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论我国引入金融控股公司预先承诺制度

发布时间:2018-06-03 19:45

  本文选题:预先承诺制 + 金融控股公司 ; 参考:《中国海洋大学》2011年硕士论文


【摘要】:以《新巴塞尔协议》为标志,以资本充足性监管为核心的全面的审慎性风险监管逐渐成为了国际银行业监管的核心和重点。针对日益突出的银行业市场风险问题,《巴塞尔协议》先后提出了标准化监管模式(Standardised Mode)和内部模型法(Internal Model/VaR),对其进行资本充足性监管。而在运用过程中,这两种方法暴露出了局限性和不足,最根本的问题是这两种方法都存在激励不相容的问题。随着信息经济学在产业经济学中的应用,作为非对称信息博弈研究和运用的成果,20世纪90年代后,激励规制理论在西方逐渐兴起和发展。在这一理论的影响下,美联储委员会提出了预先承诺制(Pre-commitment Approach)的资本充足率监管制度设想。根据这种预先承诺制方法,美联储要求银行在每一个期间(通常是一个季度)初始,预先承诺它准备承担的最大交易损失,而这一损失随即就将成为该银行相对于市场风险的当期资本要求。监管当局在对该季度报告进行审核之后,视其损失是否超过了银行自己设定的限额对银行采取相应的策略。如果超过,银行将会受到处罚,具体处罚形式包括罚款、监管处分,或在今后保证更高的资本要求等。这一制度产生于主要采用金融控股公司形式实行金融混业经营的美国,对于准备借鉴美国模式,采用金融控股公司形式实现金融分业经营向混业经营过渡的中国金融业毫无疑问具有重要借鉴意义。 本文首先对预先承诺制的产生背景、其具体内容、理论渊源、应用情况、优势与目前存在的不足等问题做了一个较为全面和系统的呈现,使读者对该制度有一个全面的了解,并重点突出了其激励相容的特性。接下来通过对金融控股公司有关理论及中国金融控股公司现状等问题进行分析,指出了金融控股公司风险监管的一系列特殊问题。揭示了中国加强金融控股公司风险监管的必要性。而后针对中国金融控股公司监管所存在的法律缺位,现行分业监管制度导致资本风险监管方面的激励不相容的等问题,提出在未来金融控股公司法中引入预先承诺制的必要性,并分析可行性和意义。最后则水到渠成,探讨了我国未来金融控股公司立法中引入预先承诺制的具体制度构建问题。提出了自己的一些分析和设想。
[Abstract]:With Basel II as the symbol and capital adequacy regulation as the core, the comprehensive prudential risk supervision has gradually become the core and focus of international banking supervision. In view of the increasingly prominent banking market risk, the Basel Accord has put forward standardised mode of supervision and internal model method, I. e., Internal Model / VaRN, to supervise its capital adequacy. In the process of application, these two methods have exposed their limitations and shortcomings. The most fundamental problem is that the two methods are incompatible with each other. With the application of information economics in industrial economics, as a result of asymmetric information game theory, incentive regulation theory has been rising and developing in the west since 1990s. Under the influence of this theory, the Fed committee has put forward the idea of a capital adequacy regulatory system for the Pre-commitment system. Under this pre-commitment approach, the Fed requires the bank to pre-commit the maximum transaction losses it is prepared to take at the start of each period, usually a quarter. The loss will then become the bank's current capital requirement relative to market risk. After reviewing the quarterly report, regulators decided whether their losses exceeded the limits set by the banks themselves. If exceeded, banks will be punished in the form of fines, regulatory sanctions, or higher capital requirements in the future. This system came into being in the United States, which mainly adopts the form of financial holding company to carry out financial mixed operation. There is no doubt that the Chinese financial industry which adopts the form of financial holding company to realize the transition from separate operation to mixed operation has important reference significance. Firstly, this paper makes a comprehensive and systematic presentation of the background, content, theoretical origin, application, advantages and disadvantages of the pre-commitment system, so that readers can have a comprehensive understanding of the system. The characteristics of incentive compatibility are emphasized. Then, by analyzing the theory of financial holding company and the current situation of financial holding company in China, this paper points out a series of special problems in risk supervision of financial holding company. It reveals the necessity of strengthening the risk supervision of financial holding companies in China. Then aiming at the problems of the absence of law in the supervision of Chinese financial holding companies and the incompatibility of incentives in the supervision of capital risks caused by the current separate supervision system, the necessity of introducing the pre-commitment system into the future financial holding company law is put forward. And analyze the feasibility and significance. Finally, the author discusses the construction of the system of introducing the advance commitment system into the legislation of future financial holding companies. Put forward some of their own analysis and ideas.
【学位授予单位】:中国海洋大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.28

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