论违约金之减额——从“实益”到“原理”

发布时间：2018-05-29 08:50

  本文选题：违约金减额 + 合意拘束力　； 参考：《北方法学》2017年04期

【摘要】：《合同法》第114条第2款为法院降低当事人约定的违约金数额打开了"方便之门",其正当性来自于实现当事人利益客观均衡的"实益型"思考。罗马法以来,违约金减额规范的变化呈现出实质化的进路,但却偏离了合同法理论的整体框架。为保持合同逻辑体系的协调,应当从"合同自由"的基本原理出发,重视缔约过程体现的当事人合意强度,以合意拘束力的界限作为认定违约金约定数额是否有效的根本依据。立法论上,违约金减额规范未必是必要的;解释论上,《合同法》第114条第2款应被视为"便宜"的表达。
[Abstract]:Article 114, paragraph 2, of contract Law opens a "convenient door" for the court to reduce the amount of liquidated damages agreed by the parties, and its legitimacy comes from the "beneficial" thinking of realizing the objective and balanced interests of the parties. Since Roman law, the change of the norm of penalty reduction presents a substantial approach, but deviates from the whole frame of contract law theory. In order to maintain the coordination of the logical system of contract, we should proceed from the basic principle of "freedom of contract", attach importance to the strength of the parties' agreement embodied in the process of contracting, and take the boundary of the binding force of agreement as the fundamental basis for determining whether the agreed amount of liquidated damages is effective or not. In terms of legislation, the regulation of reduction of liquidated damages is not necessarily necessary; in interpretation, paragraph 2 of Article 114 of the contract Law should be regarded as an expression of "cheap".
【作者单位】： 南京大学法学院;
【基金】：2016年江苏省社科基金后期资助项目“缔约信息提供义务研究”(16HQ024)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：D923.6
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本文编号：1950264