休谟伦理学中的共识理论

发布时间：2018-10-26 16:41

【摘要】：休谟在其伦理学中声称,道德判断不是来自个人情境式的或基于个人利益之上的情感,而是来自人际间某些稳定的和通用的观点,即共识。这就引起两个问题:第一,道德判断似乎成为对过去经验归纳的因果理性活动,这与其情感主义伦理学的基本主张相矛盾;第二,休谟认为人类一切情感都是自足的,却又矛盾地认为由同情而来的共识优越于情境式情感。对休谟同情理论的重新分析使得以上两个问题得到很大程度的解决:首先,共识实质是对社会公益的同情,这一根本规定决定了道德判断最终是一种情感而非理性活动;其次,建立在普遍而稳定的同情的基础上的共识是道德感的唯一来源,其优于其他情感之处就在于共识中内含着对个人和社会长远利益的反思以及对道德考察对象效用(苦乐感)的合理预期。
[Abstract]:Hume claims in his ethics that moral judgment does not come from personal situational or emotion based on personal interests, but rather from some stable and general interpersonal viewpoint, that is, consensus. This leads to two problems: first, moral judgment seems to be the causality of the past experience induction, which contradicts its basic idea of emotionalism ethics; Second, Hume believes that all human emotions are self-sufficient, but paradoxically the consensus from compassion is superior to situational emotion. The reanalysis of Hume's sympathy theory makes the above two problems solved to a great extent: first, the consensus essence is sympathy for the public good, which determines that moral judgment is ultimately an emotional rather than a rational activity; Second, consensus based on universal and stable sympathy is the only source of moral sense, It is superior to other emotions in that the consensus contains reflection on the long-term interests of individuals and society and reasonable expectations of the utility of the object of moral investigation.
【作者单位】：河北经贸大学马克思主义学院;
【基金】：河北省社会科学基金项目“休谟政治伦理思想研究”(HB14ZX008) 河北经贸大学青年基金项目“自然主义视域下的休谟政治伦理研究”(2013KYQ06)
【分类号】：B82-0

【相似文献】