股票期权激励与盈余管理的相关性问题研究

发布时间：2018-04-18 21:21

本文选题：股票期权 + 经理人激励　；参考：《东北财经大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】：股票期权激励(Executive Stock Option,简称ESO)于20世纪50年代起源于美国,并得到西方发达国家的普遍认可和广泛的应用。一时间,股票期权激励制度成为解决现代企业委托—代理问题的重要途径。直到2002年起的美国一系列大公司的财务丑闻出现,高层管理人员存在粉饰隐瞒公司的财务状况,靠虚假吹捧出来的业绩拉动公司股票价格的上扬,利用股票期权计划,抛售手中的股票获取大量不正当利润。因此,股票期权激励遭到了人们的质疑。我国在上世纪90年代开始引入股权激励制度,从2005年开始的股权分制改革经过两年基本完成,新的公司法、证券法、个人所得税法的实施,2006年中国证监会《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》的颁布,进一步规范了上市公司的股权激励制度,促进了我国实行股票期权激励的上市公司数量迅速增长。本文通过对实施股权激励计划上市公司的盈余管理问题的研究,阐述上市公司股权激励对公司业绩产生的影响,并深入分析了管理层股票期权激励制度影响公司业绩的原因,进而针对原因提出几点建议以改善股票期权激励的负面影响。本文首先对股票期权激励和盈余管理的相关理论进行评述,然后通过云南绿大地生物科技股份有限公司的股票期权实例,对股票期权制度进行进一步的分析,并推导出我国股票期权激励制度可能导致管理者进行盈余管理的假设。接下来,本文以2009年沪深两市公开公布的实施股票期权激励的上市公司为样本,对我国的股票期权激励计划的实施情况进行描述和分析,并通过盈余管理计量模型,对我国实施股票期权激励的上市公司的公开数据进行回归分析,并得出结论。最后,针对案例分析和实证分析的结果,笔者深入探讨我国股票期权激励与盈余管理的正相关关系产生的原因,并提出相应的应对策略。本文通过规范研究与实证研究二者相结合的研究方法,对股票期权和盈余管理的相关性问题进行了研究。本文的数据来自锐思数据库,在实证分析中,充分运用了SPSS和Excel等统计软件进行数据处理。本文的创新点在于深入分析了股票期权激励引起盈余管理的原因,并提出了相应的对策。
[Abstract]:Stock option Executive Stock option (ESO) originated in the United States in the 1950s, and has been widely recognized and widely used in western developed countries.At one time, stock option incentive system has become an important way to solve the principal-agent problem of modern enterprises.Until 2002, when a series of major corporate financial scandals appeared in the United States, senior executives had a tendency to whitewash and conceal the financial situation of the company, drive up the company's stock prices on the basis of false flattery, and use the stock options program.Selling off the stock to make a lot of improper profits.Therefore, the stock option incentive has been questioned by people.China began to introduce the equity incentive system in the 1990s. The reform of the split share system, which began in 2005, was basically completed in two years. The new Company Law, the Securities Law,The implementation of the personal income tax Law and the promulgation of the China Securities Regulatory Commission's measures on Stock incentive Management of listed companies in 2006 further standardized the equity incentive system of listed companies.It has promoted the rapid growth of the number of listed companies that carry out stock option incentive.Through the research on earnings management of listed companies implementing equity incentive plan, this paper expounds the influence of equity incentive on the performance of listed companies, and deeply analyzes the reasons why the stock option incentive system of management affects the performance of companies.Then some suggestions are put forward to improve the negative effect of stock option incentive.This paper first reviews the theory of stock option incentive and earnings management, and then further analyzes the stock option system through an example of stock option of Yunnan Green Earth Biotechnology Co., Ltd.The assumption that the stock option incentive system in China may lead to earnings management is deduced.Next, this paper describes and analyzes the implementation of the stock option incentive plan in China by using the listed companies publicly announced in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2009 as a sample, and adopts the earnings management measurement model to describe and analyze the implementation of the stock option incentive plan in China.In this paper, the public data of listed companies with stock option incentive are analyzed by regression analysis, and the conclusion is drawn.Finally, according to the results of case analysis and empirical analysis, the author deeply discusses the causes of the positive correlation between stock option incentive and earnings management, and puts forward corresponding countermeasures.This paper studies the correlation between stock options and earnings management by combining normative and empirical research.The data in this paper come from Rath database. In the empirical analysis, we make full use of statistical software such as SPSS and Excel to process the data.The innovation of this paper lies in the deep analysis of the causes of earnings management caused by stock option incentive and the corresponding countermeasures.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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