论沉思的伦理地位:亚里士多德幸福概念辨析
发布时间：2019-06-13 09:26
【摘要】：半个世纪以来,对于亚里士多德的幸福到底是沉思还是沉思与其他德性的结合这一问题,西方学界理智论和涵盖论者进行了持续争论,但二者实际上都未能理解沉思的伦理地位。沉思与实践并不是相互排斥的两种活动,沉思为实践提供了目的和价值标准,实践也在这个意义上已经是沉思的了。
[Abstract]:For half a century, there has been a continuous debate about whether Aristotle's happiness is contemplation or the combination of contemplation and other virtues, but neither of them has actually understood the ethical status of contemplation. Contemplation and practice are not two kinds of mutually exclusive activities. Contemplation provides the purpose and value standard for practice, and practice is already meditating in this sense.
【作者单位】： 武汉大学哲学院;贵州师范大学历史与政治学院;
【分类号】：B82-09
，
本文编号：2498429
[Abstract]:For half a century, there has been a continuous debate about whether Aristotle's happiness is contemplation or the combination of contemplation and other virtues, but neither of them has actually understood the ethical status of contemplation. Contemplation and practice are not two kinds of mutually exclusive activities. Contemplation provides the purpose and value standard for practice, and practice is already meditating in this sense.
【作者单位】： 武汉大学哲学院;贵州师范大学历史与政治学院;
【分类号】：B82-09
，
本文编号：2498429
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