知识的事实性:预设vs.语用隐含

发布时间：2019-02-22 09:26

【摘要】：知识都是事实性的。但是,需要区分"事实性"的两种不同含义。第一种含义被称为"蕴含"解释,其认为"S知道P"蕴含P;换句话说,从"S知道P"到P的推理是演绎有效的;"S知道P"要求P为其必然后承而不是可以被取消的语用隐含。第二种含义被称为"预设"解释,其认为"S知道P"不仅蕴含P,而且预设P;根据对预设的通常理解,这等于要求"S不知道P"也预设P。事实上,"S不知道P"只是在某些语境中"语用隐含"P,却并不预设P。在摒弃预设解释后,我们还可以区分出"中怀疑论",而这才是最常见的怀疑论结论;另外,如果我们将外怀疑论结论明确地表达为"P,但S不知道P",则著名的盖梯尔问题也可以看成是外怀疑论结论的具体实例。
[Abstract]:Knowledge is all factual. However, two different meanings of "factual" need to be distinguished. The first meaning is called "implied" interpretation, which holds that "S knows P" implies P; in other words, the reasoning from "S knows P" to "P" is deductive. "S knows P" requires P to be its inevitable successor rather than a pragmatic implication that can be cancelled. The second meaning is called "presupposition" interpretation, which holds that "S knows P" not only implies P, but also presupposes P; according to the general understanding of presupposition, this is equivalent to "S not knowing P" but also presupposing P4. In fact, "S does not know P" is only "pragmatic implicit" in some contexts, but does not presuppose P. After abandoning presupposition interpretation, we can also distinguish between "middle skepticism", which is the most common conclusion of skepticism. In addition, if we express the conclusion of extraneous skepticism as "P, but S does not know P", then the famous Geltier problem can also be regarded as a concrete example of the conclusion of extraneous skepticism.
【作者单位】：四川大学哲学系;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目:12AZX008;12AZD072 教育部人文社会科学青年资助项目:15YJC72040001 四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目(编号:skzx2015-sb05;skqy201645)的资助
【分类号】：B815.3

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