高管激励与高管变更

发布时间：2018-05-03 18:05

本文选题：高管薪金薪酬 + 管理层持股　；参考：《安徽工业大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：自公司出现以来，委托代理关系这一问题一直都是理论界和实务界的难题，资产的所有者将其拥有的资产委托给经营者管理，但是所有权还是在所有者的手中，，经营者在委托人给定的授权范围之内对企业的资产行使占有、支配和使用的权力。股东是企业所有权的拥有者，他不仅享有剩余索取权，同时也承担着相应风险，他们所关心的是企业价值的最大化；但对于拥有经营权的管理人员，掌握企业资产的控制权，他们所关心的是自身效用的最大化。这时就需要有一种中间的力量来缓解两者之间的矛盾。管理层的激励就是解决这一矛盾的关键因素，薪酬激励和股权的激励是上市公司管理者最主要的两种激励方式。 1999年我国国有企业开始管理者激励的改革，实行经营管理者收入与企业的经营业绩挂钩、试行管理者年薪制、持有股权等。2005年9月股权分置改革方案的实施和启动，使得我国上市公司因股权激励制度产生的同股不同权、同股不同利的弊端得以解决，2006年新修订的《公司法》、《证券法》在企业资本制度、回购公司股票、企业高级管理人员在任职期间内转让股票等方面均有所突破，从而使我国上市公司股权激励实施的法律障碍得以消除，为我国上市公司高管股权激励带来美好前景。高管持股能够改善委托代理关系，激励企业的经营者，进而提高公司的整体业绩。本文从我国上市公司高管激励制度的激励效果方面，利用相关分析、回归分析检验高管薪金薪酬、高管持股与高管变更的关系,研究结果表明，高管持股与高管变更显著负相关，高管薪金薪酬与高管变更负相关，且高管人员持股对高管变更的激励效果显著强于薪金薪酬激励，表明高管股权激励在现代企业中发挥着越来越重要的激励作用。
[Abstract]:Since the emergence of the company, the problem of principal-agent relationship has always been a difficult problem in the theoretical and practical circles. The owner of the asset entrusts its assets to the manager for management, but the ownership is still in the hands of the owner. The operator exercises the power of possession, domination and use of the assets of the enterprise within the scope of authorization given by the principal. The shareholder is the owner of the enterprise ownership, he not only has the residual claim right, but also bears the corresponding risk. What they are concerned about is the maximization of the enterprise value, but for the managers who have the management right, they have the control right of the enterprise assets. What they care about is the maximization of their own utility. At this point, there needs to be a middle force to ease the conflict between the two. The incentive of management is the key factor to solve this contradiction. Compensation incentive and equity incentive are the two most important incentives for managers of listed companies. In 1999, China's state-owned enterprises began to reform the incentive of managers, implementing the link between the income of managers and the business performance of enterprises, trying out the annual salary system of managers, holding equity shares, etc. In September 2005, the implementation and initiation of the reform scheme of split share structure was carried out. In order to solve the problems of different rights and interests of the same shares and different interests of the listed companies due to the stock incentive system, the newly revised Company Law in 2006, the Securities Law, in the enterprise capital system, repurchase the shares of the company. The senior managers of enterprises have made some breakthroughs in the transfer of stocks during their term of office, thus removing the legal barriers to the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies in our country, and bringing a bright prospect for the equity incentive of senior executives of listed companies in our country. Executive ownership can improve the principal-agent relationship, stimulate the managers, and then improve the overall performance of the company. This paper uses correlation analysis and regression analysis to test the relationship between executive salary compensation, executive stock ownership and executive change from the aspect of incentive effect of executive incentive system of listed companies in China. Executive stock ownership and executive change significantly negative correlation, executive pay and executive change negative correlation, and executive stock ownership on executive change incentive effect is significantly stronger than salary incentive. It shows that executive equity incentive plays a more and more important role in modern enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：安徽工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F224

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