股权分置改革后我国上市公司股权激励与公司绩效关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-30 00:27

本文选题：股权激励 + 公司绩效　；参考：《西南财经大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】： 股权激励是一种新型的管理层分配制度和激励模式。它通过约定的方式让经营者得到公司一定数量的股权,使经营者的角色由单纯的代理人转向管理者和所有者,从而将所有者与经营者的目标与利益连结起来。在一定程度上,股权激励可以解决企业经营者委托代理问题,使经营者更加关心企业的长期发展,实现企业价值最大化。股权激励自20世纪50年代诞生以来,就被西方发达国家广泛运用于现代公司治理的实践中,在解决委托代理问题上取得了巨大成功。而在我国,股权激励的发展相对滞后,在上个世纪90年代初,我国才有了第一家试行股权激励制度的公司—深圳万科集团。同时,我国相关法律法规的不完善,和证券市场特有的股权分置状况,严重阻碍了股权激励制度在我国上市公司的运用。随着我国经济的高速发展,原有束缚我国经济发展的法规、制度逐渐被废除、打破,一系列相关的法律法规相继出台。2004年国务院提出的《公司法》修改草案,修改了诸多制约企业实施经营者股权激励的条款。2005年4月29日,中国证监会发布了《关于上市公司股权分置改革试点有关问题的通知》,我国股权分置改革拉开了序幕。2006年1月1日,新修改的《公司法》和《证券法》正式开始实施,进一步为股权激励制度扫清政策法律障碍。同时,中国证监会颁布了《上市公司股权激励管理办法》,规定已完成股权分置改革的上市公司可实施股权激励,建立健全的激励与约束机制。2006年12月6日,国资委颁布《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》,奠定了推行股权激励政策必要的法律基础,对股权激励制度在我国的实施具有划时代的意义。在此背景下,本文选取股权分置改革后实施股权激励的上市公司作为研究对象,运用委托代理理论、人力资本理论、不完全契约理论和交易成本理论等相关原理,对公司绩效和股权激励关系进行实证分析,全面描述我国上市公司股权激励现状,发现其中的问题,最后提出可行的政策建议。第一章导论。首先阐述了本文的研究背景和意义,其次提出本文的研究目的和可能的贡献,最后介绍研究的思路和方法。第二章理论基础和文献综述。股权激励的理论基础主要包括委托代理理论、人力资本理论、不完全契约理论、交易成本理论。委托代理理论是股权激励缘起的基本理论,即股权激励的产生主要是因为公司高管和股东的利益、责任风险不同导致的委托代理问题。入力资本理论认为在知识经济时代,人力资本在经济增长中起了关键作用,而股权激励正是对人力资本理论的肯定。不完全契约理论认为,由于某种程度的有限理性或者交易费用,使得现实中的契约是不完全。在不完全契约条件下,代理人并不会仅仅按照显性契约条款约定的报酬标准确定自己的努力程度,契约中的隐性条款也会成为重要的激励因素。交易成本理论认为,不应该只强调企业的生产性却忽视其交易性,即重视企业制度结构或产权安排。为了降低交易成本,企业应该以经营管理者作为并购对象,通过股权激励,使企业的经营管理人员内部化,成为企业的有机组成部分。文献综述回顾了国内外关于公司绩效和股权激励关系实证研究的主要文献,并对这些文献进行了比较分析,他们的主要特点是研究结论有很大差异,样本、变量的选取以及实证方法的选取有所不同等。第三章股权激励效应形成机制。首先介绍了股权激励的定义和类型,本文将股权激励类型按照激励对象权利义务和激励标的模式的不同分为两大类,并具体介绍了每种分类下的股权激励模式。然后从内在因素和外在传导机制两个方面重点分析了股权激励效应形成机理。在内在因素的分析上,主‘要通过委托代理理论、人力资本理论等分析股权激励为什么能对经营者的行为造成影响；外在传导机制则是从股票市场的角度出发,分析股价传递的信息,对经营者造成的影响以及实施股权激励的必要性。第四章股权分置改革前后我国上市公司股权激励情况分析。首先简单介绍了股改前我国上市公司的股权激励情况,并描述了在当时的经济背景下,我国上市公司实施股权激励遇到的障碍。接着分析了股权分置改革为我国上市公司股权激励扫清的障碍和带来的好处：解决了长期以来困扰中国资本市场发展的非流通股股东与流通股股东的利益割裂问题、解决了股权激励的股票来源问题、有助于股票定价机制的理性回归、有利于建立和完善公司管理层激励和约束机制等。