利益输送和公司绩效视角下的中国定向增发实施效果研究

发布时间：2018-03-14 00:06

本文选题：定向增发　切入点：利益输送　出处：《华东师范大学》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国证监会2006年颁布实施的新《公司法》、《证券法》及《上市公司证券发行管理办法》重新开启了上市公司封存近一年的股权再融资,并为我国定向增发股权再融资行为打开了制度之窗,定向增发也因其显著优于其他股权再融资方式的宽松的发行条件、快捷的发行审批流程及相对低廉的成本等特点成为上市公司股权再融资中的首选,也成为我国资本市场上最主流的再融资模式。定向增发作为新型的融资方式,其发展时间较短,法律法规也尚未完善,国内理论界的理论及实证研究也没有形成如国外理论界定向增发领域的成熟体系,本文通过对定向增发中最为关键的两个问题利益输送及公司绩效的实证研究,较全面的分析了定向增发中折价及定向增发后关联交易、占款现象中的利益输送行为,并通过更为全面的财务指标体系衡量定向增发上市公司中长期综合绩效表现,以此检验我国定向增发的实施效果。该研究弥补了国内对定向增发关联交易、占款规模及中长期公司绩效的研究不足,具有一定的实用价值和现实意义。本文研究后发现,定向增发中折价问题上存在大股东利益输送的可能,而定向增发后上市公司异常关联交易及占款规模的增加也进一步证明大股东存在利用其控制权转移定向增发募集资源的可能,此外,本文还发现,定向增发后上市公司的综合绩效并未改善。两方面实证结果表明,在我国现有的资本市场机制及政策制度背景下,定向增发未能实现其应有的积极意义,不仅没有实现上市公司长期业绩提升,而且存在大股东通过低价认购新股及超常的关联交易、直接占款规模损害上市公司及未参与增发中小股东的利益的可能。与此同时,本文也发现,外部投资者的引入可以在上市公司与关联方的关联交易及占款行为监督中起到一定的积极作用,但是对上市公司中长期业绩的帮助有限。基于前述研究结论,本文相应提出了防范上市公司定向增发过程中利益输送行为及完善上市公司监督机制等方面的建议。
[Abstract]:The new Company Law promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission on 2006, the Securities Law and the measures for the Administration of Securities issuance of listed companies have re-opened the equity refinancing of listed companies that have been sealed for nearly a year. It also opens the window of the system for the refinancing behavior of China's directionally additional equity, which is obviously superior to the loose issuing conditions of other equity refinancing methods. The characteristics of quick issuance approval process and relatively low cost have become the first choice in equity refinancing of listed companies and the most mainstream refinancing mode in the capital market of our country. As a new type of financing method, the development time of directional additional offering is relatively short, the laws and regulations are not perfect, and the theoretical and empirical research of domestic theoretical circle has not formed a mature system such as that in the field of foreign theory. Based on the empirical study of the two most important issues in the process of directional placement, interest transmission and corporate performance, this paper makes a more comprehensive analysis of the behavior of interest transmission in the phenomenon of interest transmission in private placement and related party transactions after private placement. And through a more comprehensive financial index system to measure the comprehensive performance of the listed companies in order to test the implementation effect of China. Lack of research on the scale of funds and medium-and long-term company performance has certain practical value and practical significance. In this paper, it is found that there is the possibility of the transmission of the interests of large shareholders on the issue of discount in directional placement. However, the abnormal related party transactions and the increase in the amount of money taken by listed companies after the private placement further prove that the large shareholders have the possibility of using their control rights to transfer and raise additional resources. In addition, this paper also finds that, Two empirical results show that under the background of the existing capital market mechanism and policy system in our country, the directional placement has not achieved its due positive significance. Not only has the long-term performance of the listed company not been improved, but there is also the possibility that the large shareholders can directly take up money to harm the interests of the listed company and the minority shareholders who are not participating in the additional issuance by subscribing for new shares at a low price and through extraordinary related party transactions. This paper also finds that the introduction of external investors can play a positive role in the related transactions and the behavior supervision of the related parties between listed companies and related parties, but the help to the long-term performance of listed companies is limited. This paper puts forward some suggestions on how to prevent the behavior of interest transmission and how to improve the supervision mechanism of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

【引证文献】