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地方政府干预与财务报告舞弊相关性的实证研究

发布时间:2019-06-18 16:35
【摘要】:我国的证券市场远未成熟,近年来财务报告舞弊的现象也没有减少的趋势,并且也造成了严重的经济后果。对于财务报告舞弊动因的研究已经从公司治理、财务识别特征等角度进行了分析,20世纪90年代以来,政府干预及政治关系对企业的影响也逐渐得到了国内外学者们的重视。本文从一个新的角度,即从地方政府干预的这一外部宏观的角度来剖析在我国特殊的经济背景下其对财务报告舞弊的影响。由于政府干预的广泛存在,地方政府已经成为影响企业发展的重要契约方,政治资本也成为企业的重要资本来源,因此本文选择地方政府作为切入点,全面分析其与上市公司的关系,基于经济学的理论分析地方政府干预对定期编制的财务报告的影响。同时,由于我国各个地区的法治环境不同,所以本文从法治环境的角度进行进一步的研究,来分析在不同的法治环境下,地方政府干预与财务报告舞弊的相关性。 本文研究的理论基础包括市场失灵理论、信号传递理论以及舞弊三角理论。上市公司的信息披露是公司向投资者和社会公众沟通信息的桥梁。真实、全面、充分的信息才能对投资者的投资理念有真正的帮助。但是,公司管理者和外部投资者之间存在着信息不对称,管理者会通过适当的方式来向市场传达信息。如果经营效果理想,那么公司便会通过披露利润、积极融资、发放股利等方式向外部宣告,通过传达其经济业绩实现提升股价,提高公司价值的目的。当公司业绩较差时,如果披露真实的信息会对公司形象和股价产生影响,这时管理层便有了虚假披露的倾向。如果地方政府对市场和企业过度干预,公司的指标压力也就越大,这样公司就越有动机对财务报告进行虚假陈述来实现地方政府的指标,同时由于地方政府的外部保护作用,管理层的侥幸心理也就越严重,进而会增加财务报告舞弊的机会。所以在面临不利的情形时,地方政府干预更强的公司更可能会通过修改财务报告来向市场传递虚假的财务信息,地方政府干预与财务报告舞弊具有正向关系。 本文通过建立1ogistic回归模型对304个样本进行分析,来实证检验地方政府干预与财务报告舞弊的相关关系。本文的研究结论主要包括以下两点:(1)如果上市公司所处地区地方政府干预动机越强,那么发生上市公司财务报告舞弊的可能性越大,即地方政府干预与财务报告舞弊呈正相关关系。(2)法治环境越差,由于企业的侥幸心理更严重并且舞弊的惩罚成本相对较低,因此地方政府干预与财务报告舞弊的相关性越强;法治环境越好,地方政府干预与财务报告舞弊的相关性越低。 本文共分为六个部分 第一部分,绪论。这一部分主要阐明文章的研究背景和意义、研究方法、研究目的和内容以及本文的创新点。 第二部分,文献回顾及述评。这一部分首先对财务报告舞弊从形成机理、识别特征、防范三个方面进行归纳,然后对地方政府干预从形成机理、与企业业绩和会计信息质量的关系三个方面进行归纳,最后,对研究现状进行总体评述。 第三部分,理论基础、制度背景和相关概念界定。这一部分首先对相关理论进行分析,包括市场失灵理论、舞弊三角理论、信号传递理论,然后对我国政府干预的制度背景进行分析,最后对政府干预、财务报告舞弊的相关概念做出界定。 第四部分,研究设计。第四和第五部分是本文的研究重点,在这一部分主要介绍本文的研究假设,之后对模型的构建、变量的定义和数据的来源进行展开分析。 第五部分,实证回归结果分析。这一部分首先对样本总量进行特征描述性统计,然后列示舞弊样本和配对样本的T检验,最后阐述SPSS19.0软件对数据的处理结果。 第六部分,结论与建议。这一部分首先对实证回归的结果进行分析,得出结论,然后针对文章研究的内容对我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的防范提出相关建议,并进一步指出本文研究的局限性和未来可能发展方向。 本文从地方政府干预的角度对财务报告舞弊进行剖析,分析两者的相关性,同时从全新的角度提出有助于预防和减少财务报告舞弊的对策,不仅提出了识别财务报告舞弊的新的影响因素,而且丰富了财务报告舞弊的防范理论。
[Abstract]:China's securities market is far from mature, and the phenomenon of financial report fraud has not been reduced in recent years, and has also caused serious economic consequences. The research on the causes of financial reporting fraud has been analyzed from the aspects of corporate governance and financial identification. Since the 1990s, the effects of government intervention and political relations on enterprises have been paid more and more attention by the scholars at home and abroad. This paper, from a new point of view, is to analyze the influence of the external macro-level from the local government's intervention on the financial report's fraud in the special economic background of our country. Because of the wide existence of government intervention, the local government has become an important contract party that affects the development of the enterprise, and the political capital also becomes the important capital source of the enterprise, so the paper selects the local government as the entry point, and analyzes the relationship between the local government and the listed company. On the basis of the theory of economics, the effect of local government intervention on the financial reports prepared on a regular basis is analyzed. At the same time, since the rule of law environment in our country is different, this article makes a further study from the angle of the rule of law environment to analyze the correlation between local government intervention and financial report fraud under different rule of law environment. The theoretical basis of this paper includes the theory of market failure, the theory of signal transmission and the rule of fraud. The information disclosure of the listed company is the bridge of the company to communicate information to the investors and the public. The real, comprehensive and sufficient information can truly help the investor's investment concept However, there is information asymmetry between the manager of the company and the external investor, and the manager will send the letter to the market through the appropriate means If the operation effect is ideal, the company will announce to the outside through disclosure of profits, positive financing, and distribution of dividends, so as to improve the company's value by