我国公司监事会独立性问题研究

发布时间：2018-06-03 23:43

本文选题：公司治理 + 监事会　；参考：《吉林大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国《公司法》自制定以来，公司内部机关的设计，采决策权、执行权与监督权三权分立的精神。以股东会为公司最高意思机关，其下再分设董事会和监事会以分掌公司的业务执行权及监察权。长久以来我国公司股权多由少数人所掌控，再加上公司法就董事和监事的选任的规定不完善，造成大股东不仅控制了董事的选任，甚至监事也要依附于大股东的势力，才能够当选。因而造成长久以来为人所诟病的“监事不监视”的现象，究其根本原因在于我国公司监事会独立性的缺失。权利的制衡与监督是公司治理的基本原则，监事会制度是实现权利制衡的重要制度安排。我国《公司法》规定监事会为公司内设监督机构，自《公司法》颁布实施以来，监事会制度运行状况并不尽如人意。面对这种情况，独立董事和外部监事的制度设计是否应当引入到我国的公司治理结构中引发了学者的讨论，各方众说纷纭。在这种趋势下，认真梳理和检讨我国监事会制度是十分必要的。众所周知，，监督机制是维护公司健康和稳定运作的重要保障，监督又要求效率与成本之间的优化平衡，综合观之，监事会制度在有效的监督公司的经营行为和控制监督的成本，以达到有效地监督与合理的管理成本之间的平衡方面发挥着重要作用。本文拟从我国公司监事会制度的运行现状切入，企图找出目前我国公司监事会形同虚设的症结所在，认为由于法律与制度设计上的原因，使得现行公司的组织构架与公司监事会的独立性出现了问题。然而，无论独立董事制度亦或者外部监事制度，外部性是形式，独立性才是其根本性质。因而，与其引入外部监事与独立董事制度造成公司内部监控机构叠床架屋的不效率，引发公司内部监控权限的混淆，影响公司内部监控的实效性。不如，从我国公司监事会制度运行的现实问题入手，分析我国公司监事会缺乏独立性的深层次原因，找出解决我国公司监事会独立性缺失问题的方法对策，将其在法律制度层面加以规定以保障其执行实施。由此观之，完善我国公司内部监控制度，应该从强化我国公司监事会的独立性着手，使监事会独立发挥其应有的职能。本文正是从我国公司监事会制度运行的现实状况入手，来分析我国公司监事会独立性缺失的原因，针对监事会独立性缺失的原因提出相应的解决办法，同时借鉴独立监事及独立董事等制度，在制度设计中如何保持其独立性的可取之处,从而就如何保障我国公司监事会的独立性提出一些法律层面的具体建议。希望本文对我国公司监事会独立性缺失问题的现状有一个较为清晰的勾勒，为如何制定完善的保障监事会独立性的法律规范做出一点有益的探索，从而使我国公司监事会更好的发挥其职能，以利于现代公司治理制度的发展与完善。
[Abstract]:Since the company law was established in our country, the design of the internal organs of the company adopts the spirit of separation of the three powers of decision making, execution and supervision. The shareholders' meeting shall be the supreme body of the company, and the board of directors and the board of supervisors shall be set up under the board of directors and the board of supervisors to administer the company's business execution and supervision powers. For a long time, the stock rights of companies in our country were mostly controlled by a few people, and the provisions of the Company Law on the selection and appointment of directors and supervisors were not perfect, resulting in the majority shareholders not only controlling the selection and appointment of directors, but even supervisors depending on the influence of major shareholders. To be elected. Therefore, the phenomenon of "supervisor not monitoring", which has been criticized for a long time, lies in the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country. The balance and supervision of rights is the basic principle of corporate governance, and the system of board of supervisors is an important institutional arrangement to realize the balance of rights. The company law of our country stipulates that the board of supervisors shall set up the supervisory organization for the company. Since the promulgation and implementation of the company law, the system of the board of supervisors is not satisfactory. Faced with this situation, whether the system design of independent directors and external supervisors should be introduced into the corporate governance structure of our country has aroused the discussion of scholars. Under this trend, it is very necessary to comb and review the system of board of supervisors in our country. As we all know, the supervision mechanism is an important guarantee to maintain the health and stability of the company. Supervision requires an optimal balance between efficiency and cost. In a comprehensive view, the board of supervisors system can effectively supervise the company's business behavior and control the cost of supervision. It plays an important role in achieving the balance between effective supervision and reasonable management costs. This paper tries to find out the crux of our company's board of supervisors from the point of view of the current operating situation of the board of supervisors system in our country, and thinks that due to the reasons of legal and institutional design, The organizational structure of the current company and the independence of the board of supervisors appear problems. However, whether the independent director system or the external supervisor system, externality is the form, independence is its fundamental nature. Therefore, instead of introducing the system of external supervisors and independent directors, it causes the inefficiency of the overlapping structure of the internal monitoring organizations of the company, and causes confusion of the authority of the internal monitoring of the company, which affects the effectiveness of the internal monitoring of the company. Starting with the practical problems in the operation of the board of supervisors system in our country, this paper analyzes the deep-seated reasons for the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country, and finds out the countermeasures to solve the problem of the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country. It is regulated at the level of the legal system to guarantee its enforcement. Therefore, to perfect the internal supervision system of our company, we should start with strengthening the independence of the board of supervisors of our company, and make the board of supervisors play its proper function independently. This paper analyzes the reasons for the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country, and puts forward corresponding solutions to the reasons for the lack of independence of the board of supervisors, starting with the actual situation of the running of the board of supervisors system in our country. At the same time, draw lessons from the independent supervisor and independent director system, how to maintain its independence in the system design, and put forward some specific suggestions on how to protect the independence of the board of supervisors in our country. I hope this paper has a clear outline of the lack of the independence of the board of supervisors in our country, and make some useful exploration for how to establish the perfect legal norms to guarantee the independence of the board of supervisors. In order to make our company board of supervisors better play its functions, in order to facilitate the development and improvement of modern corporate governance system.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D922.291.91

【参考文献】