克里普克的“信念之谜”研究
发布时间：2019-02-17 19:03
【摘要】： 克里普克是当今美国著名的哲学家和逻辑学家,他在1979年发表的《关于信念的疑难》一文中,提出了信念之谜,在使用去引号原则、去引号原则的双条件形式以及翻译原则的前提下,克里普克把信念之谜表述为:皮埃尔究竟相信还是不相信伦敦是美丽的?这个谜题不仅涉及了同一替换律、信念、意向性等重要理论,还涉及了语言学、哲学、心理学、逻辑学等重要领域。 信念之谜提出后,在国外哲学界引起了极大的震动,虽然克里普克本人一直强调在现有的知识条件下无法解决这一难题,但还是有许多学者对这一问题进行了分析探讨,并从不同角度提出了各自的解谜方案,例如有福格林的“分离的信念系统”、索萨的“解释原则”、普特南的“等同描述”、盖若特的“识别性知识”概念以及费特的“强意义和弱意义理论”等,他们的观点虽然都有一定的合理性或者为我们提供了一个解决问题的视角,但是他们的方案都无法从根本上解决信念之谜。因为他们忽视了对信念之谜的理论背景的深层次探讨以及对信念本身特点的分析。 本文在借鉴国外最新解谜方案的基础上,对信念之谜作了重新思考。首先,在信念之谜是否有解决方案这一问题上,笔者通过对克里普克的专名理论即他和其他学者分歧的根源的探讨,驳斥了克里普克所谓的“信念之谜无解”的观点,而肯定了信念之谜是有解决方案的。同时在对克里普克的专名理论的分析过程中,笔者找到了解决信念之谜的关键,即:专名本身可以没有涵义,但是说话者却可以后天赋予专名以相关联的描述性信息,这也在一定程度上融合了克里普克和其他学者的观点。其次,笔者通过对信念理论、意向性理论以及专名的语义学语用学理论的分析,对上述观点的可能性和合理性进行了论证,并得出结论:在信念之谜问题上,虽然专名本身没有涵义,但是说话者却可以根据自身的意向性内容而赋予专名以涵义,不过需要指出的是,这种涵义不是专名本身所固有的,而是后天被赋予的。由此,笔者通过将信念理论、意向性理论、专名的指称理论相融合,对信念之谜作了一次尝试性解答。 这种解答也表明了笔者的专名理论观点。即,专名只有指称而没有涵义,在如何实现指称的问题上,笔者认为,说话者是根据自身的意向性内容而赋予专名以涵义的。这本质上也是描述理论和直接指称理论的融合。实际上,也有很多学者讨论过这个问题,如林斯基、陈波等。
[Abstract]:Kripke, a famous philosopher and logician in the United States today, put forward the riddle of belief in his 1979 article on the problem of Faith, using the principle of quotation marks. On the premise of the double conditional form of the quoted principle and the principle of translation, Kripke describes the riddle of belief as: does Pierre believe or do not believe that London is beautiful? This puzzle involves not only the same substitution law, belief, intentionality and other important theories, but also the important fields of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, logic and so on. After the riddle of belief was put forward, it caused a great shock in foreign philosophy circles. Although Kripke himself has always stressed that the problem cannot be solved under the existing knowledge, many scholars have made an analysis and discussion of this problem. And they put forward their own solutions from different angles, such as the Faith system of Separation by Fogling, the principle of interpretation by Souza, and the equivalent description by Putnam. Galot's concept of "discernible knowledge" and Fett's "theory of strong and weak meaning", although their views are reasonable or provide us with a perspective to solve the problem. But none of their solutions can solve the riddle of faith at all. Because they ignore the deep discussion of the theoretical background of the riddle of belief and the analysis of the characteristics of the belief itself. This paper reconsiders the riddle of belief on the basis of drawing lessons from the latest foreign puzzles. First of all, on the question of whether there is a solution to the riddle of belief, the author refutes Kripke's point of view that "the riddle of belief has no solution" by discussing the origin of Kripke's theory of proper name, that is, the difference between him and other scholars. And affirmed that the riddle of faith has a solution. At the same time, in the process of analyzing Kripke's theory of proper name, the author finds the key to solve the riddle of belief, that is, the proper name itself can have no meaning, but the speaker can assign the proper name with associated descriptive information. This, in part, combines the views of Kripke and other scholars. Secondly, through the analysis of belief theory, intentionality theory and semantic pragmatics theory of proper name, the author demonstrates the possibility and rationality of the above views, and draws a conclusion: in the problem of the riddle of belief, Although the proper name itself has no meaning, the speaker can assign the proper name with the meaning according to his intended content. However, it should be pointed out that this meaning is not inherent in the proper name itself, but is given by the day after tomorrow. Therefore, the author makes a tentative solution to the riddle of belief by combining belief theory, intentionality theory and reference theory of proper name. This solution also shows the author's theory of proper name. That is to say, the proper name has only the reference but no meaning. On how to realize the reference, the author thinks that the speaker gives the proper name the meaning according to his intention content. In essence, it is the fusion of descriptive theory and direct reference theory. In fact, many scholars have discussed this issue, such as Linsky, Chen Bo and so on.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：B812
