浅析我国公司法中股东权利的司法救济

发布时间：2018-04-28 16:21

本文选题：股东权利 + 司法救济　；参考：《中国政法大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】： 充分保护股东权利对于实现股东的利益、改善公司治理机制和促进公司制度的健康发展有着重要的意义。无救济则无权利,司法救济对维护股东权利有重要的作用。股东直接诉讼和派生诉讼是我国公司法中规定的两种股东权利司法救济方式。本文通过讨论这两种股东权利司法救济方式的一些问题,希望能够促进我国股东权利司法救济相关理论、立法和司法实践的发展,法律毕竟是实践性很强的经世致用的学科。本文第一部分介绍我国的股东直接诉讼。股东在权利在受到损害或无法自己实现权利时,可以依据公司法和民事诉讼法相关条文提起诉讼。股东直接诉讼的被告有多种情形,05年公司法第153条没有具体规定股东直接诉讼的被告的做法能适应被告的多样性。“董事或高管因其不当行为致使公司在股东直接诉讼中成为被告并赔偿股东损失而应对公司承担的责任”应当和“公司在股东直接诉讼对股东的责任”一并追究,因为这两种责任产生于同一事实,法院应当把股东针对公司的诉讼和公司针对董事或高管的诉讼合并审理。本文提出了现行立法条件下的权宜之计和以完善无独立请求权第三人制度为契机的长远之计来应对这一问题。本文列举三种股东直接诉讼具体情形。优先认购(缴)权可以保护股东的比例性利益,防止股东在公司的利益被稀释。股东可采取对股东(大)会决议提起撤销或无效确认之诉、请求法院责令股东(大)会重新做出决议或提起新股认购(缴)确权之诉来保护该权利。解散公司的救济方式有助于解决封闭型公司股东之间的纠纷,但鉴于其对生产经营组织、经济关系和社会就业的破坏作用,要将其作为保护股东利益的最后手段加以慎用。异议股东的股权回购请求权可以调和欲改革公司的多数股东和持异议的少数股东之间的冲突,对抗多数股东对少数股东的压迫和对资本多数决原则的滥用。我国公司法应当扩大股东能够行使该权利的范围,以充分发挥其积极作用。第二部分介绍了我国的股东派生诉讼。05年公司法对派生诉讼的规定完善了公司和股东利益保护机制,有益于改善公司的治理机制,是我们公司法发展中的一大进步。股东派生诉讼的适格原告的资格条件在某些方面有过于严格的嫌疑。股东派生诉讼的被告主体十分广泛。通过对美国派生诉讼相关程序的讨论,可以注意到我国的派生诉讼程序应当对派生诉讼开始后相关的立法和审判规则做出具体的规定,更加尊重公司的独立运营、管理者关于是否行使公司诉权的正常商业判断,以保障公司运营效率。本文认为应当给予公司管理者提出“关于其代表公司做出的不予行使公司诉权的决定的合理性”的证明和终止派生诉讼的建议的机会,我国法院应当审查管理者代表公司做出的不予行使公司诉权的决定的合理性,并在认可该决定的合理性和终止诉讼的建议时终止派生诉讼。降低派生诉讼中原告股东的诉讼费用并使该费用可由公司向原告做出补偿有利于破除股东提起派生诉讼动机不足的障碍、充分发挥派生诉讼保护公司和股东利益、改善公司治理的作用。
[Abstract]:The full protection of shareholders' rights is of great significance to the realization of the interests of the shareholders, the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism and the promotion of the healthy development of the company system. No relief is right, and the judicial relief has an important role in maintaining the rights of the shareholders. The direct and derivative litigation of the shareholders is the two kind of judicial rescue of the shareholders' rights stipulated in the company law of China. By discussing some problems of the judicial relief of the rights of the two shareholders, this paper hopes to promote the relevant theories of judicial relief for the rights of shareholders in our country, the development of legislation and judicial practice, and after all, the law is a practical and practical subject.
The first part of this article introduces the direct litigation of shareholders in our country. When the rights of the shareholders are damaged or unable to realize their rights, the shareholders can bring a lawsuit according to the relevant provisions of the company law and the civil procedure law. The defendants in the direct litigation of the shareholders have many cases, and the 153rd article of the company law of 05 years does not specify the practice of the defendant who has specified the direct litigation of the shareholders. It can be adapted to the diversity of the defendant. "The directors or executives, because of their misconduct, cause the company to become the defendant in the direct action of the shareholders and compensate the shareholders for the liability" should be investigated with the "company's liability for shareholders in the direct action of the shareholders", because these two responsibilities arise from the same fact and the court shall In this paper, the expedient plan under the current legislative conditions and the long-term plan to improve the third party system without independent claim are put forward to deal with this problem.
This article enumerates the specific circumstances of the direct litigation of three shareholders. The right of preemptive subscription (payment) can protect the proportional interests of the shareholders and prevent the shareholders from being diluted in the interests of the company. The shareholders may take the revocation or invalid confirmation of the resolution of the shareholders (big), and ask the court to order the shareholders (big) to remake the resolution or bring up the subscription of the new shares. The dissolution of the company's remedies will help to resolve the disputes between the shareholders of the closed company, but in view of its destruction to the production and operation organization, the economic relationship and the social employment, it should be used carefully as the last means to protect the interests of the shareholders. The conflict between the majority of the shareholders and the dissenting minority shareholders confronts the oppression of the majority of shareholders and the abuse of the majority of the capital. Our company law should expand the scope of the shareholders to exercise this right in order to give full play to its positive role.
The second part introduces the company law of.05 in China to improve the protection mechanism of the interests of the company and the shareholders, which is beneficial to the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism. It is a great progress in the development of our company law. The qualification of the appropriate plaintiff of the shareholder derivative action is too strict in some respects. The subject of the defendant's derivative suit is very extensive. Through the discussion of the related procedure of the derivative suit in the United States, it can be noted that the derivative litigation in our country should make specific provisions on the relevant legislation and trial rules of the derivative suit, respect the independent operation of the company and the right of the company to exercise the right of litigation. Business judgment is often used to guarantee the efficiency of the company's operation. This article thinks that the manager of the company should give the opportunity to prove the reasonableness of the decision made by the company on behalf of the company not to exercise the rights of the company and to terminate the proposal of the derivative suit. The court of our country should examine the non exercise of the right of litigation of the company by the manager on behalf of the company. The reasonableness of the decision, and the termination of the derivative action in the case of the reasonableness of the decision and the proposal to terminate the lawsuit. The reduction of the litigation costs of the plaintiff in the derivative suit and the compensation for the cost by the company to the plaintiff is conducive to the removal of the obstacles to the shareholders' motivation to bring up the motivation of derivative litigation, and to give full play to the derivative litigation protection company and The interests of shareholders improve the role of corporate governance.

【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

【参考文献】