“草场承包”为何姗姗来迟

发布时间：2018-10-10 13:44

【摘要】：根据交易成本经济学的一般原理,如果毗邻牧户草场之间设置阻隔性边界/栅栏的边际收益大于其边际成本时,这样一种界权费用将会由双方承担,即实现内部化。但是,在甘青藏区,基于草场禀赋、传统游牧方式的存续等诸多局限条件,毗邻村或牧户双方之间设置阻隔性边界的费用却不能通过自发商谈的形式实现内部化。由此导致甘青藏区,乃至全国大部分牧区,呈现出了"畜-草"承包不能同步推进的尴尬局面——牲畜承包早已进行,但草场承包却迟迟没有推进。当"拉动内需"即国家补贴下的围栏建设以及由于草原过密化而引发要素价格上涨等多种因素意外地出现并契合在一起时,甘青藏区的草场承包改革才真正得以启动,并籍此使草场承包经营权初级物权化的制度费用问题得到了解决。
[Abstract]:According to the general principle of transaction cost economics, if the marginal income of the barrier boundary / fence is greater than its marginal cost, the cost of such a boundary right will be borne by both sides, that is, to realize internalization. However, due to the limited conditions of grassland endowment and the existence of traditional nomadic way, the cost of setting barrier boundary between neighboring villages or pastoral households can not be internalized by spontaneous negotiation in Gansu and Qinghai-Tibet region. As a result, Gansu Qinghai-Tibet region, and even most pastoral areas in China, present an awkward situation in which the "Livestock and Grass" contract cannot be promoted synchronously-the livestock contract has been carried out for a long time, but the grassland contract has not been pushed forward. When "stimulating domestic demand", that is, the construction of fences under state subsidies, and factors such as factor price rises due to the over-dense grassland appeared unexpectedly and joined together, the reform of grassland contracting in Gansu and Qinghai-Tibet regions really started. In this way, the system cost of the primary real right of grassland contract management has been solved.
【作者单位】：西北师范大学法学院;
【基金】：2011年国家社科基金项目“草场产权制度改革与甘青藏区基层治理研究”(项目编号为11BZZ029)阶段性成果 2011年西北师范大学青年教师科研能力提升计划骨干项目“草场权属、边界冲突与纠纷解决机制研究”(项目编号为SKQNGG11024)阶段性成果
【分类号】：D920.4

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