本文编号：2425496
[Abstract]:Kripke, a famous philosopher and logician in the United States today, put forward the riddle of belief in his 1979 article on the problem of Faith, using the principle of quotation marks. On the premise of the double conditional form of the quoted principle and the principle of translation, Kripke describes the riddle of belief as: does Pierre believe or do not believe that London is beautiful? This puzzle involves not only the same substitution law, belief, intentionality and other important theories, but also the important fields of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, logic and so on. After the riddle of belief was put forward, it caused a great shock in foreign philosophy circles. Although Kripke himself has always stressed that the problem cannot be solved under the existing knowledge, many scholars have made an analysis and discussion of this problem. And they put forward their own solutions from different angles, such as the Faith system of Separation by Fogling, the principle of interpretation by Souza, and the equivalent description by Putnam. Galot's concept of "discernible knowledge" and Fett's "theory of strong and weak meaning", although their views are reasonable or provide us with a perspective to solve the problem. But none of their solutions can solve the riddle of faith at all. Because they ignore the deep discussion of the theoretical background of the riddle of belief and the analysis of the characteristics of the belief itself. This paper reconsiders the riddle of belief on the basis of drawing lessons from the latest foreign puzzles. First of all, on the question of whether there is a solution to the riddle of belief, the author refutes Kripke's point of view that "the riddle of belief has no solution" by discussing the origin of Kripke's theory of proper name, that is, the difference between him and other scholars. And affirmed that the riddle of faith has a solution. At the same time, in the process of analyzing Kripke's theory of proper name, the author finds the key to solve the riddle of belief, that is, the proper name itself can have no meaning, but the speaker can assign the proper name with associated descriptive information. This, in part, combines the views of Kripke and other scholars. Secondly, through the analysis of belief theory, intentionality theory and semantic pragmatics theory of proper name, the author demonstrates the possibility and rationality of the above views, and draws a conclusion: in the problem of the riddle of belief, Although the proper name itself has no meaning, the speaker can assign the proper name with the meaning according to his intended content. However, it should be pointed out that this meaning is not inherent in the proper name itself, but is given by the day after tomorrow. Therefore, the author makes a tentative solution to the riddle of belief by combining belief theory, intentionality theory and reference theory of proper name. This solution also shows the author's theory of proper name. That is to say, the proper name has only the reference but no meaning. On how to realize the reference, the author thinks that the speaker gives the proper name the meaning according to his intention content. In essence, it is the fusion of descriptive theory and direct reference theory. In fact, many scholars have discussed this issue, such as Linsky, Chen Bo and so on.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：B812
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 蒉益民;;从弗雷格之谜及信念之谜看心灵内容与语义内容的关系[J];世界哲学;2006年06期
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