农地征收中权力侵蚀的法律规制——以湖南省H市“地方政府—被征地农民”的博弈为例

发布时间：2018-08-05 17:27

【摘要】：在农地征收中,被征地农民与地方政府博弈形成了权力侵蚀现象,其生成机制在于地方政府与被征地农民围绕是否遵守法律政令而形成的共谋博弈。"第三方势力"和部分媒体参与地方政府和被征地农民之间的博弈,不但强化了共谋博弈,而且其自身也寻求演化为稳定的"博弈食利群体",从而形成由被征地农民、"第三方势力"等要抉地方政府及其官员甚至与之进行利益共谋的权力侵蚀现象。法律政令成为博弈工具的内在原因是其对土地权利多重功能的切割,将其简化为单一的金钱和物质补偿,而且补偿标准低;外在原因是地方治权的财权支持不足。规制权力侵蚀的法制之道在于建立普遍均等的公共服务确权制度和便捷的公共服务救济制度。
[Abstract]:In the farmland expropriation, the game between the land-expropriated farmers and the local government forms the phenomenon of power erosion, and its generating mechanism lies in the collusion game between the local government and the land-expropriated peasants around whether or not to abide by the laws and decrees. " The participation of third party forces "and some media in the game between local governments and land-expropriated peasants not only strengthens the collusion game, Moreover, it also seeks to evolve into a stable "game feeding interest group", thus forming the power erosion phenomenon in which local governments and their officials collude with land expropriated peasants and "third party forces". The inherent reason that law and order become game tool is that it cuts many functions of land rights, and simplifies it to single money and material compensation, and the compensation standard is low; the external reason is that the financial power of local governance is not supported enough. The legal system of regulating the erosion of power lies in the establishment of universal and equal system of confirming the right of public service and the convenient system of relief of public service.
【作者单位】：中南大学法学院;
【基金】：法治湖南建设与区域社会治理协同创新中心平台建设及国家自然科学基金(项目号:71671187、71171203)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D922.32

【相似文献】