historical point.4. Analyzing and discussing main factors that influencing the peasants’utility by Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit regression. This part of research used the sample of peasant households that invested in SWCFs in resent five vears. 5. Analyzing by binary logit regression of the investment willingness by money and labor respectively. This research is modeling on account of the static game theory, screening main factors that affects the peasant households’ investment willingness.6. Researching the incentive problem on the peasant households’behavior. This part of research analyzing both explicit and implicit motivation by ways of financial support, instrument perfection and social preference cultivation based on the framework of model "V-I-E".7. Analyzing three main pattern of the demand display, which including initiative contacting, strongman substitution expression, and voting.Conclusion:1. The key point of the effective supply for the rural quasi-public goods is that the reconstruction of rights and obligations between the government and the peasant households. SWCFs are quasi-public goods which has strong externality and monopoly with double nature of public resource and club goods in certain territorial scope. The motivation mechanism, cost apportionments, relationship coordination, organization and mobilization in the cooperated supply are satisfied under the production mode of big collective. However, when the households management replaced the collective production, these problems have not institutional arranged effectively., result in glide of construction of SWCFs, following bad influence on agriculture, urban-rural integration, food security and ecological safety. The construction of SWCFs are not only pressing needs of peasant households, but also duty-bound of the government. The key point of the effective supply for SWCFs is that, to increase the government investment, to respect and ductlead the willingness of peasants, to reconstruction of rights and obligations between them.2. Farmers were generally satisfied with the returns on existing water conservancy construction investment, but is still lacking compared to the initial investment’s enthusiasm, Agricultural income ratio, water use, whether to participate in the management, whether the views work, degree of education are influencing factors. The higher the proportion of agricultural income, farmers satisfaction is higher; The more of water consumption, the greater the famers’satisfaction; Farmers who participated in the management is more satisfied than who were not involved in management; Farmers whose views of the water conservancy construction project is worked are more satisfied; farmers with higher education whose satisfaction is higher.3. The ability of organizers, non-agricultural income level of community, government funded dynamics, utility of water conservancy construction, and education degree influence farmer’s intention to input money; area of paddy field, adequacy of existing facilities, non-agricultural income level of community and education degree influence famers intention to input labor. The empirical results show that, as the income of the farmers is increasing gradually, and the government investment ratio to the SWCFs is rising, income has not become one of the main factors affecting peasant investment. As labour costs rising, farmers tend to capital investment, and the price of main labor in the family is higher, the more willing to invest money. There is a game Among farmers and between farmers and the government. The lower educated groups has less understanding of the importance of water conservancy facilities and keep low investment willingness. There’s big difference between the influencing factor of capital or labour investment. more farmers to consider price factor and utility in theFor capital investment decision-making, they consider more price and utility factors, and behaves more like "Rational Peasant"; only when the water facilities is important, famers consider to input labour, and almost not consider of other factors, as behaves more like "moral famers".4. There are two ways for the government to motivate farmers willingness:the explicit motivation, including financial support and institutional support; the implicit motivation, by guiding or cultivating thesocial preference, such as sense of fairness, moral emotion and social capital. The government financial support is at present matched with the majority of peasants’ subjective expectation, demonstrating the importance to expand investment range in the existing cost sharing proportion, and benefit more water conservancy project. Comprehensive improvement of institutions such as decision-making system, financial supervision system, property rights system, organization system and the water rights system is helpful to enhance peasants’ willingness. Most of the peasants is " discretioner " on fairness, so hitchhike phenomenon has a significant negative impact. Farmers have the potential motive to pay for social welfare, but the SWCFs is not prior in their donation lists. Social networks are still in a certain extent influence the behavior, and encourage the farmers cooperative.5. Forms of willingness expression in construction of SWCFs is diversified. Initiative contacting comes from strong discontent with the status quo, with high authenticity and strong consistency. Broaden expression channels contribute to the eliminating the motivation for initiative contacting. Strongman substitution expression is with high efficiency, but most of the villages do not have such conditions. In addition, Possibility of "Rent-seeking" and mandatory substitution expression is notable. The relative adequacy of public financial transfer payment resources is the precondition of the realization of the voting expression, however the rural cadres are domaint in the rules and space control to suppress the villagers expression, as for the expression of "Elite-control".This form is high efficient in case the divergence is between the villagers and the elite is little, but when big differences occurs, elite control will damage the rights of villagers, or even lead the break of cooperation.Innovation: Established a frame of utility-behavior-demand display-collective action to describe the relationship between person and collective, and alanyzed the joint-supply of SWCFs from the perspective of peasants’ behavior. Be differ from existing research which consider the famers’ supply decision of public goods as a utility function submit to the hypothesis of rationality, this research considered individual heterogeneity and social preference, and introduced factors as income structure changes, uneven development of non-agriculture income level of community, rising of labour price and increase of government investment in recent years, arrived at reliable conclusion, discussed methods of motivation, and to refer to effective supply of SWCFs.

农村小型水利设施的农户投入行为与激励研究

摘要5-8Abstract8-11第1章 导论12-22    1.1 研究背景与研究问题12-16    1.2 概念界定及研究范围说明16-18    1.3 研究思路与内容18-20    1.4 研究方法20-21    1.5 可能的创新点21-22第2章 理论基础与文献综述22-44    2.1 理论基础22-34    2.2 文献综述34-44第3章 小型水利设施投入的农户行为理论分析44-60    3.1 水利设施的类型与属性44-47    3.2 小型水利设施联合供给的经济学分析47-49    3.3 小型水利设施投入的农户行为特征49-54    3.4 小型水利设施投入主体的博弈行为54-57    3.5 小型水利设施有效供给的条件57-58    3.6 本章小结58-60第4章 小型水利设施供给的体制演进60-68    4.1 国家主导下的大集体投入(1949-1978)60-62    4.2 承包制下以村为主体的供给(1979-2001)62-64    4.3 税费改革后乡村合作供给公共品的困境(2002-2011)64-65    4.4 市场化改革的深入与责权重建(2011至今)65-68第5章 小型水利设施农户投入的效用及影响因素68-78    5.1 研究假设与变量选择68-70    5.2 描述性统计70-73    5.3 排序二元选择回归分析73-76    5.4 本章小结76-78第6章 小型水利设施农户投入行为的影响因素78-96    6.1 已有研究及启示78-80    6.2 理论框架与研究假设80-85    6.3 数据说明及变量选择85-91    6.4 实证分析91-93    6.5 本章小结93-96第7章 小型水利设施农户投入需求的显示96-108    7.1 公共品供给的需求显示困难96-97    7.2 背景材料97-98    7.3 主动接触型需求显示98-101    7.4 强人替代型需求显示101-104    7.5 投票表达104-106    7.6 本章小结106-108第8章 小型水利设施农户投入行为的激励108-120    8.1 理论模型与分析框架108-110    8.2 农户投入行为的显性激励110-113    8.3 农户投入行为的隐性激励113-119    8.4 本章小结119-120第9章 研究结论与政策启示120-124    9.1 研究结论120-121    9.2 政策启示121-123    9.3 有待进一步研究的问题123-124参考文献124-132附录132-136致谢136-138攻读研究生期间的科研成果138

  本文关键词：农村小型水利设施的农户投入行为与激励研究，由笔耕文化传播整理发布。