排污权初始分配的法律调控

发布时间：2018-09-07 09:42

【摘要】：严格意义上的排污权交易制度应当包括三个主要过程：排放总量控制、排污权初始分配(排污许可证配额分配)以及排污权交易(买卖交易)。其中,总量控制担负着环境保护及创造稀缺市场职责,构成排污权交易制度之必要前提；排污权交易则保障稀缺资源实现优化配置,形成排污权交易制度之逻辑终点；居于中间位置的排污权初始分配则起着承上启下之功能：借助初始分配机制,排污总量被分成若干具体份额,按照既定分配规则赋予不同排污主体,以污染物持续减排为主要目标的总量控制机制才得以贯彻落实。通过初始分配机制,形成具有相对排它性、可交易和可测量之排污权,以经济效率为主要价值取向的市场交易机制才有可能真正启动。对排污权初始分配机制进行专门研究不仅可以指导排污权初始分配的实践工作,而且对于排污权交易制度自身完善也有重要意义。论文第一部分分析了排污权初始分配机制的基本原理。首先明确排污权及其法律属性。通过回顾排污权物权化理论和实践困境,指出在财产权来源多元化、财产权性质综合化和功能性财产权日益增多的情况下,应跳出以所有权为中心而析出其它权利、须在绝对之物权和相对之债权二元结构中寻找财产权利性质的理论桎锆,以开阔视野和更广泛领域内探寻排污权法律属性。结合新财产权理论,文章指出从以下几个方面理解排污权法律属性：第一,排污权具有私权和公权的双重属性,受公法和私法调整；第二,排污权是一种功能性权利,具有促进、引导和激励等诸多功能；第三,排污权保护具有特殊性,排污权初始分配构成权利保护重要内容。其次,对排污权初始分配进行了界定。作为一种行为、一个过程、一类关系的有机总和,排污权初始分配基本构成要素应当是相对固定的,即分配关系主体、分配客体和调整分配关系的具体分配权利(权力)义务规则。排污权初始分配特征包括：行政主导下市场手段和管理手段的有机统一,利益分配和资源配置的有机统一,多种价值取向的有机统一；最后,论文论述了分配法律关系主体理论。指出所谓主体即依法或依照协议参与排污权初始分配过程,享有权利(权力)和承担义务(责任)的法人或法人共同体组织。按照享有权利和承担义务的不同性质,初始分配法律关系主体可以分为分配主体和分配接受主体。在特殊情况下,国家可以作为分配主体,也可能成为接受主体。分配主体就是分配法律关系中,依法对确定排放总量按照既定分配规则进行分配,享有权力和承担责任的行政主体或其它依法授权受委托组织。分配接受主体就是依照政策法律规定,依法或依照协议参与排污权初始分配法律关系,基于一定分配规则获得一定排放权份额的排污主体的总称。分配主体和分配接受主体为主连结其它利益相关者构成一个分配共同体结构。论文第二部分论述了排污权初始分配基本规则包括既往占有、当前占有、公平分配等。既往占有亦称历史分配,是基于历史排放量基准或其它基准进行排污权初次分配。种类包括：按照历史排放量分配,按照历史能耗量或排放绩效为基准进行的初次分配。洛克的劳动财产理论及诺齐克财产持有理论构成了既往占有正当性的主要来源。既往占有在排污权初始分配占据重要地位,但存在着基准年选择困难和一定的道德困境。基于当前或最近排放量或其它基准进行排污权初始分配即当前占有分配。它包括基于当前实际排放量进行排污权初始分配和基于当前排放绩效进行排污权初始分配。当前占有的正当性可以从法律规定中找到,也可以从休谟的功利主义和法经济学的效率标准中找到根据。当前占有存在很多优点：减少重新制定分配规则的制度成本；可以带来效率提高；可能产生制度规则的预期效应等。但当前占有形成的禀赋效应造成排污权“惜售心理”且当前占有与人自然和谐理念也存在矛盾之处。公平分配包括基于机会公平的初始分配、基于结果公平的初始分配及考虑机会与结果公平的多元分配。德沃金的资源平等理论和“拍卖”假设论证了排污权初始分配拍卖规则的正当性。拍卖规则可以分为密封拍卖和公开加价拍卖。拍卖规则保障每个排污主体同等竞价机会,强调排污权初始配置过程中的机会公平同时带来环境治理资金客观效果,故成为理论和实务界推崇的主要分配规则。但也存在造成排污主体无污染防治计划及加重排污主体额外成本负担等顽疾。基于结果公平的平均主义分配也在温室气体排放权分配中占据一席之地。全球气候变化的不确定性会引起平均主义思潮泛滥。平均主义理论主要包括基于人均排放的“紧缩与趋同”分配规则,“一个标准,两个趋同”分配方案,“人均累积排放”计划等。论文第三部分对初始分配机制包括主体和具体分配规则的实践状况做了细致描述。论文回顾了美国“酸雨计划”二氧化硫排放权分配的公开博弈过程,指出以下几点经验值得借鉴：第一,依法赋予分配主体(EPA)职权能够保障初始分配顺利进行。EPA法定地位和权责是保证初始分配顺利进行必要条件和重要保证；第二,分配接受主体有效厘定和有序扩大。排放接受主体被明确为具有固定源、同质性等属性特征的火电厂,并按照强制和自愿结合思路确定接受主体,有序扩大参与主体数量,保障规模市场效应；第三,建立一种分配规则为主,多种分配规则并存的分配格局。采用何种分配规则或几种规则组合,取决于在支配作用的经济、政治、技术以及环境条件以及规则的有机整合程度。《京都议定书》谈判中,当前占有能够满足当时各国控制温室气体需求,兼顾各国现存或既得利益,能够做到当前利益的最大化满足,且包括了一个更低的管制成本。人均排放量为基础的排放权分配机制可以为发展中国家提供更大的生存和发展空问,较易为发展中国家接受。但由于基准年难以确定以及实施操作的具体难度,平均主义最终没有出现在国际法律文件之中。论文第四部分对完善中国排污权初始分配机制提出思路。回顾了中国排污权交易制度规范性法律文件等,分析了中国排污权初始分配机制存在的种种问题：第一,排污权交易制度缺乏整体主义考量,断片化现象突出。缺乏递减的总量控制目标和对初始分配关注不够,旨趣仅停留“交易”层面。第二,分配主体及其分配权配置存在问题。包括横向权力配置方面的部门利益化和监督权缺失问题,纵向权力配置方面的正式法律渊源虚化,多样化权力配置造成可操作性差等；第三,排污权初始分配规则存在问题。包括具体分配规则单一问题；定价出售规则所耗成本巨大和随意性问题；拍卖规则功能异化,有沦为资本游戏风险；有偿分配费用名目繁多,名称各异,有加重排污主体负担问题。第四,排放量数据管理规则问题分析。包括缺乏规范的排放数据库管理制度和明确的责任追究制度。最后对中国排污权初始分配机制提出了若干建议：在法律法规完善方面,提出修改完善环境法律法规,明确总量控制制度及实施措施；法律授权环境主管部门总量初始分配权责；出台国家层面的排污权初始分配规则制度。在初始分配主体分配权配置方面,依寻能源和环境政策一体化思路,依法明确环境部在总量控制和初始分配的主导地位,通过联席会议和通报机制协调横向关系；在初始分配接受主体方面,结合同质性、成本差异、技术手段、市场力量等,将强制性和自愿性结合起来,分阶段有计划渐次扩大接受主体范围和数量,在较长一段时间内应在火电行业推广为宜；在分配规则方面,建立一种分配规则为主,多种规则并存分配格局。
