论政府实施部门PPP项目合同风险管理——基于不完全契约理论的分析
发布时间：2018-08-05 17:35
【摘要】：政府实施部门对PPP项目合同的风险管理应基于其不完全性特质。在不完全契约理论框架下,政府对PPP项目合同的风险管理应实现从被动监督到主动管理的转变,以解决信息不对称问题为核心,以动态协商和再缔约为基本工具,通过预期风险发生时再平衡政府和社会资本之间的利益责任分配,维持项目平稳有效运转。动态协商和再缔约的顺利达成以对合同要旨的理解合意和信息充分共享为条件。项目合同应对动态协商和再缔约机制事先约定,政府合同管理团队组建、风险管理介入时间确定、管理运行架构设计等,都应当以有效促成动态协商和再缔约为原则。
[Abstract]:The risk management of the PPP project contract should be based on its incompleteness. Under the framework of incomplete contract, the government should realize the transformation from passive supervision to active management to the risk management of PPP project contract, in order to solve the problem of information asymmetry as the core, and take dynamic negotiation and re contracting as the basic tool, through expectation. When the risk occurs, the responsibility allocation between the government and the social capital is rebalanced to maintain a smooth and effective operation of the project. Dynamic negotiation and the successful conclusion of the contracting parties are conditional on the understanding of the meaning of the contract and the full sharing of information. Risk management intervention time determination, management and operation framework design, etc., should be effective in facilitated dynamic negotiation and re contracting.
【作者单位】： 安徽省社会科学院法学研究所;四川省社会科学院社会科学研究杂志社;
【分类号】：D922.1
本文编号：2166500
[Abstract]:The risk management of the PPP project contract should be based on its incompleteness. Under the framework of incomplete contract, the government should realize the transformation from passive supervision to active management to the risk management of PPP project contract, in order to solve the problem of information asymmetry as the core, and take dynamic negotiation and re contracting as the basic tool, through expectation. When the risk occurs, the responsibility allocation between the government and the social capital is rebalanced to maintain a smooth and effective operation of the project. Dynamic negotiation and the successful conclusion of the contracting parties are conditional on the understanding of the meaning of the contract and the full sharing of information. Risk management intervention time determination, management and operation framework design, etc., should be effective in facilitated dynamic negotiation and re contracting.
【作者单位】： 安徽省社会科学院法学研究所;四川省社会科学院社会科学研究杂志社;
【分类号】：D922.1
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