论诺奇克对“自由”与“自愿”的混淆
发布时间：2019-04-01 18:14
【摘要】：诺奇克的国家学说和分配正义的资格理论都基于其对"自由"概念的推崇,然而,在具体的论证中诺奇克不是以"自愿"曲解"自由",就是用"自由"曲解"自愿",从根本上混淆了"自由"与"自愿"两个概念。这些混淆揭示了诺奇克最小国家理论和持有正义理论存在重大漏洞,有必要对其进行澄清。
[Abstract]:Both Nochk's theory of state and the theory of eligibility for distributive justice are based on his admiration for the concept of "freedom." however, in his concrete argument, Nochk either misinterprets "freedom" by "voluntarily" or "freely" by distorting "freedom". It fundamentally confuses the concepts of "freedom" and "voluntary". These confusions reveal that there are significant loopholes in Nochick's theory of minimum state and justice of possession, and it is necessary to clarify them.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学国际关系学院;
【分类号】：B82-02
本文编号：2451768
[Abstract]:Both Nochk's theory of state and the theory of eligibility for distributive justice are based on his admiration for the concept of "freedom." however, in his concrete argument, Nochk either misinterprets "freedom" by "voluntarily" or "freely" by distorting "freedom". It fundamentally confuses the concepts of "freedom" and "voluntary". These confusions reveal that there are significant loopholes in Nochick's theory of minimum state and justice of possession, and it is necessary to clarify them.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学国际关系学院;
【分类号】：B82-02
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