董事篡夺公司机会法律规制问题研究
[Abstract]:Corporate opportunity rules refer to the obligation of directors not to usurp business opportunities. Corporate opportunity rule is a system of corporate governance developed by Anglo-American law countries on the basis of many relevant cases. Its purpose is to protect the interests of companies from being infringed by directors. In recent years, civil law countries have gradually introduced it. The present Company Law of our country has established the company opportunity rule, but because the stipulation of the law is too simple, it is necessary to continue to carry on the related theory research. This article mainly includes the introduction, the text and the conclusion three parts. Among them, the body part has five chapters. The first chapter combs the theoretical basis of prohibiting directors from usurping corporate opportunities. The relationship between directors and companies mainly includes fiduciary relationship theory, agency relationship theory and appointment relationship theory, company opportunity rules and self-dealing restrictions, and non-competition rules are both specific requirements of directors' duty of loyalty. All of them solve the conflicts of interests between directors and companies, but there are differences in the object of adjustment, the elements of constitution and the legal consequences. The second chapter defines and analyzes the standards of corporate opportunity. There are different theories on how to identify the company opportunity, such as interest and expectation interest standard, business scope standard, fair standard and so on. This chapter analyzes and compares the jurisprudence of the British and American countries on the corporate opportunity judgment standard. And introduced our country judicial practice regarding the company opportunity confirmation standard. The third chapter discusses the proper situation of the directors' taking advantage of the company's opportunity and the design of the proper procedure. In Anglo-American case law, directors' use of corporate opportunities is not absolutely and unconditionally prohibited, and in theory they tend to change from the absolute prohibition of directors' taking advantage of corporate business opportunities to the relative prohibition obligations of utilizing corporate business opportunities. Directors should not be prohibited from taking advantage of the company's opportunity, and they have the right to take advantage of the company's opportunity under certain circumstances such as the company giving up the opportunity and not being able to take advantage of the opportunity and allowed to use it by legal procedure. The fourth chapter analyzes the legal consequences and remedies of directors usurping corporate opportunities. The legal consequences mainly include the validity of the transaction with the third party after the directors usurp the opportunity of the company and the liability of the directors who violate their obligations. As the injured party, the company and its shareholders can claim the rights of the infringing directors through the special remedy in the company law. The fifth chapter is about our country related legislation insufficiency and the consummation proposal. This paper mainly discusses how to establish the standard of corporate opportunity, clarify the exception of directors' reasonable use of company's opportunity, perfect the relief way of directors usurping the company's opportunity, and increase the regulation to the outgoing directors.
【学位授予单位】:上海交通大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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