国有资本参与创业投资的模式选择与制度分析

发布时间：2018-01-10 13:15

本文关键词：国有资本参与创业投资的模式选择与制度分析　出处：《西南财经大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自1985年组建“中国新技术创业投资公司”以来,我国创业投资市场(VC)的不断扩大过程中,便始终都伴有国有资本的身影。并且,国有资本在很长一段期间内不仅提供资金支持,而且还直接负责创投基金的运营。与此同时,以法治水平为标志的外部制度环境却并非如创投市场那般“一日千里”,单是从成文法的角度来观察,便会发现：直到2002年之后,创业投资领域(含国有资本)的运行规范才相继颁行。质言之,“法律至上论”常常言及的“市场经济就是法治经济”的观点,却在我国国有资本参与创业投资的市场实践中遇到了“挑战”——我国法律制度并不当然构成创业投资市场兴起的前提。那么从“法律与经济发展”的宏观视角观之,这两者又存在怎样的关联呢?或者说是不是真的没有关联?这便是本文的核心理论之所在。“存在不一定合理,但存在一定有原因”。本文正是基于对国有资本参与创业投资市场的商业实践与传统理论的反差,集中研判的主题是：在我国法治相对缺失的背景下,国有资本是如何建立并发展创业投资市场的。并借此“中国故事”呈现和反思,在中国语境下法律与经济发展的真实关系。鉴于此,本文分为如下几章,以期给予阐述和建构：第一章属于全文的引论,不仅在于阐明前述事实与理论之间的“悖论”,而且试图开宗明义地提出作者对于这一论题的解释,并将其作为全文的理论中心：法律与经济发展之间存在着双向的互动结构,一方面承认法律是对一定时期经济发展情形的反映、继承乃至强化,否定“想当然地”法律创设或者改革。并且,认为早期的经济发展相对独立于法律制度；但另一方面又赋予法律以主动者姿态,认为法律同样构成经济发展的约束性条件。为了厘清这一理论观点在整个学术脉络当中的位置,本章特别选取了“法律与经济发展”理论中颇具代表性的四篇经典文献(LLSV、Pistor、Coffee、鹤光太郎,他们彼此之间也是相互映证的),并认为法律与经济发展的双向互动关系虽然能够从其文献之中获得隐约感知,但是更多地还是单向度的关系研究。基于此,本文所意欲构建的“法律与经济发展”的“双向互动结构”,既区别于“法律至上论”(law matters)的外生性视角,认为法律的生长独立于经济发展,非成熟法治无以建立市场交易；但也有别于“法律内生性”理论的单向度法治观,仅认为法律是对现实交易均衡模式的固定和呈现。第二章旨在从事实角度“勾勒”我国国有资本参与创业投资的模式选择,并将其作为后续各章理论解释的对象。这是一种时空纬度的观察,它既选择从域外比较的视角来厘清我国国有资本的参与样态：持股模式；又将视线在1985-2015年的时间当中穿梭,并发现即使是国有资本的持股模式,也居然在2002年前后发生了重要变化：直接\间接。概言之,我国国有资本参与创业投资市场存在两项(模式)特色：第一、国有资本始终参与其中；第二、国有资本以持股(直接\间接)方式参与其中。第三章旨在针对上述第一项特点予以理论性解释——为什么国有资本始终参与创业投资。为此,本章首先比较银行融资、民间借贷、内部入股以及创业投资(VC)四种金融模式与高新初创企业困境的匹配情况,并借此确定发展创业投资市场的必要性。在此基础之上,本章将同时探讨创业投资市场的失灵情况——羊群效应与规模效应(外部性),以及国有资本的参与行为(暂且不论何种具体方式)对于克服上述市场失灵的重要价值。与此相对,本章还将专门探讨另外一种克服上述市场失灵的方案——“先规范,后发展”的立法主导模式。也正是基于国有资本的参与行为和“先规范,后发展”的立法主导模式之间的这种比较,更加确定了本章的理论观点：国有资本参与创业投资市场是为应对创投市场的失灵(内生性)而进行的理性选择,并非立法主导模式下的强制推行。换句话说,国有资本参与创业投资的逻辑在于市场而非法律,参与行为本身与法律制度的设计之间存在相对的独立性。第四章是从我国创投市场的个性化特点——法治缺失与声誉失灵的背景出发,继续探究“为什么国有资本始终参与创业投资”。其主旨在于探讨,国有资本在我国创业投资市场建立初期,起到了替代法律制度和声誉机制的治理功效。基于此,三、四两章的关系可以从立论前提做出区分：一样的市场失灵,不一样的治理风险。所以,本章开篇便从风险构成的角度将其概括为双层代理成本,但是创投市场建立初期我国不仅法律约束欠缺,而且声誉等非正式制度也功效甚微。与此同时,国有资本的参与行为却由于地域限制和政治关联的原因,而在客观上替代性地发挥了降低前述代理成本的功能。综上：国有资本参与创业投资市场的发展(早期)是相对独立于法律制度的。第五章则是针对前述第二项特点予以理论解释,即国有资本为什么以持股(直接\间接)方式参与创投。其中,法律制度的差异导致投融资合作收益的不确定性,从而影响了合作方式的采用(债权模式由于缺乏动态调整而对法治条件要求更高)。而直接投资模式的产生,则是由于既有法律制度促成了国有资本在人力、科技、资金多方面的集聚优势,从而导致了国有资本参与模式的“路径依赖”。国有资本之所以会向间接投资方式转变,则是因为变化后的法律制度与声誉机制发挥了约束效果,并且法律制度的变化还导致外商、民营投资等多种模式对国有资本的直接投资模式形成了竞争压力。由此可见,经济发展(方式)离不开法律制度及其变化的制约与推动。第六章属于全文的结论,一为总结,二为延伸。一方面,通过对我国创业投资市场的建立和发展的模式解释,本文发现国有资本的参与实际上属于经济发展的必然逻辑(应对市场失灵),并非成文法制度自上而下进行安排和设计的结果。而且,国有资本的参与行为还替代了早期市场的法治缺失与声誉失灵,从而说明经济发展(早期)对法律制度的相对独立性。与此同时,我国国有资本以持股(直接\间接)方式参与创业投资的理论解释,证明经济发展(方式)离不开法律制度的约束和推动。另一方面,本文并不是否定正式法律有效论,而仅仅是想通过考察一项具体商业交易的发生过程来全面理解法律与经济发展的真实关系。并且,凭借本文提炼的法律与经济发展的双向互动结构,可以适用于对国企改革、创新创业等话题的继续讨论。
[Abstract]:Since 1985 the formation of "Chinese new technology venture capital company since China's venture capital market (VC) of the expanding process, will always accompanied by the state-owned capital and state-owned capital. The figure, not only provides for a long period of financial support, but also directly responsible for the operation of venture capital fund. At the same time. The external institutional environment to the level of the rule of law as a symbol of the venture capital market is not like that, one is from a thousand li a day" into grammar view, we may see that until after 2002, the field of venture capital (including state-owned capital) that have been issued. The standard operation in essence, "the supremacy of law theory" often says "the market economy is the economy ruled by law" point of view, but in the market practice of China's state-owned capital to participate in the venture investment in a "challenge" of China's legal system does not constitute the venture capital market interest The premise. So from the macro perspective of law and economic development "concept, and what is the correlation between the two? Or is not really no association? This is the core theory of this paper." there is not necessarily reasonable, but there must be a reason. "This is the business practice the state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market and traditional theory based