“两党制”选举与规制俘获博弈——对托里森规制俘获模型的思考

发布时间：2018-12-11 09:00

【摘要】：规制俘获理论始于20世纪70年代,由美国经济学家斯蒂格勒指出利益集团往往会向规制者支付"价格"以俘获规制政府,使得政府据此作出有利于该利益集团的公共决策。托里森规制均衡模型则是在此基础上,根据规制者、生产者、消费者三大利益主体自身利益的需要,会相互妥协并最终实现帕累托最优。笔者在以上经济学研究基础上,运用博弈论的知识,在三方博弈的基础上将西方社会政治体系中普遍存在的两党选举制运用到模型中,对托里森模型进行了修正,发现在托里森模型中的最优均衡在现实中将永远不会实现,而西方政党中常用的两党选举往往会导致政党出于选票最大化的角度向所代表的利益集团倾斜,并最终酿成生产者危机与消费者危机,进而得出两党选举制才是欧美国家陷入经济危机的一个重要根源。
[Abstract]:The theory of regulatory capture began in the 1970s, when American economist Stigler pointed out that interest groups often pay "prices" to regulators to capture the regulatory government, which makes the government make a public decision in favor of the interest group. On the basis of this, Torrison's equilibrium model of regulation will compromise with each other and finally realize Pareto optimal according to the needs of the interests of the three main interests of the regulators, producers and consumers. On the basis of the above economic research, using the knowledge of game theory and on the basis of tripartite game, the author applies the popular two-party election system in the western social and political system to the model, and modifies the Torrison model. It is found that the optimal equilibrium in the Torrison model will never be realized in reality, and that the bipartisan elections commonly used in Western political parties tend to cause the parties to tilt to the interest groups represented by the maximization of the votes. And finally lead to producer crisis and consumer crisis, and then came to the conclusion that the bipartisan electoral system is an important source of economic crisis in Europe and the United States.
【作者单位】：北京交通大学经济管理学院;
【分类号】：D05

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