[Abstract]:Strictly speaking, the emission trading system should include three main processes: total emission control, initial allocation of emission permits (emission permit quota allocation) and emission trading (trading). Trading guarantees the optimal allocation of scarce resources and forms the logical end point of the emission trading system; the initial allocation of emission rights in the middle position serves as a connecting link between the preceding and the following functions: with the aid of the initial allocation mechanism, the total amount of pollutants is divided into several specific shares, and different pollutant dischargers are given according to the established allocation rules, so that pollutants can be sustained. Only through the initial allocation mechanism can we form a relatively exclusive, tradable and measurable emission right, and the market trading mechanism with economic efficiency as the main value orientation can be really started. The practice of the initial allocation of emission rights is of great significance to the perfection of the emission trading system.
The first part of the paper analyzes the basic principles of the initial allocation mechanism of emission rights. Firstly, it clarifies the emission rights and their legal attributes. In order to explore the legal attributes of the emission right in a wider field of vision and in a broader range, it is necessary to find out the nature of the property right in the dual structure of absolute property right and relative creditor's right. Combining with the new property right theory, this paper points out that the legal attributes of the emission right can be understood from the following aspects: First, the emission right has private rights and public rights. The dual attributes of the right are regulated by public law and private law; secondly, the right to emit pollutants is a kind of functional right, which has many functions such as promoting, guiding and encouraging; thirdly, the protection of the right to emit pollutants has its particularity, and the initial distribution of the right to emit pollutants constitutes an important part of the right protection. secondly, the initial distribution of the right to emit pollutants is defined. The basic elements of the initial allocation of pollutant emission rights should be relatively fixed, that is, the subject of the allocation relationship, the object of the allocation and the specific allocation rights (rights) and obligations rules regulating the distribution relationship. Finally, the paper discusses the theory of the subject of distribution legal relationship, pointing out that the so-called subject is a community of legal persons or legal persons who enjoy rights (rights) and undertake obligations (responsibilities) by participating in the initial distribution process of emission rights according to law or agreement. The subject of initial distribution legal relationship can be divided into distribution subject and distribution acceptance subject according to the different nature of the obligation. Under special circumstances, the state can act as distribution subject or acceptance subject. The subject of distribution and acceptance refers to the person who participates in the initial distribution of pollutant discharge rights according to law or agreement according to policy and law and obtains a certain share of pollutant discharge rights according to certain distribution rules. Its stakeholders constitute a distributive community structure.
