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论我国股东代表诉讼制度的适用与立法完善

发布时间:2018-06-03 14:31

  本文选题:股东代表诉讼 + 商业判断 ; 参考:《中国政法大学》2011年硕士论文


【摘要】:股东代表诉讼制度是伴随着现代公司制度的发展和完善而产生的一种诉讼机制,是弥补公司治理结构缺陷及其他救济方法不足的必要手段,这一制度强化了股东对董事等公司经营管理人员的内部监督和制衡,它赋予了受资本多决制不合理压制的中小股东借助司法力量维护自身权益的权利,对维护公司及股东尤其是中小股东的合法利益具有积极的意义。但该制度毕竟是对公司自治性的突破,如果构建合理,则有利于调节所有权和经营权分离后公司治理结构的平衡,也可成为保护中小股东及公司合法权益的利剑;如果运用不当,则可能成为恶意股东扰乱公司正常经营的手段。 2005年,我国进行了新一轮的《公司法》修订,这是第一次将股东代表诉讼纳入正式制度,并在司法实践中开始运用。但是,目前股东代表诉讼制度的构建还并不完善,由于缺乏相关方面的立法和实践经验,该规定还存在具体条文偏于保守等相关方面的弊端,缺乏在现实操作性。我国应该认真学习总结先进国家经验教训,以实际国情作为出发点不断改进。本文通过分析其他国家在股东代表诉讼立法以及实践的基础上,提出一些建议,使股东代表诉讼制度在我国能够得到更好地适用,更加合理。 本文除引言和结论分为四个部分: 第一部分是对股东代表诉讼进行的的简要介绍。文章首先勘定了股东代表诉讼的概念,然后对这一制度的起源和发展的历史以及在我国的引入和实践运用进行了简单的考察,最后对股东代表诉讼所赖以确立的原则进行阐述。通过这一部分的论述我们可以得出这样的结论,股东代表诉讼本事就是均衡理念的产物,这一制度的盛行同样也是由于公司治理结构均衡的要求;制衡的目的和均衡的理念仍然是股东代表诉讼所依赖的法理出处。 第二部分是通过对我国股东代表诉讼制度中诉讼费用的考量,以达到激励中小股东提起代表诉讼的目的。股东代表诉讼的直接受益方为公司,股东只能通过公司的受益而获得间接的利益,而一旦败诉起诉股东还需要承担起诉费用。由本部分的论述可以看出,我国应当对股东代表诉讼的诉讼费用制度进行改革,将其改为非财产案件以方便股东起诉,并对股东代表诉讼中的胜诉方给予诉讼补偿。 第三部分是关于建立股东代表诉讼的制约机制。为了平衡股东与公司的利益,我国对股东代表诉讼中提起诉讼的股东有持股时间以及持股份额的限制,并只能在穷尽公司内部救济方式后方能使用。因股东代表诉讼很可能会干扰公司正常的经营活动,建议我国公司法应当引入商业判断原则以判断对于公司董事、高管等的行为是否能够提起股东代表诉讼。 第四部分是关于构建股东代表诉讼的其他程序保障机制。股东代表诉讼作为一种特殊诉讼制度应当遵循诉讼的基本原理,但是由于股东代表诉讼中利益关系的特殊性,决定了股东代表诉讼在被告、管辖、反诉、调节机制以及判决效力方面都有其独特的因素,股东代表诉讼应当遵循其特殊的程序保障机制,以达到鼓励诉讼与防止滥诉的效果。
[Abstract]:The shareholder representative litigation system is a lawsuit mechanism which is accompanied by the development and perfection of the modern company system. It is a necessary means to make up for the defects of the corporate governance structure and the insufficiency of other relief methods. This system strengthens the internal supervision and balance of the shareholders to the directors and other company management personnel. It gives the capital multi decision system. It is of positive significance for the small and medium shareholders to maintain their rights and interests with the aid of judicial power to maintain the legitimate interests of the company and the shareholders, especially the small and medium shareholders. However, the system is a breakthrough in the autonomy of the company after all. If the construction is reasonable, it is beneficial to adjust the level of corporate governance after the separation of the right and the management right. Heng can also become a sharp sword to protect the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders and companies. If used improperly, it may become a means for malicious shareholders to disrupt the normal operation of the company.
In 2005, our country carried out a new round of "Company Law > amendment", which was the first time to bring the shareholder representative action into the formal system, and began to apply in the judicial practice. However, the construction of the shareholder representative litigation system is not perfect. Due to the lack of relevant legislation and practical experience, the provisions still exist to be conservative and so on. Our country should study and summarize the experience and lessons of the advanced countries and improve the actual situation as the starting point. On the basis of analyzing the legislation and practice of the shareholder representative litigation in other countries, this paper puts forward some suggestions so that the shareholder representative litigation system can get more in our country. Good application, more reasonable.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this paper is divided into four parts:
The first part is a brief introduction to the shareholder representative litigation. The article first explored the concept of shareholder representative litigation, and then made a brief review of the origin and development history of the system and the introduction and practice in China. Finally, it expounded the principle of the shareholder representative litigation. In part, we can draw the conclusion that the shareholder representative action is the product of the equilibrium concept, which is also due to the requirement of the equilibrium of corporate governance structure, and the purpose of balance and the concept of equilibrium are still the legal origin of the shareholders' representative litigation.
The second part is to measure the cost of litigation in the lawsuit system of the shareholder representative litigation in our country, so as to achieve the purpose of encouraging the small shareholders to bring the representative action. The direct benefit of the shareholder's representative action is the company, and the shareholders can only gain indirect benefits through the benefit of the company, and the shareholders also need to bear the cost of prosecution once the shareholders lose the prosecution. In the part of the discussion, we can see that China should reform the litigation cost system of shareholders' representative litigation, change it into non property cases to facilitate shareholders' prosecution, and give compensation to the winning parties in the shareholder's representative action.
The third part is about the restriction mechanism for the establishment of shareholder representative litigation. In order to balance the interests of shareholders and companies, the shareholders of the shareholder representative litigation in our country have the time of holding the shareholding and the limit of the share share, and can only be used in the rear of the company. As a regular operation, it is suggested that our company law should introduce the principle of commercial judgment to judge whether the actions of the directors of the company, the executives, etc. can bring the shareholder's representative action.
The fourth part is about the other procedural safeguards for the construction of shareholder representative litigation. As a special litigation system, the shareholder representative action should follow the basic principle of litigation, but because of the particularity of the interest relationship in the shareholder's representative action, the shareholder's representative action is determined by the defendant, jurisdiction, counterclaim, regulation mechanism and the effect of judgment. Each side has its own unique factors. Shareholder representative litigation should follow its special procedural safeguard mechanism so as to encourage litigation and prevent abuse of litigation.
【学位授予单位】:中国政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91

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