隐名股东的概念及其地位分析

发布时间：2018-06-16 03:37

本文选题：隐名股东 + 名义股东　；参考：《西南政法大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：隐名股东,作为一种现实经济生活中颇为常见的投资方式,在我国市场经济发展和商事法律兴旺的今天,此种现象有增无减,由其引发的纠纷亦愈来愈多,传统的合同法、物权法和公司法已不足以对此进行规范和保护。隐名股东的概念及其地位问题,是解决隐名股东问题的基础和关键,而迄今为止,立法未对此问题作出明确的规定,学界亦无成型理论及学说,以至于实务界在面临此类法律纠纷时处于无法可据、无理可依的境地。《最高人民法院关于适用(中华人民共和国公司法)若干问题的规定(三)》(法释[2011]3号,以下简称解释(三))于2011年2月16日公布施行,其中有关“实际出资人”的条款亦应适用于隐名股东,可以作为隐名股东纠纷解决的依据,然而我们也意识到,《解释三》的出台并未对隐名股东问题进行根本上的解决,《解释三》的法律效果乃至社会效果有待进一步观察,同时,《解释三》本身亦存在不少漏洞,这在一定程度上影响了其效果的发挥。因此,对隐名股东问题的理论研究未因《解释三》的发布而走向终点,而是刚刚走到一个新起点。本文基于这一观点,在《解释三》颁布不久,归纳总结时下较为通行的理论及立法例,以“隐名股东的概念及其地位”为题撰写了此篇论文。全文共分四个部分对隐名股东的概念及其地位问题进行系统地分析和研究。本文第一部分：本部分首先从比较法学的角度出发,分析了隐名股东在不同法域国家中的存在,指出隐名股东这一投资模式并不符合各国的立法潮流,其他国家鲜有此立法例；分析隐名股东在我国的立法现状,指出隐名股东理论和立法上的缺失给实务界所带来的困扰；最后在列举和分析学界关于隐名股东各学说的基础上,界定本文所指称“隐名股东”的定义、特征及其类型。本文第二部分：本部分首先对隐名股东这一投资模式在经济生活中的纠纷形式进行列举,指出这一模式利益关系复杂,交易成本和风险较大。其后对隐名股东与其他关系人的法律关系进行深入剖析,明确各自的权利义务及其纠纷处理。本文第三部分：本部分主要在商法原则层面,对隐名股东这一投资模式进行价值分析。商事法的原则是商事立法的统率和指导,隐名股东模式在交易迅捷原则下,具有反效率性；在企业维持原则下,具有不稳定因素；在交易安全原则下,不利于对第三人的保护；而在私法自治原则下,为从商自由理念所允许和支持。本文第四部分：本部分首先对学界颇具影响的隐名股东立法理论——股权信托制度进行评论,指出我国引入该制度,并以此来规范隐名股东模式,保护有关当事人权益的可行性；其后对《解释三》相关法条进行评述,指出《解释三》在处理隐名股东问题上的进展与不足。
[Abstract]:Anonymous shareholders, as a very common way of investment in real economic life, in our country's market economy development and commercial law prosperity today, this phenomenon has been increasing, caused by more and more disputes, traditional contract law, Property law and company law are not enough to regulate and protect this. The concept and status of dormant shareholders is the basis and key to solve the problem of hidden shareholders. So far, the legislation has not made a clear provision on this issue, and there is no shaping theory or theory in academic circles. In the face of this kind of legal disputes, the practical circles are in a situation where they are unable to be substantiated and unreasonable to follow. < provisions of the Supreme people's Court on the Application of certain issues (Company Law of the people's Republic of China) (3) > (interpretation of the Law [2011] 3, The term "actual investor" shall also apply to dormant shareholders and may be used as the basis for resolving disputes between dormant shareholders. However, we also realize that the introduction of "explanation three" has not fundamentally solved the problem of hidden shareholders, and that the legal effect and even the social effect of the "explanation three" need to be further observed. At the same time, there are also many loopholes in the "explanation three" itself. To some extent, this affects its effect. Therefore, the theoretical study on hidden shareholders has not come to an end because of the release of explanation III, but has just reached a new starting point. Based on this point of view, this paper, shortly after the promulgation of explanation III, summarized the prevailing theories and legislative examples, and wrote this paper under the title of "the concept and status of Hidden shareholders". This paper is divided into four parts to analyze and study the concept and status of dormant shareholders. The first part of this article: from the perspective of comparative law, this part analyzes the existence of hidden shareholders in different jurisdictions, and points out that the investment mode of hidden shareholders does not accord with the legislative trend of other countries, and few other countries have such legislation. This paper analyzes the current legislative situation of dormant shareholders in China, and points out that the lack of the theory and legislation of dormant shareholders brings difficulties to the practice circle, and finally, on the basis of enumerating and analyzing the theories of hidden shareholders in academic circles, Define the definition, characteristics and types of "anonymous shareholders" referred to in this paper. The second part of this article: this part first enumerates the hidden shareholder, the investment mode in the economic life dispute form, points out this model interest relation is complex, the transaction cost and the risk is bigger. Then, the legal relationship between dormant shareholders and other related parties is deeply analyzed, and their rights and obligations and their disputes are clarified. The third part: this part mainly in the commercial law principle level, carries on the value analysis to the hidden shareholder this investment pattern. The principle of commercial law is the rule and guidance of commercial legislation, the hidden shareholder mode has the anti-efficiency under the principle of quick transaction, the unstable factor under the principle of enterprise maintenance, the protection of the third party under the principle of transaction security. Under the principle of autonomy of private law, it is permitted and supported by the concept of freedom of business. The fourth part of this paper: first of all, this part comments on the influential legislative theory of dormant shareholders in academic circles-equity trust system, and points out that the system is introduced in our country, and the model of dormant shareholders is regulated by this system. This paper discusses the feasibility of protecting the rights and interests of the parties concerned, and then comments on the relevant articles of law, and points out the progress and shortcomings of interpretation III in dealing with the problem of anonymous shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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