独处权初论

发布时间：2018-04-25 09:28

本文选题：独处 + 隐私　；参考：《苏州大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：独处权由来已久,却一直禁锢于隐私权的概念下。但就本质上而言,独处权与隐私权是两种相互独立的权利,两者在权益核心、客体、构成方面各不相同。进一步地,独处权作为一项独立的权利与自由权、人身自由权、住宅权、空间权也并具有异质性。在证成权利独立性的基础上,本文继而从心理学、社会学等多角度分析了独处权的重要理论价值。最后,文章通过两种维度构建起独处权的饱满框架,一方面由独处权的积极面向论证了独处权的三项权能,即公共领域退隐权、空间支配权以及独处情状维护权;另一方面由权利的消极面向反观独处权的保护范畴,指出行为人的侵扰构成独处侵权的核心标准——理性人标准。
[Abstract]:The right to be alone has a long history, but has been confined to the concept of privacy. But in essence, the right of solitude and the right of privacy are two independent rights, which are different in the core, object and constitution of rights and interests. Furthermore, as an independent right and liberty, the right of personal freedom, the right of residence and the right of space also have heterogeneity. On the basis of the independence of probative right, this paper then analyzes the important theoretical value of the right of solitude from psychology and sociology. Finally, the article constructs the full frame of the right of solitude through two dimensions. On the one hand, from the positive aspect of the right of solitude, it demonstrates the three powers of the right of solitude, that is, the right of withdrawing from the public domain, the right of spatial domination and the right of maintaining the state of solitude. On the other hand, from the negative aspect of rights, the author points out that the core criterion of torts of solitude is rational person.
【学位授予单位】：苏州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D90

【参考文献】