on contrast, concentrated judged the theme: the rule of law in our country is relatively scarce in the background, state-owned capital is how to establish and develop the venture capital market. And this" Chinese story "presentation and reflection, the true relationship between law and economic development in the context of China in view of this, this paper is divided into the following chapters, in order to give explanation and construction: the first chapter is the introduction to the full text, to clarify the facts and theories is not only between the" paradox ", and tries to put forward clearly The explanation for this topic, which will serve as the theoretical center of the full text: there are two-way interactive structure between law and economic development, on the one hand that the law is to reflect the situation of economic development in a certain period, and even strengthen the denial of inheritance, the law or most probably it did not actually happen "reform. And that early economic development independent legal system; but on the other hand, the law gives to the active attitude, think the law constitutes a constraint for economic development. In order to clarify this point of view in the academic context of the position, this chapter selects" on behalf of a legal and economic development "theory of the four classic the literature (LLSV, Pistor, Coffee, Tsuruhikaru Taro, is also a mutual reflection between them, and that the) two-way interaction between the legal and economic development although can from the literature Study on the relationship between the obtained vaguely perception, but more is unidirectional. Based on this, this paper intends to construct the "legal and economic development" and "interactive structure" is different from "the supremacy of law theory" (law matters) exogenous perspective, that the law is independent of the growth of economic development, non mature rule of law to establish market transactions; but there are one-way law different from the "endogenous legal theory view, only that the law is fixed and presented to the real transaction equilibrium model. The second chapter aims to" Outline "point of view from the fact that China's state-owned capital to participate in the venture investment mode selection, and the subsequent interpretation as an object each chapter of theory. This observation is a spatio-temporal latitude, it can choose from the extraterritorial comparative perspective to clarify China's state-owned capital in state ownership mode; and the line of sight: in 1985-2015 years time The shuttle, and found that even the shareholding pattern of state-owned capital, even in 2002 and has undergone significant changes: direct and indirect. In general, China's state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market is two (mode) features: first, the state-owned capital has always been involved; second, state-owned capital holding (direct and indirect) in which third. The first chapter aims at the characteristics to be theoretical explanation for why the state-owned capital has always been involved in venture investment. Therefore, this chapter compares bank financing, private lending, venture capital and internal shares (VC), four kinds of financial models and the plight of high-tech start-ups, and to determine the necessity of the development of venture capital investment the market. On this basis, this chapter will also discuss failure: herding effect and scale effect of the venture capital market (external), and state-owned capital Participation (regardless of what specific way) for important value to overcome the market failure. In contrast, this chapter will be devoted to another to overcome the market failure of the program -- the "first legislative norms, the dominant mode of development". It is based on the participation of state-owned capital and the "first specification the comparison between the legislative mode leading development", the more certain theoretical perspectives in this chapter: the