communicating its economic performance to improve the stock price. . When the company's performance is poor, if the disclosure of the real information will have an impact on the company's image and the stock price, the management has a false disclosure. In the case of local government's excessive intervention on the market and the enterprise, the greater the index pressure of the company, the more motivation the company is to make false statements about the financial report to achieve the local government's indicators, and the more severe the management's relief is due to the external protection of the local government Heavy, in turn, will increase the number of financial reporting fraud Yes, so in the face of a negative situation, local government intervention is more likely to deliver false financial information to the market by modifying financial reporting, where local government intervention and financial reporting fraud have a positive correlation This paper is based on the analysis of 304 samples by the establishment of a logistic regression model to examine the phase of local government intervention and financial reporting fraud. The research conclusion of this paper mainly includes the following two points: (1) If the local government intervention motivation of the listed company is stronger, the greater the possibility of the financial report fraud of the listed company, that is, the local government intervention and the financial report fraud are normal. (2) The worse the environment of the rule of law, the stronger the local government's intervention and the fraud of the financial report, the better the environment of the rule of law, the local government's intervention and the fraud of the financial report. The lower the sex. divided into six parts The first part, the introduction, this part mainly expounds the research background and significance of the article, the research method, the research purpose and the content. And the point of innovation in this paper. In this part, the author sums up the financial report fraud from the formation mechanism, the identification feature and the prevention, and then sums up the relationship between the formation mechanism, the enterprise performance and the quality of the accounting information in the local government. The third part, the theoretical foundation, This part first analyzes the relevant theories, including the theory of market failure, the theory of fraud triangle, the theory of signal transmission, and then analyzes the system background of the government intervention, and finally, the government's intervention and the financial report the relevant concept of fraud The fourth part and the fifth part are the research focus of this paper. In this part, we mainly introduce the research hypothesis of this paper, and then the construction of the model and the determination of the variable The source of the meaning and data is analyzed. The fifth part, the analysis of the result of the empirical regression. This part first carries on the characteristic descriptive statistics on the total quantity of the sample, then shows the T-test of the fraud sample and the paired sample, and finally expounds the SPS. S19.0 Software-to-data The sixth part, conclusion and suggestion, this part first analyses the result of the empirical regression, draws a conclusion, and then puts forward some suggestions on the prevention of the financial report fraud of listed companies in our country, and further points out that This paper studies the limitation and the future development direction. This paper analyzes the financial report fraud from the angle of local government intervention, and analyzes the correlation of the two. At the same time, it puts forward the countermeasures to prevent and reduce the financial report fraud from a new perspective. Only a new impact on the identification of financial reporting fraud is put forward
【学位授予单位】:东北财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:D625;F224;F275

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