道德知识与伦理客观性

发布时间：2018-05-20 00:08

本文选题：道德知识 + 价值的实在性　；参考：《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》2013年01期

【摘要】：关于道德知识的本质的问题与道德辩护问题密切相关。道德虚无主义认为没有什么东西在根本上值得在乎,因为没有什么东西是道德上错的。这个观点已经成为我们时代的人类状况的一个标记。面对虚无主义的这个挑战,很多道德哲学家已经感觉到为人类道德提供一个辩护的迫切性。传统的道德实在论被认为是回应这个挑战的一种有力方式,但有趣的是,这种实在论不仅在某种意义上导致了道德怀疑论,而且也不能对道德动机提出合理的说明。另一方面,非认知主义的道德理论在能够说明道德动机的可能性的同时,却被认为也是道德怀疑论和道德虚无主义的一个来源。本文旨在考察这两种观点之间的一些主要张力,在批评道德知识的物理知识模型的基础上,通过借助于休谟、康德和亚里士多德的观点来试图表明道德知识是一种反思性的知识,并由此对怀疑论和虚无主义的挑战做出一个回答。
[Abstract]:The essence of moral knowledge is closely related to moral defense. Moral nihilism holds that nothing is fundamentally worth caring about because nothing is morally wrong. This view has become a mark of the human condition of our time. Faced with the challenge of nihilism, many moral philosophers have felt the urgency of providing a defense for human morality. Traditional moral realism is considered to be a powerful way to respond to this challenge, but it is interesting to note that this realism not only leads to moral skepticism in a sense, but also fails to provide a reasonable explanation of moral motivation. On the other hand, the non-cognitive moral theory is regarded as a source of moral skepticism and moral nihilism while it can explain the possibility of moral motivation. The purpose of this paper is to examine the main tension between these two views, based on the physical knowledge model of criticizing moral knowledge, through the aid of Hume, Kant and Aristotle try to show that moral knowledge is a kind of reflective knowledge and thus give an answer to the challenge of skepticism and nihilism.
【作者单位】：浙江大学;
【分类号】：B82-02

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