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论标准必要专利的跨境救济

发布时间:2019-01-30 10:31
【摘要】:标准必要专利是一种专利的例外情形。它保护专利时效内的排他性权利,还保护标准实施者以合理成本实施标准的权利。这种专利是由标准化组织所认可,标准化组织成员所持有的专利。这个过程中可能伴随着众多专利被纳入标准专利池。同一个标准专利池中的专利可能来自不同国家,这些专利的有效区域和标准实施区域可能只有部分重叠。这些巨量的专利,很难避免在非重叠区域内的个别专利的效力瑕疵。我们不能难看出,该问题需要在专利权利的排他性和标准化的公共利益层面寻求平衡,同时解决在跨境实施标准化过程中所带来的专利区域性问题。在某一特定产业领域中,能否成为标准制定参与者,决定着一个企业可否成为该行业的领导者。当专利被纳入标准后,专利持有人将获得巨大的经济利益。为了保障这种优势,专利持有人可以通过提高专利使用价格来限制竞争对手,还可以利用反向授权协议来保持自己的技术优势,从而引发专利挟持问题。由于专利挟持问题的应对方法尚不完善,专利持有人往往利用行政机关的市场禁令来行使其专利的排他性权利。专利权人的排他性权利是否被滥用需要司法机关做出裁量,而漫长的诉讼过程可能使得标准实施人失去将新产品推向市场的机会。由此可见,应对这一问题需要利用反垄断机关、市场管理机关和法院的合作来实现。同时结合标准化的跨境推广问题,由于各国执法尺度和司法裁量尺度的差异,同一个标准必要专利在不同国家可能收到截然不同的对待,这时往往需要达成双边或多边贸易协议来解决。但这种贸易协议的达成是旷日持久的,而且以美国德国为代表的专利大国是否愿意放弃他们长期以来坚持的专利政策也不得而知。有数据表明我国现阶段的专利注册年增长量稳居世界榜首,发达国家在专利持有的数量优势正在逐渐被削弱。我们将在不久的将来取得与这些国家平等对话的实力,我们是否需要未雨绸缪适当调整现行的专利政策,建立高效的专利保护制度。如果这样,当我国企业在境外遭遇高强度专利执法调查时,可以在本土找到对等的报复手段。对等的报复手段也可以迫使这些国家放下身段来和我们达成双边贸易协定,以实现平等保护标准实施人权利和标准专利持有人权利的目的。
[Abstract]:A standard necessary patent is an exception to a patent. It protects exclusive rights in patent limitation and the right of standard implementers to enforce standards at reasonable cost. This patent is approved by the ISO and held by its members. This process may be accompanied by numerous patents into the standard patent pool. The patent in the same standard patent pool may come from different countries, the valid area of these patents and the standard enforcement area may only partially overlap. It is difficult to avoid defects in the effectiveness of individual patents in separate areas. It is not difficult to see that the issue needs to strike a balance between the exclusivity of patent rights and the public interest of standardization, while addressing the regional patent issues arising from cross-border standardization. In a particular industry, the ability to become a standard-setting participant determines whether an enterprise can become a leader in the industry. When the patent is included in the standard, the patent holder will benefit greatly. In order to protect this advantage, patent holders can limit their competitors by raising the price of patent usage, and can use reverse licensing protocol to maintain their own technical advantages, thus causing the problem of patent hijacking. Because the solution to the problem of patent hijacking is not perfect, patent holders often use the market ban of administrative organs to exercise their exclusive rights of patents. Whether the patentee's exclusive rights are abused requires judicial discretion, and the lengthy litigation process may deprive the standard enforcement of the opportunity to bring the new product to market. Therefore, to deal with this problem, we need to use the cooperation of antitrust agencies, market management agencies and courts. At the same time, in the context of standardized cross-border promotion, due to the differences in the scale of enforcement and judicial discretion of each country, the necessary patent of the same standard may receive very different treatment in different countries. This often requires bilateral or multilateral trade agreements. But such trade deals have been long-lasting, and it is unclear whether the big patent powers, represented by the United States and Germany, are willing to abandon their long-held patent policies. Some data show that the annual increase of patent registration in China ranks first in the world at the present stage, and the number advantage of patent holding in developed countries is gradually weakened. We will gain the strength of dialogue with these countries on an equal footing in the near future. Do we need to plan ahead to adjust our current patent policy and establish an efficient patent protection system? In this case, when Chinese enterprises encounter high-intensity patent enforcement investigation abroad, they can find reciprocal retaliation at home. Reciprocal retaliation can also force these countries to put aside their positions and enter into bilateral trade agreements with us to achieve the goal of equal protection of the rights of those enforcing standards and the rights of standard patent holders.
【学位授予单位】:南京师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D923.42

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