霍布斯与巴特勒道德动机思想之比较

发布时间：2018-02-04 08:07

本文关键词： 霍布斯约瑟夫·巴特勒道德动机决定论良心道德情感　出处：《郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2014年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：霍布斯认为动机的来源是欲望和嫌恶,而意志仅仅是一个机械运动。道德动机源于自利及其所伴随的对被伤害的恐惧。巴特勒将动机分为四种:自爱、仁爱、混合动机和良心。良心或反思原则引导思考行动的动机和后果,并做出赞许或不赞许的评判,它是高于其他动机的权威。霍布斯与巴特勒的思想都具备英国经验论的色彩,留下一些问题促使后来的哲学家探讨。休谟继承了霍布斯的道德来源于感觉的观点,以及巴特勒道德情感的思想,将社会同情看做首要的道德情感。康德在解决自由意志与决定论难题时,否认道德标准与道德动机来源于经验,提出自由意志在于自由地制定与自由地服从道德法则。舍勒则进一步地综合了理性与情感,发掘了既非理性也非感性的先天性道德情感体验。
[Abstract]:Hobbes believes that motivation comes from desire and disgust, while will is merely a mechanical movement. Moral motivation stems from self-interest and its accompanying fear of being hurt. Butler divides motivation into four categories: self-love and benevolence. A mixture of motivation and conscience. The principle of conscience or reflection guides consideration of the motives and consequences of action and makes judgments of approval or disapproval. It is a higher authority than any other motive. Both Hobbes and Butler's ideas have the color of English empiricism. Some of the questions left behind prompted later philosophers to explore. Hume inherited Hobbes' view of morality derived from feeling and Butler's thought of moral emotion. When solving the problem of free will and determinism, Kant denied that moral standards and moral motives came from experience. The author points out that free will lies in freely formulating and freely obeying moral law, while Scheler further synthesizes reason and emotion, and explores the innate moral emotional experience, which is neither rational nor emotional.
【作者单位】：美国南伊利诺伊大学哲学系;河南工程学院;
【分类号】：B82-0
【正文快照】： 一、霍布斯的意志概念作为近代唯物主义的奠基者,霍布斯在其巨著《利维坦》中出色地展示了机械的认识论和道德哲学体系。知识体系的来源是感觉,动机体系的来源则是欲望。在霍布斯看来,人类有各样的欲望和嫌恶。所谓“直接与行动或不行动相连的那种欲望或嫌恶”,霍布斯意指导

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