最后描述了股改后我国上市公司股权激励的现状,对这些公司的地区分布、行业分布、控股类别以及激励模式的选择作了描述性统计。第五章股权分置改革后我国上市公司绩效与股权激励关系的实证分析。本文的核心部分。 1.研究假设根据股权激励效应形成的内在因素,提出假设一,上市公司财务绩效与股权激励持股比例存在显著的正相关关系；根据外在传导机制等,提出假设二,上市公司财务绩效与股权激励价值存在显著的正相关关系。 2.研究设计选择从2005年1月1日到2008年12月31日实施了股权激励的公司作为样本,以股权激励比例和股权激励价值作为自变量,公司绩效作为因变量,同时选取公司规模、资本结构、控股类别作为控制变量建立模型。 3.实证结果及分析首先对样本公司基本情况、股权激励实施前后两年的绩效和模型指标进行描述性统计,从最大值、最小值、标准差等方面进行比较,并进行分析总结。然后检验自变量以及模型的相关性,判定变量的设定和模型的设计是符合统计学要求的。最后对模型进行回归分析,用回归结果来验证假设。第六章结论和建议通过实证研究,得出的主要结论有： 1.我国上市公司实施股权激励后的公司绩效比实施前有明显提高。 2.股权激励价值与净资产收益率显著正相关,说明股权激励给经营者带来的额外报酬越多,企业的经营业绩越好。 3.股权激励比例与净资产收益率显著正相关,表明公司股权激励计划授予员工的股权占公司总股本的比例越大,企业的绩效越好。最后,利用相关理论基础和实证分析结果,从管理部门和公司自身的角度出发,提出政策建议：加强对资本市场的建设、完善相关的法律、法规和政策、制定科学股权激励制度、完善公司治理结构、建立科学的绩效考评体系、建设有效的经理人市场。本文可能的贡献主要体现在： 1.将股权激励效应形成机制分为内在机制和外部传导机制,从证券市场的角度来分析股权激励效应形成机制,为建立模型打下理论基础。 2.在分析股权激励水平时,不仅分析了公司股权激励授予经营者股权,让经营者拥有剩余索取权带来的激励效应,同时还考虑了股权收益带来的激励效应。并在模型建立中,将两者同时设为解释变量,观察其对绩效的影响。 3.研究在新背景下展开。选取了股改开始到08年底实施股权激励的公司作为样本,数据为最新,同时,提出政策建议具有较强的时效性。本文存在的不足主要有： 1.样本选择方面。由于本文的研究基于股权分置改革之后实施股权激励的上市公司,所以样本数量只有31个,占我国全部上市公司的比重很小。对整个证券市场而言,说服力有限。随着股改的进行和相关法律法规的完善,实施股权激励的公司会越来越多,今后的研究可以扩大样本数量,增加实证结果的说服力。 2.公司绩效包括经营绩效、组织绩效和财务绩效。由于前两个衡量指标难于量化,本文没有对它们进行深入研究,只选取了财务绩效进行实证分析,所以本文的实证模型有待进一步完善。 3.在变量选取方面,因为样本量较少,没有考虑行业规模,风险因素,成长性,以及一些外部因素,在控制变量的选取上需要进一步研究。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is a new type of management distribution system and incentive model. It allows the operator to get a certain number of shares in the company by means of the agreed way, making the role of the operator turning from a simple agent to the manager and the owner, so as to connect the owner and the manager's goals and interests. To a certain extent, the equity incentive is encouraged. It can solve the problem of agency entrustment of business operators, so that operators will be more concerned about the long-term development of enterprises and maximize the value of enterprises.
