进入管制、腐败与反腐败政策
发布时间：2018-12-27 13:41
【摘要】：本文通过构建一个行业进入管制的混合寡头模型,研究政府在不同制度环境下的最优反腐败政策。我们发现:(1)当腐败成本很低且政府对就业重视程度较小时,政府最优政策是治标(打击腐败但保留进入管制);(2)当政府对就业重视程度非常大时,不论腐败成本高低,政府最优政策都是治本(去除管制);(3)当政府对就业重视程度较大且腐败成本较低,或政府对就业重视程度较小且腐败成本较高时,保持现状是最优选择;(4)治标政策导致社会总产量最低、价格最高,治本政策导致社会总产量最高、价格最低,保持现状政策的结果处于两者之间。本文结论对于当前反腐败政策和简政放权改革具有重要的理论启示。
[Abstract]:By constructing a mixed oligopoly model of industry entry regulation, this paper studies the optimal anti-corruption policy of government in different institutional environments. We find that: (1) when the cost of corruption is very low and the government attaches less importance to employment, the government's best policy is to remedy (combat corruption but retain entry control); (2) when the government attaches great importance to employment, no matter the cost of corruption, the government's best policy is to cure the root (remove the control); (3) when the government pays more attention to employment and the cost of corruption is lower, or the government pays less attention to employment and the cost of corruption is high, the best choice is to maintain the status quo; (4) the palliative policy leads to the lowest total social output and the highest price, while the radical policy leads to the highest total social output and the lowest price. The result of the policy of maintaining the status quo is between the two. The conclusion of this paper has important theoretical implications for the current anti-corruption policy and the reform of decentralization.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金委面上项目(71572190) 教育部青年长江学者项目 中国人民大学科学研究基金项目(17XNH036)的资助
【分类号】：D262.6;F279.2
，
本文编号：2393155
[Abstract]:By constructing a mixed oligopoly model of industry entry regulation, this paper studies the optimal anti-corruption policy of government in different institutional environments. We find that: (1) when the cost of corruption is very low and the government attaches less importance to employment, the government's best policy is to remedy (combat corruption but retain entry control); (2) when the government attaches great importance to employment, no matter the cost of corruption, the government's best policy is to cure the root (remove the control); (3) when the government pays more attention to employment and the cost of corruption is lower, or the government pays less attention to employment and the cost of corruption is high, the best choice is to maintain the status quo; (4) the palliative policy leads to the lowest total social output and the highest price, while the radical policy leads to the highest total social output and the lowest price. The result of the policy of maintaining the status quo is between the two. The conclusion of this paper has important theoretical implications for the current anti-corruption policy and the reform of decentralization.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金委面上项目(71572190) 教育部青年长江学者项目 中国人民大学科学研究基金项目(17XNH036)的资助
【分类号】：D262.6;F279.2
，
本文编号：2393155
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