社会事实、价值与法律的规范性
发布时间：2018-09-17 19:18
【摘要】：当代法律实证主义者主张,法律的规范性是法理论需要说明的首要议题。同时,他们坚持对法律规范性要求的识别标准,完全是由社会事实所决定。这就是社会事实命题。然而,将法律视为规范性实践,意味着法律是能够向人们提供行动理由的事实。对这种事实给予充分理解,一方面必须说明它是如何与某些深层价值保持关联的,另一方面必须说明在每个具体情境下,它是如何对具体的行动给予指引的。德沃金所提炼的理论争议显示出,实证主义无法确保由社会事实确定的法律规范,在错综复杂的法律实践中,始终和深层价值保持必要的关联。而实证主义要避免陷入这种争议,对法律规范性的说明就只能停留在抽象、一般的层面上,这又导致法律的规范性变得空洞。这说明,法律实证主义无法维护社会事实命题。法理论必须在一个基本的实践哲学框架下才能完成自己的使命。
[Abstract]:Contemporary legal positivists claim that the standardization of law is the most important topic to be explained in the theory of law. At the same time, they insist on the legal normative requirements of the identification criteria, is entirely determined by social facts. This is the social fact proposition. However, considering law as normative practice means that law is a fact that can provide people with reasons for action. To fully understand this fact, it is necessary, on the one hand, to explain how it relates to certain deep values and, on the other hand, to explain how it guides specific actions in each specific context. The theoretical controversy abstracted by Dworkin shows that positivism can not ensure the legal norms determined by social facts, and in the complicated legal practice, it always maintains the necessary connection with the deep value. If positivism wants to avoid falling into this kind of dispute, the legal normative explanation can only stay in the abstract, general level, which leads to the legal normative become empty. This shows that legal positivism can not maintain the proposition of social facts. The theory of law must be within the framework of a basic philosophy of practice in order to complete its mission.
【作者单位】： 华东政法大学科学研究院;
【分类号】：D90
本文编号：2246847
[Abstract]:Contemporary legal positivists claim that the standardization of law is the most important topic to be explained in the theory of law. At the same time, they insist on the legal normative requirements of the identification criteria, is entirely determined by social facts. This is the social fact proposition. However, considering law as normative practice means that law is a fact that can provide people with reasons for action. To fully understand this fact, it is necessary, on the one hand, to explain how it relates to certain deep values and, on the other hand, to explain how it guides specific actions in each specific context. The theoretical controversy abstracted by Dworkin shows that positivism can not ensure the legal norms determined by social facts, and in the complicated legal practice, it always maintains the necessary connection with the deep value. If positivism wants to avoid falling into this kind of dispute, the legal normative explanation can only stay in the abstract, general level, which leads to the legal normative become empty. This shows that legal positivism can not maintain the proposition of social facts. The theory of law must be within the framework of a basic philosophy of practice in order to complete its mission.
【作者单位】： 华东政法大学科学研究院;
【分类号】：D90
【相似文献】
相关期刊论文 前4条
1 涂光启,贺林波;解构与批判:庞德社会工程法学的社会事实[J];求索;2004年11期
2 刘东升;;论法律与道德分离的规范性意义[J];青海民族大学学报(教育科学版);2011年01期
3 陈景辉;;命令与法的基本性质[J];北方法学;2013年04期
4 ;[J];;年期
相关重要报纸文章 前1条
1 西南政法大学 周尚君;法学如何面向社会事实[N];光明日报;2014年
，本文编号：2246847
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/falvlunwen/falilunwen/2246847.html