Since the birth of equity incentive since 1950s, it has been widely used by western developed countries in the practice of modern corporate governance and has achieved great success in solving the problem of principal-agent. In China, the development of equity incentive is lagging behind. In the early 90s of last century, China had the first trial equity incentive system. Shenzhen Vanke Group. At the same time, the imperfect laws and regulations of our country and the special status of the stock market in the securities market have seriously hindered the use of equity incentive system in China's listed companies.
With the rapid development of China's economy, the existing laws and regulations that bind our country's economic development have been gradually abolished and broken. A series of relevant laws and regulations have promulgated the revised draft of "company law" proposed by the State Council for.2004 years, and amended a number of clauses that restrict the implementation of the incentive of managers in enterprises in April 29th. The China Securities Regulatory Commission issued a series of articles issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued in April 29th. The notice on the problems related to the reform of the split share reform of the listed companies has been announced. The reform of China's equity division began in January 1st.2006, and the newly revised "Company Law > and the securities law" began to be formally implemented to clear the legal barriers to the equity incentive system. At the same time, China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the stock equity incentive management of listed companies. The listed companies that have completed the split share reform can implement equity incentive and establish a sound incentive and restraint mechanism in December 6th. The SASAC issued a trial method for the implementation of equity incentive for the state-owned listed companies (domestic), which laid the necessary legal basis for the implementation of equity incentive policies, and the incentive system of equity incentive in China in.2006. The implementation is of epoch-making significance.
Under this background, this paper selects the listed companies with equity incentive after the split share reform as the research object, and uses the principal-agent theory, the human capital theory, the incomplete contract theory and the transaction cost theory, and makes an empirical analysis on the relationship between the company performance and the equity incentive, and describes the equity incentive of the listed companies in our country. Encourage the status quo, identify the problems, and finally put forward feasible policy recommendations.
The first chapter is introduction. First, the background and significance of the study are expounded. Secondly, the purpose and possible contribution of the research are put forward. Finally, the ideas and methods of the study are introduced.
The second chapter is the theoretical basis and literature review. The theoretical basis of equity incentive mainly includes principal-agent theory, human capital theory, incomplete contract theory, transaction cost theory. The principal agent theory is the basic theory of the origin of equity incentive, that is, the ownership incentive is mainly due to the interests of the company executives and shareholders, and the liability risk is different. The theory of force capital believes that in the era of knowledge economy, human capital plays a key role in economic growth, and equity incentive is the affirmation of human capital theory. Incomplete contract theory holds that because of a certain degree of limited rationality or transaction costs, the contract is incomplete. Under the condition of complete contract, the agent does not only determine its degree of effort according to the remuneration standard stipulated in the explicit contract clause. The implicit clause in the contract will also become an important incentive factor. The transaction cost theory holds that the enterprise's productive nature should not be emphasized but the transaction is ignored, that is, the enterprise system structure or property right security should be emphasized. In order to reduce the transaction cost, the enterprise should take the manager as the object of merger and acquisition, through the equity incentive, make the enterprise management personnel internalized and become an organic part of the enterprise. The literature review reviews the main literature on the empirical research on the relationship between company performance and equity incentive at home and abroad, and compares these documents with the literature. Comparatively speaking, their main characteristics are the great differences in research conclusions, the selection of samples, variables and the selection of empirical methods.
The third chapter is about the formation mechanism of equity incentive effect. First, it introduces the definition and type of equity incentive. This paper divides the type of equity incentive into two categories according to the difference between the rights and obligations of the incentive object and the model of the incentive standard, and introduces the equity incentive model in each category. Then, it is from the internal and external transmission mechanism in two aspects. This paper mainly analyzes the formation mechanism of equity incentive effect. In the analysis of factors, the main reason is to analyze why equity incentive can affect the behavior of managers through the theory of principal agent and human capital theory, and the external transmission mechanism is from the point of view of the stock market to analyze the information of stock exchange transmission and to the operator. The necessity of influence and the implementation of equity incentive.
