密尔功利主义自由原则保护个人自由权利的可能性

发布时间：2018-05-12 23:22

本文选题：密尔 + 功利主义　；参考：《伦理学研究》2013年05期

【摘要】：密尔为了保护个人在涉己行为领域的自由而提出的功利主义自由原则遭受了诸如伤害概念模糊不清、涉己与涉他行为领域的划分不可能、自由原则与功利原则相冲突的指责。密尔通过把伤害概念界定为是对他人或公众"明确的且可指定的义务"的违背、是对他人已经发生了的"确定的损害"和"可觉察得到的"损害,伤害的内容是指对他人应当认作权利的利益的伤害,以使伤害概念可能成为自由原则的基础;通过把"对他人的影响"区别于"对他人的伤害",使得涉他行为领域与涉己行为领域的划分成为可能;通过把于己无害的涉己行为界定为个体自我发展的行为、自由原则的适用范围只限定于成熟的人类及人类个体、自愿受影响不完全等同于自愿受伤害等来实现自由原则与功利原则的一致性。因此,密尔的自由原则具有保护个人自由权利的可能性,然而,这种可能性是基于密尔的许多"设定"为基础的,因此,密尔功利主义自由原则保护个人自由权利的可能性是有限度的。
[Abstract]:The principle of utilitarian freedom put forward by Mill in order to protect the individual freedom in the field of personal behavior has been criticized such as the vagueness of the concept of harm, the impossibility of dividing the field of personal and other behavior, and the conflict between the principle of freedom and the principle of utility. By defining the concept of injury as a breach of a "clear and identifiable obligation" towards another person or the public, Mill is responsible for the "definitive damage" and "detectable" harm that has occurred to others, The content of injury refers to the harm to the interests of others which should be recognized as rights, so that the concept of injury may become the basis of the principle of freedom; By differentiating "influence on others" from "harm to others", it is possible to divide the field of behavior involving others from the field of behavior involving oneself, and by defining self-development as behavior that is harmless to oneself, The scope of application of the principle of freedom is limited to mature human beings and human individuals, and voluntary influence is not completely equivalent to voluntary injury to achieve the consistency between the principle of freedom and the principle of utility. Thus, Mill's principle of liberty has the potential to protect the individual's right to liberty. However, this possibility is based on many of Mill's "assumptions", so, There is a limit to the possibility that Mill's utilitarian liberal principle protects the individual's right to liberty.
【作者单位】：广西师范大学;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学项目“功利主义伦理学及其当代价值研究”(批准号:10YJA720018),“国家哲学社会科学基金项目英国当代道德哲学发展”(批准号:08BZX058) 广西教育科学“十一五”课题“伦理学与大学生道德实践能力培养研究”(批准号:2010B16) 广西师范大学博士基金项目“密尔对功利原则的辩护” 广西文科中心“特色研究团队培育工程”项目“桂商研究团队”
【分类号】：D09

【共引文献】