论董事破产民事责任

发布时间：2018-06-20 21:25

本文选题：董事 + 债权人　；参考：《西南政法大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：企业负债对企业的发展来说是不可或缺的，债权融资是企业主要的融资方式之一。企业通过发行企业债券的形式来募集资金，并以此作为经营资产来扩大自身的规模。随着企业的进一步发展，其已经不在是一个单纯的营利主体，而成为了社会经济活动的一个主要组成部分。同时，企业的债务分布也不再局限于单个的主体，其范围之广，数额之大，几乎足以影响到每一个社会主体。保护债权人的利益有利于社会的稳定，有利于经济的良性循环。传统的企业法几乎在所有方面都将其关注的重点聚集在企业与其成员、董事与股东之间的权利义务关系方面，很少甚至是根本不考虑企业债权人等利益相关者的权利和利益问题。但当企业处于无力清偿状态或者即将处于无力清偿状态时，企业还有多少剩余财产也就直接意味着债权人能够分摊到多少财产。此时，作为企业经营管理者的董事，其行为无疑会直接影响到债权人的利益。不管是英美法系国家还是大陆法系国家都对董事在企业处于无力清偿状态时的行为进行了相当多的法律规制。我国在这一方面的规定相对来说比较落后，破产法、公司法等规定的相关制度缺乏系统性和可操作性，进一步弱化了原本就不太完善的法律规制。本文力求通过在破产法上建立一个较为独立的制度来规范董事在企业处于无力状态时或者在破产程序开始时的相关行为。当董事违反了这些行为，损害债权人利益时，追究其相应的民事责任。本人一共分为五个部分。第一部分阐述了董事需要承担破产民事责任的理论基础：保护债权人的利益和公司治理的需要。在企业处于无力清偿状态时，股东更倾向于赋予董事更多的管理权限，而董事可能会基于个人利益最大化的考虑损害企业和债权人的利益。同时，在企业处于无力清偿状态时，企业的剩余财产就相当于债权人的财产，企业的债权人相对于董事处于弱势地位，其利益直接受董事行为的影响。基于债权人的利益考虑和企业治理的需要，此时，需要对董事的行为进行规制。同时，本文也考察了相关的外国立法，为文章后面的借鉴提供基础。第二个部分阐述了董事破产民事责任的性质和归责原则。董事的破产民事责任应该为侵权责任。由于董事是违反了法定的义务而需要承担民事责任，根据一般的法学理论，违反法定义务行为构成侵权。另外，由于董事行为的特殊性，在归责原则方面采纳过错推定原则。第三部分通过类型化的方式具体分析了董事的哪些行为需要承担民事责任。本人将董事需要承担破产民事责任的情形分析归纳为四类：欺诈性交易的破产民事责任、偏僻性清偿的破产民事责任、恶意减少公司财产的破产民事责任和违反破产程序中的义务的破产民事责任。前三种类型一般是董事在企业处于无力清偿状态时或者是破产前的法定期间内进行的不当行为而需要承担民事责任的情形。同时，，在破产程序中，董事负有一系列的义务，若董事未履行或者未适当履行这些义务时也可能会给债权人的利益造成损害，需要承担民事责任。该情形与前面的三种类型差异较大，故将其作为一个独立的类型加以说明。第四个部分说明了我国建立一个完善的董事破产民事责任制度的必要性和正确处理好董事破产民事责任与法人人格否认之间的关系。本文认为，要求董事承担破产民事责任和要求否认法人人格二者之间并行不悖。同时可以将法人人格否认之诉纳入到追究董事破产民事责任的破产程序中。第五个部分详细阐述了我国引入董事破产民事责任后具体制度的构建。本文分别论述了适用董事破产民事责任的适用情形、构成要件、责任的承担方式和责任的追究机制。本文认为，董事破产民事责任的适用情形为第三部分类型化的四种情形。董事破产民事责任为侵权责任，其构成要件为一般侵权责任的构成要件。在责任承担方面，要求董事返还财产、赔偿损失，并对那些行为严重的董事，限制或取消其相关的资格。另外，本文将追求董事破产民事责任的权力一般情况下赋予了破产管理人，在管理人未履行时，债权人会议可以也可以向法院起诉相关的董事。
[Abstract]:Debt financing is indispensable to the development of enterprises. Debt financing is one of the main financing ways of enterprises. By issuing corporate bonds, enterprises raise funds and use them as operating assets to expand their own scale. With the further development of enterprises, it has become a simple profit subject. At the same time, the distribution of the enterprise's debt is no longer limited to the individual subject, its scope is wide and the amount is large enough to affect every social subject. Protecting the interests of the creditors is beneficial to the stability of the society and is beneficial to the virtuous circle of the economy. The traditional enterprise law is almost in all sides. The focus of its attention is focused on the rights and obligations of the enterprise and its members, and between the directors and the shareholders, and few even do not even consider the rights and interests of the stakeholders, such as the enterprise creditors. However, when the enterprise is in a state of insolvency or is about to be in a state of insolvency, it has many remaining property. It directly means that creditors can apportion to how much property. At this point, as the managers of company directors, their behavior will directly affect the interests of creditors.
Both the common law countries and the civil law countries have made quite a lot of legal regulations on the behavior of the directors when they are in a state of insolvency. Our regulations are relatively backward in this respect. The relevant systems in the bankruptcy law and the company law are lack of system and maneuverability, which further weaken the original. A less perfect legal regulation. This article seeks to establish a more independent system in the bankruptcy law to regulate the relevant behavior of the director when the enterprise is in a weak state or at the beginning of the bankruptcy proceedings. When the director is in violation of these acts and damages the interests of the creditor, it will be investigated for its corresponding civil liability.