The fourth chapter analyses the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China before and after the split share reform. First, it introduces the equity incentive situation of the listed companies before the stock reform, and describes the obstacles encountered by the listed companies in our country under the economic background at that time. Then it analyses the equity division reform as the stock right of the listed companies in China. The obstacles and benefits of cleaning up: solving the problem of splitting the interests of the non tradable shareholders and the shareholders of the circulation stock which has plagued the development of the Chinese capital market for a long time, solving the stock source problem of equity incentive, helping the rational return of the stock pricing mechanism, and helping to establish and perfect the incentive and restraint machine for the management of the company. In the end, it describes the current situation of equity incentive in China's listed companies after the stock reform, and makes a descriptive statistics on the regional distribution, industry distribution, holding category and incentive mode of these companies.
The fifth chapter is the empirical analysis of the relationship between the performance of listed companies and equity incentive after the split share structure reform.
1. the hypothesis, based on the intrinsic factors formed by the equity incentive effect, puts forward a hypothesis that there is a significant positive correlation between the financial performance of listed companies and the proportion of equity incentive stock. According to the external transmission mechanism, the hypothesis two is put forward, and there is a significant positive correlation between the financial performance of listed companies and the value of equity incentive price.
2. the selection of equity incentive companies was selected from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2008 as a sample, with equity incentive ratio and equity incentive value as independent variables, company performance as the dependent variable, and company size, capital structure and holding category as control variables.
3. empirical results and analysis of the basic situation of Sample Firms, the performance and model index of two years before and after the implementation of equity incentive to carry out descriptive statistics, from the maximum value, minimum value, standard deviation and other aspects of comparison, and analysis and summary, and then test the correlation of independent variables and models, determine the setting of variables and the design of the model Finally, regression analysis of the model was carried out, and regression results were used to verify the hypothesis.
The sixth chapter, conclusions and recommendations, through empirical research, the main conclusions are as follows:
1. the performance of Listed Companies in China after equity incentive is significantly higher than before.
2. the equity incentive value is significantly positively related to the net asset yield. This shows that the more compensation the equity incentive brings to the operator, the better the business performance of the enterprise.
3. the proportion of equity incentive is positively correlated with the return on net assets, which indicates that the greater the proportion of the equity incentive plan of the company to the total share capital of the company, the better the performance of the enterprise.
Finally, using the relevant theoretical basis and empirical analysis results, from the management department and the company's own point of view, put forward policy suggestions: strengthen the construction of the capital market, improve the relevant laws, regulations and policies, formulate a scientific equity incentive system, improve the corporate governance structure, establish a scientific performance appraisal system, and build effective classics. The market for people.
The main contributions of this article are as follows:
1. the formation mechanism of equity incentive effect is divided into internal mechanism and external transmission mechanism, and the formation mechanism of equity incentive effect is analyzed from the perspective of the securities market, which lays a theoretical foundation for the establishment of the model.
2. when analyzing the level of equity incentive, we not only analyze the incentive effect of the company's equity incentive to the operator's equity, let the operator have the residual claim, but also consider the incentive effect of the equity income. In the model establishment, the two are set to explain the variable and observe the effect on the performance.
The 3. research in the new background, selected the stock reform to implement the stock incentive companies as the sample of the end of 08, the data is the latest, at the same time, the policy recommendations have strong timeliness.
The main shortcomings of this article are as follows:
The 1. sample selection. Because this study is based on the equity incentive based listed companies, the number of samples is only 31, which accounts for a small proportion of all listed companies in China. For the whole stock market, it has limited persuasiveness. With the improvement of the stock market and the improvement of relevant laws and regulations, the public equity incentive is carried out. There will be more and more divisions. Future research can expand the number of samples and increase the persuasiveness of the empirical results.
2. company performance includes business performance, organizational performance and financial performance. Since the first two indicators are difficult to quantify, this paper does not conduct in-depth research on them, and only selects the financial performance for empirical analysis, so the empirical model of this paper needs to be further improved.
3. in the selection of variables, because the sample size is less, the size of the industry, risk factors, growth, and some external factors are not considered, and the selection of control variables needs further study.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F272;F832.51;F224

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