The second part of the paper discusses the basic rules of the initial allocation of emission rights, including past possession, current possession, fair distribution and so on. Quasi-initial distribution. Locke's theory of labor property and Nozick's theory of property possession constitute the main sources of the legitimacy of previous occupancy. Previous occupancy occupies an important position in the initial allocation of emission rights, but there are difficulties in choosing the base year and certain moral dilemmas. Initial allocation of rights is the current allocation of occupancy. It includes initial allocation of emission rights based on current actual emissions and initial allocation of emission rights based on current emission performance. There are many advantages: reducing the system cost of redesigning the distribution rules; bringing about efficiency improvement; possibly producing the expected effect of the system rules and so on. The fair initial allocation is based on the fair initial allocation of results and the multiple allocation of opportunities and results. Dworkin's resource equality theory and the "auction" hypothesis demonstrate the validity of the auction rules for the initial allocation of emission rights. The main body has the same bidding opportunity and emphasizes the fair opportunity in the initial allocation of pollutant emission rights and the objective effect of environmental control funds. Therefore, it has become the main distribution rule advocated by the theoretical and practical circles. Equalism also holds a place in the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions. Uncertainty about global climate change can lead to a flood of equalitarianism. Equalism theory mainly includes the "tightening and convergence" distribution rules based on per capita emissions, the "one standard, two convergence" distribution scheme, and the "cumulative per capita emissions" plan.
The third part of the paper describes in detail the practice of the initial allocation mechanism including the main body and the specific allocation rules. The paper reviews the open game process of sulfur dioxide emission rights allocation under the "acid rain program" in the United States, and points out that the following experiences are worth learning: Firstly, giving the distribution subject (EPA) authority according to law can guarantee the initial allocation. The statutory status and rights and responsibilities of EPA are the necessary conditions and important guarantees to ensure the smooth initial distribution; secondly, the allocation and acceptance subject is effectively defined and orderly expanded. The emission acceptance subject is clearly defined as a thermal power plant with fixed source, homogeneity and other characteristics, and the acceptance subject is determined according to the compulsory and voluntary combination of ideas, orderly. Third, establish a distribution pattern in which distribution rules are dominant and multiple distribution rules coexist. The choice of distribution rules or combinations of rules depends on the economic, political, technological and environmental conditions and the degree of organic integration of the rules that play a dominant role. China's current possession can meet the needs of all countries to control greenhouse gases at that time, take into account the existing or vested interests of all countries, maximize the current benefits and include a lower regulatory cost. It was accepted by developing countries, but eventually equalitarianism did not appear in international legal documents because of the difficulty in determining the base year and the specific difficulty in implementing it.
The fourth part of the paper puts forward some ideas to improve the initial allocation mechanism of China's emission rights. It reviews the normative legal documents of China's emission trading system, and analyzes the problems existing in the initial allocation mechanism of China's emission rights. Firstly, the emission trading system lacks holistic consideration and fragmentation. Secondly, there are some problems in the distribution subject and its allocation of power, including the problems of departmental interests and lack of supervision power in horizontal power allocation, the weakening of formal legal sources in vertical power allocation, and the poor maneuverability caused by diversified power allocation. Thirdly, there are some problems in the initial allocation rules of emission rights, including the single specific allocation rules, the huge cost and arbitrariness of pricing and selling rules, the dissimilation of auction rules and the risk of becoming a capital game, and the various categories and names of paid allocation fees, which aggravate the burden of the main pollutants. Finally, some suggestions are put forward for the initial allocation mechanism of emission rights in China: in the aspect of perfecting the laws and regulations, the environmental laws and regulations are revised and perfected, and the total amount control system and implementation measures are clarified; and the environment authorized by law is also clarified. On the allocation of the initial allocation of pollutant rights at the national level, in accordance with the idea of the integration of energy and environmental policies, the dominant position of the Ministry of Environment in the total control and initial allocation is defined according to law, and horizontal relations are coordinated through joint meetings and notification mechanisms. In the aspect of acceptor of initial distribution, combining homogeneity, cost difference, technical means and market forces, the compulsion and voluntariness are combined, and the scope and quantity of acceptor should be gradually expanded in stages and in a long period of time. In the aspect of distribution rules, a distribution rule should be established. A variety of rules coexist with the distribution pattern.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.68;X197

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