The first part is divided into five parts. The first part expounds the theoretical basis of the director's need to bear the civil liability for bankruptcy: to protect the interests of the creditors and the needs of the corporate governance. When the enterprise is in a state of insolvency, the shareholders are more inclined to give more management authority to the directors, and the directors may be based on the consideration of the maximization of personal interests. At the same time, when the enterprise is in a state of insolvency, the remaining property of the enterprise is equivalent to the creditor's property, the creditor of the enterprise is in a disadvantaged position relative to the director, and its interests are directly affected by the director's behavior. In addition, this article also examines relevant foreign legislation to provide a basis for reference later.
The second part expounds the nature of the civil liability for the director's bankruptcy and the principle of imputation. The director's civil liability for bankruptcy should be the liability for tort. Because the director is in violation of the legal obligation, it needs to bear civil liability, and the violation of the legal obligation according to the general law theory constitutes the right to invade. In addition, the particularity of the director's behavior is in return. The principle of presumption of fault is adopted in the principle of responsibility.
The third part analyzes the behavior of the director by the way of typization, which needs to bear civil liability. I summarize the situation of the civil liability of the director to four categories: the bankruptcy civil liability of the fraudulent transaction, the insolvency civil liability for the remotely liquidated bankruptcy, the maliciously reducing the civil liability for the bankruptcy of the company's property and the civil liability of the bankruptcy of the company. The civil liability for bankruptcy in violation of the obligations of the insolvency proceedings. The first three types are generally a case of civil liability for a director in a state of insolvency or a legal period prior to the bankruptcy. In the case of bankruptcy, the director has a series of obligations if the director has failed to perform or unwell. When these duties may also cause damage to the interests of the creditors should bear civil liability. The differences between the three types of the situation and in front of the larger, so it can be used as an independent type of explanation.
The fourth part explains the necessity of establishing a perfect civil liability system for the bankruptcy of the directors and the relationship between the correct handling of the civil liability of the directors and the denial of the personality of the legal person. The case of denial of complaint is incorporated into the bankruptcy proceedings for investigating the civil liability of directors' bankruptcy.
The fifth part expounds the construction of the specific system after the introduction of civil liability for directors bankruptcy in China. This article discusses the application of civil liability for the bankruptcy of directors, the constitutive requirements, the way of responsibility and the mechanism of accountability. This article holds that the application of the civil liability of the director's bankruptcy is the four type of the third part. The civil liability of the director is a tort liability, and its constituent elements are the constituent elements of the general tort liability. In the aspect of responsibility, the director requires the director to return the property, compensate for the loss, and restrict or cancel the relevant qualifications for those who have serious behavior. In addition, this article will pursue the general situation of the power of the director's civil liability for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy administrator is entrusted to the creditors, and when the manager fails to perform, the creditors' meeting may or may sue the relevant directors to the court.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D922.291.92

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