休谟德性理论中的动机问题

发布时间：2018-05-29 21:30

本文选题：休谟 + 道德区分　；参考：《武汉大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：休谟在《人性论》"论道德"部分中主张,一切德性只是因为善良的动机而是有功德的。然而,在休谟划分的两大类三种德性中,动机并没有一贯地在其中起作用。休谟将德性分为两大类:人为德性与自然德性。前者需要通过后天协议和教育形成,如正义;后者与生俱来。自然德性又可以分为两种:一类与人类情感相关,使人在社会上履行职责,如仁爱和慷慨;一类是自然才能,对自己有利,如明智和判断力。动机在这些德性中体现的程度各有不同。正义这类人为德性的原始动机是人类的自私和有限的慷慨,次生动机是在正义德性确立后引起的荣誉感和义务感,它们都不是正义之为德性的原因。正义因为对他人和社会有用而是善的。自然才能,鉴于休谟承认它与意愿无关且不可改变,那么显然不涉及动机。自然才能是有功德的,不是因为动机,而是因为对自己或他人有用,或给他人或自己带来愉快。而在仁爱这类自然德性中,普遍的同情心就是行为的动机。动机要素在此表现得最为充分。鉴于动机在诸种德性中未必体现出来,可见休谟并没有贯彻以动机区分道德性质的观点。休谟总体上认为,经由同情而激发道德感的,都是产生效用或愉快的倾向。作为对"论道德"的改写,《道德原则研究》印证了这点。在后一著作中,人类情感与人为德性被归入有用性与愉快性的框架里,效用和愉快统一了整个理论,道德区分中动机的作用不再被提及。作为当代情感主义伦理学的代表人物,迈克尔·斯洛特受休谟的同情说的启发,发展出了二阶移情的新理论。斯洛特指出,在现代语境下,休谟所谓的同情(sympathy)主要是指移情(empathy)。他进一步把移情分为一阶移情和二阶移情:一阶移情是行动者对他人的移情,二阶移情是旁观者对一阶移情的移情。最后,斯洛特认为,二阶移情才是道德区分的根据,一个行为的道德性质取决于它是否反映了行动者对他人的移情关怀。换言之,在这个理论中,行动者的动机或态度(有无移情)才是道德判断的根据。斯洛特提供了一种较为一贯的动机论的情感主义学说。
[Abstract]:Hume argues in "on morality" that all virtue is meritorious only because of good motives. However, motivation does not always play a role in Hume's two categories and three virtues. Hume divided virtue into two categories: human virtue and natural virtue. The former need to be formed by agreement and education, such as justice; the latter by birth. Natural virtue can be divided into two types: one is related to human emotion, which makes people perform their duties in society, such as benevolence and generosity, and the other is natural talent, which is beneficial to oneself, such as wisdom and judgment. The extent to which motivation is reflected in these virtues varies. The original motive of man's virtue, such as justice, is human selfishness and limited generosity, and the secondary motive is the sense of honor and obligation which is caused by the establishment of justice virtue, and neither of them is the reason why justice is virtue. Justice is good because it is useful to others and society. Natural talent, given Hume's admission that it is irrelevant and irrevocable, clearly does not involve motivation. Natural talent is meritorious, not because of motivation, but because it is useful to, or pleasant to, others or themselves. In such natural virtues as benevolence, universal compassion is the motive for action. Motivational elements are most fully expressed here. In view of the fact that motivation is not necessarily reflected in all kinds of virtues, Hume does not carry out the idea of distinguishing moral nature by motivation. Hume, in general, believes that the moral motivation of compassion is a tendency to produce utility or pleasure. As a rewriting of "on morality", the study of moral principles confirms this point. In the latter work, human emotion and human virtue are classified into the framework of usefulness and pleasure, utility and pleasure unify the whole theory, and the role of motivation in moral differentiation is no longer mentioned. As the representative of contemporary emotionalism ethics, Michael Slote, inspired by Hume's sympathy theory, developed a new theory of second order empathy. Slote pointed out that in modern context, Hume's so-called sympathy is mainly referred to empathy. He further divides empathy into first order empathy and second order empathy: the first order empathy is the actor's empathy to others, the second order empathy is the bystander's empathy to the first order empathy. Finally, Slote believes that the second order empathy is the basis of moral distinction, and the moral nature of an act depends on whether it reflects the empathy of the actor to others. In other words, in this theory, the actor's motivation or attitude (empathy) is the basis of moral judgment. Slote offers a more consistent theory of emotionalism.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B82-0

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