“达尔文式困境”与道德实在论

发布时间：2018-07-06 20:38

本文选题：进化伦理学 + 元伦理学　；参考：《浙江大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：近十年来,一种被称作"进化揭露论证"的论证方式在道德哲学家中间备受关注。该论证的支持者主张,如果我们的评价性判断是自然选择的产物,那么健全的道德实在论就会因为某些形而上学或认识论上的原因而难以为继。这篇论文的目标在于探讨实在论者应当如何应对当前最著名的进化论证之一——斯特里特提出的"达尔文式困境"。论文将通过三个步骤达成该目标。首先,阐明达尔文式困境的具体内容,并整理出其中蕴含的核心挑战。其次,筛选出看上去较为可行的实在论解决方案,并通过分析和论证依次评估这些方案的可信度。最后,根据评估结果确定我认为最可行的实在论解决方案。"达尔文式困境"的最终目标在于让人怀疑设立"独立于立场的道德真理"的健全道德实在论。斯特里特认为,一旦实在论者一方面同意"进化力量对我们评价性判断的内容产生了重大影响"这件事,另一方面又要坚持"独立于立场的评价性真理"存在,那么他就必须否定或肯定二者之间的关系。根据斯特里特的论证,如果他否定上述关系,那么我们大部分评价性判断都是"脱轨"的;相反,如果他肯定上述关系,那么他就只能主张一种在科学上不可信的、关于评价性真理的学说。这两个选项似乎都是实在论者无法接受的。这个论证的核心挑战在于要求实在论者解释"由非循真因果力量产生的评价性判断和与之相应的评价性真理之间难以说明的惊人关系"。论文第4-6章分别审视了三个实在论者用于应对"达尔文式困境"的流行思路。我认为这三个解决方案都因为某些实质性弊端而无法成功拒斥斯特里特的进化揭露论证。"基础主义解决方案"因其支持者们无法在他们的理论框架内正当地建立起不可错的"基础信念"而失败。"第三因解决方案"因为无法通过解释消除"反事实巧合"而显得不太可信。"同罪论证解决方案"的崩溃则源自其论证过程中的致命缺陷。在这样的情况下,实在论者需要一条新的出路。我建议采用"提及物种"策略修正第三因理论中内在的问题,并以"将评价性判断看作推拉表征"的方式拯救元伦理学中符合论的真理观,从而确保弱化版健全道德实在论的成立。
[Abstract]:For nearly a decade, a form of argumentation called evolutional disclosure has attracted much attention among moral philosophers. Proponents of this argument argue that if our evaluative judgment is the product of natural selection, sound moral realism will become unsustainable for some metaphysical or epistemological reasons. The aim of this paper is to explore how the realists should deal with the Darwinian dilemma proposed by Street, one of the most famous evolutionary arguments. The paper will achieve this goal in three steps. First, clarify the specific content of Darwinian dilemma and sort out the core challenges involved. Secondly, the feasible realistic solutions are selected, and the reliability of these solutions is evaluated by analysis and demonstration. Finally, based on the results of the assessment, I believe that the most feasible realistic solution. " The ultimate goal of Darwinian Dilemma is to set up sound moral realism. Street believes that once the positivist agrees that evolutionary forces have had a significant impact on the content of our evaluative judgments, on the other hand, they must insist on the existence of "evaluative truth independent of position." Then he must deny or affirm the relationship between the two. According to Street's argument, if he negates the relationship, most of our evaluative judgments are "derailed"; on the contrary, if he affirms the relationship, then he can only claim a scientifically untrustworthy one. The doctrine of evaluative truth Both options seem unacceptable to realists. The core challenge of this argument is to require the positivist to interpret "the inexplicable relationship between the evaluative judgment and the corresponding evaluative truth generated by the force of non-truth causality". Chapter 4-6 examines the popular ideas of three realists dealing with Darwinian Dilemma. "I think all three solutions cannot successfully reject Street's evolutional disclosure argument because of some substantial drawbacks." The foundational solution "failed because its supporters could not legitimately build the 'fundamental beliefs' within their theoretical framework." The third is that the solution "is not credible because it is impossible to eliminate 'counterfactual coincidences' by interpretation." The collapse of the argumentation solution of the same crime originates from the fatal defects in its argumentation. Under such circumstances, realists need a new way out. I suggest that the "mention of species" strategy be used to correct the inherent problems in the third cause theory, and to save the truth of conformity theory in meta-ethics by "treating evaluative judgment as a push-pull representation". So as to ensure the establishment of the weakened version of sound moral realism.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：B82-0

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