关于股东之间互负出资监督义务的反思

发布时间：2018-05-23 08:45

本文选题：出资监督 + 资本制度　；参考：《深圳大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：股东的之间互负出资监督义务是指股东之间负有监督各自出资状况的义务。《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国公司法〉若干问题的规定(三)》(以下简称“《公司法司法解释三》”)第十三条第三款的规定是股东出资监督义务的直接来源,它规定股东对其他未履行或未完成出资义务的股东承担连带补缴责任,实质上规定了股东之间互负出资监督的义务。笔者在引言部分引用一个司法案例,分析股东出资监督义务的司法实践,提出笔者的困惑:规定股东之间互负出资监督义务的立法目的何在?股东出资监督义务的弊端思考、结合资本制度思考股东有限责任与股东出资监督义务的矛盾、谁是监督股东出资的适格主体?如何监督?沿着思考的路径,本文分为四大部分。第一部分,着重分析股东互负出资监督义务的立法目的。笔者尝试从资本充实、发起人连带责任和债权人利益保护等角度来分析立法者的目的。资本充实是公司的原始资产构成,是保证公司对外展开营运的基础;有理论认为,发起人连带责任是认为发起人之间是合伙关系,发起人之间对公司共享盈余,共担风险;债权人利益保护是我国公司法的立法宗旨之一,资本充实的存在很大程度上是为了保护债权人的利益。第二部分,思考股东互负出资监督义务规定的弊端,分为三部分:违反利益衡平理念、资产信用理念与股东有限责任原则。利益失衡包括股东内部的失衡、股东与外部债权人的失衡、股东与董监高人员的失衡;资产信用是指公司以其全部资产而非资本为信用基础对外承担责任。股东之间互负出资监督义务的规定本质上仍恪守资本信用的理念来保护债权人;股东之间互负出资监督义务从根本上否定了股东有限责任原则。第三部分,通过域外法比较,选取日本公司法和德国公司法为比较对象,对比两国对未缴纳出资股东的不同处理措施,并从中借鉴。第四部分,探索解决路径——公司自治与借鉴日本董事制度。股东出资义务是公司章程中的约定义务,属于公司自治范畴,法律不宜过多干涉。将股东的监督义务回归至董事身上,董事应尽到忠实勤勉的义务,对股东的出资状况进行监督。日本公司法中对董事监督股东出资的义务规定全面,我国可借鉴日本董事制度,更好地落实董事的忠实勤勉义务。
[Abstract]:The obligation of mutual negative investment supervision between shareholders refers to the obligation between shareholders to supervise their respective capital contribution. The provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the application of the People's Republic of China Company Law (three) (hereinafter referred to as "the" "the company law judicial interpretation three >") are the thirteenth provisions of the third provisions of the shareholders' investment supervision obligations. The direct source, which stipulates the shareholders' liability to the shareholders of other unfulfilled or uncompleted capital contribution obligations, in essence stipulates the obligation of mutual negative investment supervision between shareholders. In the introduction part, I quote a judicial case, analyze the judicial practice of the shareholders' obligation to invest supervision, and put forward the author's confusion: stipulates the mutual interests of shareholders. What is the purpose of the legislative purpose of the obligation to oversee the capital contribution? Thinking about the abuse of the supervision obligation of shareholders, considering the contradiction between the limited liability of shareholders and the supervision obligation of shareholders, who is the appropriate subject of supervising shareholders' investment and how to supervise? This article is divided into four parts along the path of thinking. The first part focuses on the analysis of the mutual negative share of the shareholders. The author tries to analyze the purpose of the legislator from the perspective of capital enrichment, the joint liability of the sponsor and the protection of the creditor's interests. The capital enrichment is the composition of the original assets of the company and the basis for the company to carry out the operation of the company; the theory holds that the sponsors' joint and several liability is the agreement between the sponsors. It is one of the legislative purposes of the company law of our country, the protection of the interests of creditors is one of the legislative purposes of our company law. The existence of capital enriches to a great extent to protect the interests of the creditors. In the second part, it thinks about the disadvantages of the supervision obligation of shareholders' mutual negative investment, which is divided into three parts: violating the concept of equity equity, The principle of asset credit and the limited liability of shareholders. The imbalance of interests includes the imbalance within the shareholders, the imbalance between the shareholders and the external creditors, the imbalance between the shareholders and the high officials of the director of the directors; the assets credit means that the company takes all its assets rather than the capital as the credit basis. We abide by the concept of capital credit to protect the creditor; the mutual negative investment supervision obligation between shareholders fundamentally negates the principle of shareholders' limited liability. The third part, comparing the foreign law, selects the Japanese company law and the German company law as the comparison object, comparing the different treatment measures between the two countries on the unpaid shareholders and from the fourth. Part, explore the solution path - corporate autonomy and reference to the Japanese board of directors. Shareholders' obligation to invest is a contractual obligation in the company's articles of association. It belongs to the company's autonomous category. The law should not be too much interference. The obligation of shareholders' supervision should be returned to the director. The director should do the duty of diligence and diligence to supervise the state of shareholders' contribution. In the company law, the obligation of directors to supervise shareholders' capital contribution is comprehensive. China can learn from the Japanese director system to better implement the directors' loyalty and diligence obligations.
【学位授予单位】：深圳大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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