state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market is the failure to deal with venture capital market (endogenous) rational choice of legislation is not mandatory, dominant mode. In other words, the state-owned capital to participate in the venture investment logic is the market rather than the law, there is relative independence between itself and involved in the design of the legal system. The fourth chapter is from the individual characteristics of China's venture capital market and the lack of rule of Law -- Reputation failure background, to explore why the state-owned capital has always been involved in venture capital ". The main purpose is to explore the state-owned capital in China's venture capital market established, to replace the legal system and the reputation mechanism of the governance effect. Based on this, the three, 42 chapter can distinguish from the premise: the failure of the market, not the same governance risk. Therefore, this chapter begins from the perspective of risk will be summed up as double agent cost, but the early establishment of venture capital market in China not only lack of legal constraints, and the reputation of the informal institutions such as have little effect. At the same time, participation of state-owned capital is due to geographical restrictions and the political connection, and the objective of alternative play reduce agency cost function. The summary: development of state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market (early) is Relatively independent legal system. The fifth chapter is the second characteristics to explain that the state-owned capital holdings (direct and indirect) why to participate in venture capital. Among them, the legal system difference leads to the co financing of income uncertainty, which affects the way of cooperation (pattern of debt due to the lack of dynamic adjustment of the rule of law requirements higher). A direct investment model, is due to the existing legal system of science and technology contributed to the state-owned capital in human capital, agglomeration advantages, in many aspects, which leads to the state-owned capital to participate in the mode of "path dependence". The reason why the state-owned capital shift to indirect investment, it is because of the law after the change of system and the reputation mechanism play a restraint effect, and the changes in the legal system also led to foreign, private investment and other modes of state-owned capital direct investment Capital has formed the model of competitive pressure. Therefore, the economic development (way) cannot do without restricting the legal system and its change and promotion. The sixth chapter is the conclusion of the paper, as a summary, the extension. On the one hand, through the establishment and development of China's venture capital market model to explain, the inevitable logic of state-owned capital the participation actually belongs to the economic development (with market failure), and the design results are not top of the statutory law. Moreover, participation of state-owned capital is to replace the lack of rule of law and the reputation of the early market failure, so that the economic development (early) on the legal system of the relative independence. At the same time, China's state-owned (direct and indirect) held in the capital in the interpretation of venture investment theory, proof of the economic development (way) cannot do without the legal system constraints and push. On the other hand, this paper No formal legal theory is effective, and the true relationship to the process of investigation of a specific business to fully understand the legal and economic development only. And, by virtue of interactive structure this paper refines the legal and economic development, can be applied to the reform of state-owned enterprises, innovation and other topics to continue the discussion.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D922.28

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