公司僵局之实证分析与破解路径研究

发布时间：2018-07-06 16:19

本文选题：公司僵局 + 压迫　；参考：《深圳大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：司法解散制度是公司僵局的司法救济,但法院对于司法强制解散公司的条件在公司僵局纠纷中的适用仍有不一样的理解,仍存在许多亟待明释的问题。本文将借助实证研究方法,对我国公司僵局案例的进行样本抽取和统计,着重考察股东持股比例和公司盈利状况在司法裁判中的体现,通过实证分析并讨论公司僵局和股东利益受损在司法解散制度中的适用情况,以达到对司法强制解散这一救济手段的更准确认识。在对起诉解散方股东持股比例进行考察并结合公司僵局的成因与实证分析后,我们发现即使公司法与公司章程对股东参加股东会有程序性的规定,但股东没有必须参加股东会或必须做出表决的义务,因此在股东持股比例悬殊的公司也会发生公司僵局。而针对有个别法院运用域外法的“压迫”理论进行裁判的情况,本文从立法技术、少数股东的过度保护、公司的意志保护等方面进行论证,呼吁理性看待司法解散制度的对股东压迫的引入。而关于股东利益受损的条件,本文坚持股东利益的直接体现是股东的投资利益。公司的盈利状况是股东投资利益的直接关联,法院对盈利的公司谨慎裁判解散并无不妥。司法解散制度解散的是公司本身,因此法院在审判公司僵局纠纷时,应当注重自己的司法角色扮演,不可越俎代庖,也不可过分介入。此外,公司僵局的关键还在于如何破解。本文提供了两个破解路径:其一,就公司内部突破僵局而言,假设我国未来引入授权资本制度,公司董事会可以灵活发行新增资本以此引入外部股东;在授权资本制度的前提下,有限责任公司的股权回购制度也不会被禁止,而是由公司决定股权回购的情形,如此一来,公司章程便可以规定在公司僵局的情况下,经过股东会的特别多数决公司便可以回购部分股东的股权。其二,就司法介入的层面而言,建议借鉴域外法的强制股权收购,该路径的前提是由公司法明确法院有适用强制股权收购的自由裁量权。
[Abstract]:The judicial dissolution system is the judicial relief of the company deadlock, but the court still has different understanding of the application of the judicial compulsory dissolution of the company in the company deadlock dispute, and there are still many problems that need to be explained. In this paper, with the help of empirical research method, we will collect samples and statistics of the corporate deadlock cases in our country, and focus on the reflection of shareholders' shareholding ratio and corporate profitability in the judicial decision. This paper analyzes and discusses the application of corporate deadlock and shareholders' interests in the judicial dissolution system, so as to get a more accurate understanding of the relief means of judicial compulsory dissolution. After investigating the shareholders' shareholding ratio of the disbanding party and combining the causes of the corporate deadlock and empirical analysis, we find that even though the company law and articles of association have procedural provisions on shareholders' participation in shareholders' meetings, But shareholders have no obligation to participate in shareholders' meetings or have to vote, so there is also a corporate deadlock in companies where shareholders have different shareholdings. In view of the fact that there are individual courts applying the "oppressive" theory of extraterritorial laws, this paper demonstrates from the aspects of legislative techniques, excessive protection of minority shareholders, protection of the company's will, etc. Call for a rational view of the judicial dissolution of the system of the introduction of shareholder oppression. On the condition of shareholders' interests being damaged, this paper insists that the direct embodiment of shareholders' interests is shareholders' investment interests. The profitability of the company is directly related to the shareholders' investment interests, and it is not inappropriate for the court to rule discreetly on the dissolution of the profitable company. The dissolution of the judicial dissolution system is the company itself, so the court should pay attention to its own judicial role play when trying the deadlock dispute of the company. In addition, the key to corporate deadlock is how to break it. This paper provides two ways to solve the problem: first, as far as breaking the deadlock within the company is concerned, assuming that China will introduce the authorized capital system in the future, the board of directors of the company can issue additional capital flexibly to introduce external shareholders; Under the premise of the authorized capital system, the share buyback system of a limited liability company will not be prohibited, but rather the situation in which the company decides on the share buyback, so that the articles of association of the company can stipulate that in the case of the deadlock of the company, After the shareholders' meeting of the special majority of the company can buy back some of the shareholders' equity. Secondly, on the level of judicial intervention, it is suggested to draw lessons from the extraterritorial law of compulsory equity acquisition, the premise of this path is that the court has the discretion to apply compulsory equity acquisition by the company law.
【学位授予单位】：深圳大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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